

Presidential Elections

*Strategies of American
Electoral Politics*

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Strategies of American Electoral Politics

SECOND EDITION.

Nelson W. Polsby & Aaron B. Wildavsky

University of California Berkeley

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For Linda and Carol

Preface to the Second Edition

IN PREPARING the Second Edition of this book, we received a great deal of help—mostly intentional and direct and some hindrance—mostly unintentional and indirect. In both categories we place the candidacy of Barry Goldwater for the Presidency. The Goldwater nomination made the 1964 election the most peculiar election of modern times—and it forced us to rewrite the entire book. *The silver lining in this black cloud* was the fact that the Goldwater candidacy also gave us an opportunity to rethink our interpretation of Presidential elections from start to finish. We believe that on the whole what we said in early 1964 stands up well and we are able to affirm this in the light of a comprehensive consideration of the election of 1964. Our review of the literature has, however, led to certain changes of emphasis. Important recent research and the experience of 1964 have led us to give greater significance to the ideological commitments of party activists. Similarly, we have developed further our views on the reform of the Electoral College, reconsidered the significance of national conventions as decision-making bodies, and examined more closely alternative strategies that may be employed in choosing a Vice Presidential candidate.

Although for some years we taught on opposite sides of the continent, it was our good fortune to spend a year as neighbors while this book was being revised. In this connection, Nelson W

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Polsby wishes to thank the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences for its hospitality in 1965-66. Our manuscript received a most helpful editorial critique from Miriam Calliber of the Center and from Jean Zorn. Bryson Collins and Joan Warmbrunn prepared it for the publisher with care and efficiency. Robert P. vom Ligen worked devotedly on our revised and expanded Index.

Both of us have published preliminary thoughts on the 1964 election. Nelson W. Polsby "Strategic Considerations" in *The National Election of 1964* ed. Milton C. Cummings (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1966) and Aaron Wildavsky "The Goldwater Phenomenon: Purists, Politicians and the Two-Party System" *Review of Politics* 27 (July 1965) 386-413. We want to extend our thanks to the editors of both these publications and to the Institute of Governmental Studies at the University of California (Berkeley) for indispensable financial support that facilitated the research on the Goldwater phenomenon.

Finally, to our wives who warned that collaboration with either of us was impossible (and how would *they* know?) we rededicate this book.

NWP

ABW

June 1967
Middletown, Connecticut
Berkeley, California

Preface to the First Edition

THIS BOOK has had a long and for us a very happy gestation. Each of us has had over the last decade a chance to watch from a distance several Presidential elections; we have from time to time examined the scholarly literature on the subject, collected data on our own, and tried to think systematically about them independently of one another. In the winter of 1956-57, while we were graduate students at Yale, our collaboration began with an effort at disentangling the theoretical and practical implications of then current proposals for party reform. Since then we have repeatedly returned to American electoral politics in conversation and in our thoughts and writing. Despite considerable differences in the ways in which we express ourselves, and occasional differences in the emphases we would give to different events, we have been able to arrive at agreement on virtually all of the issues raised in this book. It is a totally collaborative effort in that we ourselves would have difficulty tracing the genesis or development of ideas contained here to one or the other of us.

Along the way we have incurred many intellectual debts separately and jointly. Some of our obligations are mentioned in the footnotes, but others of a more personal kind should be noted here. Nelson W. Polsby wants especially to thank Malcolm

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C Moos Harvey Wheeler and Ralph M Goldman who originally got him interested in Presidential election politics and who helped to guide his first preliminary researches into the decision making of the Democratic National Convention of 1952 Robert A Dahl stimulated an approach to political analysis that led to a paper describing the logic of national convention behavior This paper appeared as "Decision Making at the National Conventions" *Western Political Quarterly* 13 (September 1960) 609-619 Lewis A Froman Jr collaborated with him on a paper which served as forerunner and prototype of the treatment in this volume of the Electoral College He also received excellent assistance from Margaret MacGregor Spellman Carolyn Stoakes Sheila Jones and Martha Leiserson who typed several versions of our manuscript and from Bruce Franklin Paul D O'Brien John R Hanson Peter Fritts Charles L Zetterberg and Michael Austin who ran down footnotes read proof and performed other odious chores cheerfully and well Much of this work was made possible by a Ford Foundation Grant to Wesleyan University

Aaron Wildavsky wants to thank the students in his senior seminar at Oberlin College for their stimulating discussion and for the preparation of a series of papers on past national conventions He is grateful to the Eagleton Institute of Politics for a National Convention Fellowship which enabled him to study the behavior of the Ohio delegation at the 1960 Democratic Convention The results of this enterprise were published as "What Can I Do? Ohio Delegates View the Convention" in Paul Tillett ed *Inside Politics The National Conventions 1960* (Dobbs Ferry N Y 1962) While at the convention he benefited from conversations with James D Barber

Together we are grateful for the lasting inspiration and repeated encouragement of our teachers David H Truman and Allan P Sindler and for excellent critical readings of earlier versions of this work to Richard F Fenno Fred I Greenstein Lewis A Froman Jr H Douglas Price Milton C Cummings

Jr Michael Leiserson Duane Lockard Allan P Sndler, Herbert
E Alexander Elmer E Cornwell and Paul G Willis

It is customary for joint authors each to receive half the credit for their work, but to be blamed for all its errors In this instance as we are sure in so many the credit deserves to be even more widely dispersed We need hardly volunteer to our readers information about the sources of error

N W P

A.B W

July 1963

Washington D C

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Presidential Elections

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Electoral Politics*

Introduction

Political Strategies and Presidential Elections

THIS BOOK is about the winning of the Presidential office. In spite of the great and lonely eminence of the Presidency this office exists within a cultural and political tradition that guides and shapes the ways in which the Presidency is won and later the ways in which Presidential power is exercised. But we will not speak further here about the exercise of executive power. Rather the task before us is to make plain the context within which the battle for Presidential office is waged, to discuss the strategies of contending parties and, if possible, to explain why some strategies are used by some contestants and other strategies by others. In this way we hope to elucidate a significant area of our common political life.

Our thesis is a simple one. The strategies of participants in a Presidential election make sense once we understand the web of circumstances in which they operate. This principle applies to candidates and their managers, to delegates at nominating conventions, to party workers, and to voters. Strategies are courses of action consciously pursued toward well understood goals. Watching strategies shows how political leaders use the constraints and opportunities of their environment to achieve their goals.

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Both the political strategies of participants in Presidential elections and the circumstances that give rise to them are relatively stable persistent features of our political system. We have had a two party political system with the same two major parties for a little over a hundred years. Presidential nominees have been picked by national party conventions for an even longer period.¹ Presidential candidates have always been faced with such problems as deciding whether a greater or lesser emphasis on their party affiliation will help them gain more votes. Contemporary evidence that party preferences are not distributed evenly among the electorate helps explain for example why the strategy of recent Democratic candidates has been to place great stress on their party label while Republicans are normally inclined to minimize their connection with their party.

Political strategies that persist over a period of time are reasonably easy to identify even when they are colored by the distinctive styles and personalities of particular candidates. We hope therefore to achieve a level of discussion that goes beyond the special circumstances of 1968 or any other year and say something about American Presidential elections in general.

The study of politics has progressed to the point where political scientists can now make available such a discussion. In large measure an improved description and analysis is possible because of the efforts of dozens of scholars who have reported upon and investigated with ever increasing detail and accuracy the component parts of the American political system. The task of this book will be to synthesize these reports for the enlightenment and use of interested citizens. But we cannot forecast the outcome of any particular election and we have no desire to advise people how to vote.

In the first chapter we identify characteristics of the American political system which make up the strategic environment within which the pursuit of the Presidency takes place. Strategies are optional methods of pursuing one's goals under certain limiting conditions. The would be President must come to terms with

voters who enter each election period as complex bundles of already formed habits attitudes and loyalties The ways in which interest groups and parties activate these habits are largely out of the hands of any single participant in the process Another element, the rules by which votes are counted is also beyond any participant's control Finally we discuss the comparative availability to candidates of certain key resources such as money and control over information

The first chapter lays out a framework for much that follows in the second and third chapters The latter deal successively with the various steps of the nomination and election processes At this point in the book we discuss a variety of classic strategic "moves" such as entering or not entering primaries the candidacy of favorite sons the starting and stopping of bandwagons at national party conventions the selection of areas to campaign in and the selection of issues to emphasize In Chapters 2 and 3 we try to relate these moves to their necessary preconditions in terms of resources and also to relate them to their probable consequences

Chapter 4 deals with the election of 1964 in the light of the previous chapters Essentially we have to explain how the Republicans in 1964 came to nominate Senator Goldwater even though this was in the terms of our theory—and as the election outcome demonstrated—clearly a self defeating strategy

In the fifth chapter we discuss significant proposals for altering the strategic framework of Presidential elections—proposals for reform that would in some respects reconstitute the party system and redistribute resources among contestants for the Presidency Reform proposals are often debated rather abstractly on their presumed merits without being related to any concrete consequences We hope to provoke fresh insight on the subject of party reform by looking at these reforms in the light of the new distribution of benefits and handicaps which they propose to allocate to various participants in Presidential elections

Finally, in Chapter II we attempt to state in general terms

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what the ballot means in a political system like ours. Here we urge reconsideration of two stereotypes: one which insists that democracy cannot exist without strict majority rule, and another that suggests that public officials in our system receive many specific and meaningful policy directives from the electorate. We try to show that while our political system discourages both strict application of majority rule and mandates on specific policies, it is still meaningful to speak of our form of government as democratic, open and responsive—as well as flexible, tough, stable and resourceful.

Presidential elections are important to us as citizens. They determine who will guide our future. They also remind us of our heritage of political responsibility and freedom, a heritage which, in a troubled world, seems to us increasingly precious.

NOTES

1 See Paul T. David, Ralph M. Goldman, and Richard C. Bain, *The Politics of National Party Conventions* (Washington, 1960) for a lengthy treatment of the history of national party conventions.

Chapter 1

The Strategic Environment

ALL POLITICAL STRATEGIES are worked out within a framework of circumstances which are in part subject to manipulation but to even a greater degree are "given." Needless to say this fact of life also applies to the strategies of aspirants to the Presidency who must construct extremely complex plans of action within a context of hundreds of thousands of relevant circumstances most of which lie beyond their control. Some of these circumstances are contingent and relate to the strategies being pursued by other active participants in the election process and to the resources at their command. Other circumstances are more stable and have to do with features of the American political system that have persisted over time. These features provide advantages and handicaps differently to Democrats and Republicans to incumbent Presidents and challengers. It is these relatively persistent "givens" that we shall deal with in this chapter. We shall discuss the behavior of American voters and how the parties "reach" them; the party system and party finance; the rules for counting votes in the Electoral College; and the nature of political information. Our point of view in dealing with these elements of the political system will be to show how they shape the decisions of Presidential election strategists.

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VOTERS

Precisely what part does the voter play in American politics? This depends entirely on his interest and activity. Most people however are not interested in most public issues most of the time.¹ In our society it is apparently quite possible to live comfortably without being politically concerned. Political activity is costly. It eats up time and energy at an astounding rate. To be informed on strategic problems in nuclear politics or on the operations of a municipal electric plant is not a matter of a few moments of reflection; many hours must be spent. One must ordinarily attend meetings, listen to or participate in discussion, write letters, attempt to persuade or be persuaded by others, and engage in other time-consuming labor. This means foregoing other activities like devoting extra time to the job, playing with the children, and watching TV. But so far as we can tell these other activities rather than public affairs are the primary concerns of most people, and the costs of participation in public affairs appear for most people to be greater than the returns. Only a few people receive financial rewards or hold jobs or are acclaimed in the public arena—considerations which might lead them to devote the time and effort required to participate. It is only in regard to a few issues at best that most citizens find it worthwhile to participate in politics compared to other sectors of life.

Even so, there are a few people who are continuously interested in a wide variety of issues. These are usually public officials, interest group leaders, newspaper editors, and academics—all people whose occupations require their interest. There are a larger number who have specialized interests in specific policy areas. These may include public and private officials, members of civic organizations and interest groups, citizens who are directly affected, and a sprinkling of others who make a hobby of being interested, including seekers after causes and people who like to get their names on letterheads.

The fact that individuals do vary enormously in their degree of interest has profound implications for political life. For interest is a necessary condition of influence. The interested tend to go to meetings where public affairs are discussed and decided. They tend to belong to political parties and to work in various ways to help the party of their choice. They cultivate their access to public officials. They tend to care more about the outcomes of public policies and to communicate their concerns to decision makers. And so they become more influential.

Differences in interest also influence voting behavior. People who are interested in politics tend to vote and those who are disinterested tend not to vote.² Who are in these two groups? In general the better educated people are more active and interested in public affairs. They also tend to be people who are better off financially.³ This is of course also the population from which the Republican party draws disproportionate support which consequently gives a substantial advantage to the Republican party among voters who tend to turn out most reliably for Presidential elections. On the other hand the low turnout groups (normally Democratic) tend to be numerically greater than the high turnout groups. Furthermore traditionally Democratic groups may be clustered in such a way as to maximize their strength in Presidential elections by being located in areas which are favored by the Electoral College system of vote counting. We shall return to this topic later.

How do voters make up their minds whom to support? By far the majority of people vote according to their habitual party affiliation.⁴ In other words most people will have made up their minds how to vote in 1968 before the candidates are chosen because they always support a particular party. These party regulars are likely to be more interested and active in politics and have more political knowledge than the "independents."⁵ But they rarely change their minds. They tend to listen to their own side of political arguments and to agree with the policies espoused by their party. They even go so far as to "block-out

information which they perceive to be unfavorable to the party of their choice.⁶

If party is so important in giving a structure to a voter's picture of reality and in helping him choose a Presidential candidate to vote for before the candidate is even nominated we had best inquire where people get their party affiliations from. There seems to be no simple answer to this. The party affiliations of most voters seem to be governed by a number of forces. An individual lives in a social context and inherits a social identity from his parents that contains a political component. People are Democrats or Republicans in part because their families and the other people they interact with are Democrats or Republicans.⁷ Most individuals come into close contact only with people who are predominantly one or the other.⁸ And just as people tend to share characteristics with their friends and families such as income and educational level, religious affiliation, area of residence, and so on, they also tend to share party loyalties with them too.⁹

Now of course we all know of instances where people do not share various status giving characteristics with their parents and at least some of their friends, and so it should come as no surprise that sometimes children do not share the politics of their parents. In fact, political differences tend to run together with the other kinds of differences as well. But by and large voters retain the party loyalties of the primary groups of which they are a part.

The result of this process is to give each of the major political parties reservoirs of voting strength they can count on from year to year. Republicans traditionally do well in the small towns and rural areas of New England, the Middle Atlantic states, and the Middle West. They draw their support from people who are richer, better educated, occupy managerial or professional positions or run small businesses, tend to live in or to move into the well-to-do suburban areas, and are predominantly Protestant. Democrats draw great support from the large cities outside of the South and the rural areas in the South. Poorer people wage

earnings union members Catholics Negroes Jews and the new (that is since 1900) immigrant populations of Irish and Polish ethnic origins—all contribute disproportionately to the Democratic vote¹⁰

One may ask, how did these particular groups come to have these particular loyalties? We must turn to history to find answers to this question. Enough is known about a few groups to make it possible to speculate about what kinds of historical events tend to align groups with a political party.

Let us take a few examples. We all know about the "Solid South" which ever since the Civil War has been predominantly Democratic in its Presidential voting. To this day resentment against the harsh Reconstruction period under the leadership of the Republican party is reflected in the election returns. Less well known is the fact that the South was not unanimous in its enthusiasm for the Civil War or in its resentment of Reconstruction. In many states of the old South there were two kinds of farms: plantations on the flat land that grew cash crops, used slaves and in general, before the Civil War prospered; and subsistence farms in the uplands that had a few or no slaves and in general were run by poorer white people. This latter group formed the historical core of mountain Republicanism that still can be discovered in Presidential elections today in western Virginia and North Carolina, eastern Tennessee and Kentucky, and south eastern West Virginia.¹¹

The voting habits of Negroes where they have voted have been shaped by several traumas. The Civil War freed them and made them Republicans. The Counter Reconstruction disenfranchised them and the industrial revolution brought them North where a crushing burden of economic destitution was added to racial discrimination. The differing effects of the Great Depression of 1929 on Negro voters in the North brought them into the New Deal coalition and the Northern Negro has remained Democratic ever since.¹²

II for some people the historical events of the Civil War

and the Depression shaped their political heritage for others the critical forces seem less traumatic and more diffuse. It is possible perhaps to see why the poor become Democrats since the Democratic party has in recent years been so welfare minded but why do the rich lean toward the Republicans? Perhaps in part this is a reaction to the redistributive aspirations of some New Deal programs and the inclination of Democratic Presidents to expand the role of government in the economy. But in all probability it is also a response to the record of the Congressional wing of the Republican party which so thoroughly dominated the post Civil War era of industrial expansion. In this era Republican policies vigorously encouraged risk taking by private business men granted them Federal aid in a variety of forms, and withheld Federal regulation from private enterprise.

Sometimes party affiliation coincides with ethnic identification because of the political and social circumstances surrounding the entry of ethnic groups into the country. In southern New England politics was dominated by the Republican party and by "Yankees" of substance and high status during the decades following the Civil War. During these decades thousands of Irish people streamed into this area. The Democratic party welcomed them the Republicans did not. Soon the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote began to increase and Irish politicians took over the Democratic party.¹³

In the Middle West, events such as the American involvement in two wars against Germany under Democratic auspices seem to have shaped the political preferences of Americans of German descent.¹⁴

Specific candidates of special attractiveness may under certain circumstances sway voters to leave the party of their choice. The extraordinary elections of President Eisenhower are a recent example of this. His appeal to Democrats was quite amazing. But this was possible partially because these Democrats did not perceive President Eisenhower as a partisan figure and so it is not surprising that his personal popularity did not greatly aid

other Republicans who ran with him or the Republican party, once he no longer headed the ticket ¹⁵

Most of the time *issues* have much the same sporadic and peripheral effect as candidates. Let us see why. We can say to begin with that at least three preconditions must be satisfied for a voter's opinion about an issue to change his vote ¹⁶ First a voter must know about the issue second he must care about it at least a little and third he must be able to distinguish the positions of the parties and their candidates on the issue. Data from public opinion polls tell us that most people are not well informed about the content of issues most of the time ¹⁷ All but major public issues are thus eliminated for most people. And even these major issues may enter the consciousness of most people in only the most rudimentary way.

It makes a difference whether a person has a weak preference on an issue or whether he breathes fire when the subject is mentioned. The number who care even a little is substantially less than those who know about issues.

Once a voter has some grasp of the content of a public policy and learns to prefer one outcome rather than another he must also find public leaders to espouse his point of view. Finding differences on policy issues between parties is not always easy. Party statements on policy may be vague because leaders have not decided what to do. They may deliberately obfuscate an issue for fear of alienating interested publics. They may try to hold divergent factions in their parties together by glossing over as best they can disagreements on many specific issues. Even when real party differences on policy exist many voters may not be aware of them. The subject may be rather esoteric to the common understanding or the time required to master the subject may be more than most people are willing to spend. By the time we get down to those who know *and* care *and* can discriminate between party positions on issues we usually have a small proportion of the electorate rarely larger than 30 per cent ¹⁸ What can we say about these people?

The most obvious characteristic they share is interest in and concern about issues and party positions. But these are precisely the people who are most likely to be strong party identifiers—men and women who are characterized by a deep devotion to party which makes it most unlikely that they will shift allegiance just because of a disagreement on one or two issues.¹¹ The number of issue-oriented “independents” who are left must be very small. And it is not unlikely that these people are distributed about equally on both sides of major policy questions so that the total number of votes changed by the impact of any specific issue is bound to be minute.

We still have some preconditions to satisfy, however, before even these changes can be accepted as certain. One is that there must not be other issues which are also highly salient to voters and which work the other way. For if voters were willing to change their votes on one particular issue, why should they not switch their support back because of another? There are usually many issues in a campaign, only if all or most of the issues pointed voters in the same direction would they be likely to switch their votes. But what is the likelihood that parties will arrange their policies along a broad front so as to force large numbers of “independent” voters from or into the fold? It is low—but not impossible. In 1964 the Republicans may have done so. We will examine this question in detail in Chapter 4.

Although it is true that the less knowledge a person has about public affairs, the more likely he is to vote for a candidate of the opposite party, it is important to distinguish between those who only have a little knowledge and those who have none at all. For the man utterly without any contact with the political world, except at the polls, has no reason whatsoever to change his customary party vote. Thus changes in vote from one party to another are likely to be concentrated among those who receive a little but not a great deal of information about parties, issues, and candidates.¹²

A recent study seeks to demonstrate that there is considerable issue content in the citizen's behavior at the polls by showing that those who change party from one election to the next are generally sympathetic to some key policies of their new party. The standpatters on the other hand generally are in sympathy with major policies of their party.²¹ Whether the citizen is taught what to believe by his party or finds a party in accordance with his beliefs cannot be determined from evidence presently available.

We can now see that a strong issue orientation is likely to guide voting decisions under some circumstances. One set of circumstances occurs when one issue becomes so intensely important that the voter is willing to lay aside his party preferences and his preferences on other issues. An unpopular war, severe economic deprivation (whether or not it is related to governmental policies), a fixation on a subject like keeping water free of fluoride have at times led to the required intense feeling. The pocketbook nerve seems especially sensitive.²² Another possibility occurs when a party is seen to change across the spectrum of policies or the voter himself undergoes such a broad scale change of heart. Finally in a historical sense we can say that issues may have a lasting impact on voting behavior through the ways in which they shape the party affiliations of whole generations of voters. But few issues have the power to do this and unless they occur under obviously dramatic circumstances they are hard to identify except long after the fact.

This picture of the relation between voters and issues is somewhat unreal in any case. For as far as we are able to tell voters adopt most of their issue orientations at the instigation of the parties. Strong party identifiers are more likely to learn more about issues and to care more about them in part precisely because it reinforces their party identification.²³ This means that there are few issues that are not made by parties and political leaders and hence few party identifiers are lost as a result of the policies adopted by the party of their choice.

Merely to list the functions which party identification performs for the voter—reducing his costs of acquiring political information telling him what side he is on organizing his information ordering his preferences letting him know what is of prime importance—is to suggest the profound importance of parties in the voter's mind. Politics is amazingly complex: there are scores of possible issues a myriad of relevant political personalities and often many choices to be made on Election Day. The voter who follows his party identification however can vastly simplify the choices he must make and thus reduce to manageable proportions the amount of time he spends on public affairs. He need only follow his party's nomination to arrive at a voting decision. When issues arise the voter with strong party identification need not puzzle over every one. He can instead listen to the pronouncements of his party leaders who inform him about what issues are important what information is most relevant to these issues and what position he ought to take. Of course, the citizen with greater interest in public affairs will want to investigate a few matters for himself. Even so his party identification provides him with important guides for the many other matters on which he cannot possibly be well informed. Indeed all of us including full time participants like the President have to find ways to cut information costs on some matters.²⁴ For most people who vote their identification with one of the two major political parties performs that indispensable function.

If parties and their leaders make the issues and give them meaning for most people then fundamental changes in party allegiance among large numbers of people are not likely to arise from their reasoned look at issues. A depression a civil war events felt immediately and personally by millions have precipitated the great changes in party allegiances not debates on the merits of this or that comparatively minor matter. The sheer brute impact of great events does more to change votes over the long run than any single policy problem.

INTEREST GROUPS AND VOTING BLOCS

Interest groups are collections of people who are similarly situated with respect to one or more policies of government and who organize to do something about it. The interest groups most significant for elections in our society are those having the following characteristics:

- 1) they have a mass base that is composed of many members
- 2) they are concentrated geographically rather than dispersed thinly over the entire map
- 3) they represent major resource investments of members—such as in the case of the *producers* of bicycles whose entire livelihoods are tied up in the group involved as against the *consumers* of bicycles for whom investment in a bicycle is not anywhere near as important
- 4) they involve those characteristics of people which give them status in society—such as their race and ethnicity

Interest groups may be more or less organized and more or less vigilant and alert on policy matters that concern or ought to concern them. They are not necessarily organized in ways that make them politically effective. Very often the paid lobbyists of interest groups spend more time trying unsuccessfully to alert their own members to the implications of government policies than they spend lobbying with politicians.²⁵

In American politics interest group activity is lively and ubiquitous even when it is not particularly effective or meaningful in terms of policy outcomes. We shall be concerned with interest groups in three ways. First we must recognize that membership in these groups may be quite important in giving voters a sense of affiliation and political position. In this respect interest groups act much the way parties do, helping to fill in the voter's map of the world with preferences, priorities, and facts. Secondly, interest groups are important with respect to their

partisan political activities they may actively recruit supporters for candidates and aid materially in campaigns. Thirdly interest groups may influence party policy by making demands with respect to issues in return for their own mobilized support.

The extent to which interest groups can "deliver" the votes of their members however is always problematic to a great extent interest group leaders are the prisoners of past alliances their group has made. Even so the Negro vote the farm vote the labor vote and many other "votes" are bandied about as though they were political commodities which could be manipulated easily in behalf of one or another candidate for public office. So long as the use of election statistics and opinion polls was in its infancy claims to guarantee support or threaten to withdraw it could be accepted or rejected on intuitive grounds where no man could claim much greater competence than another. The appearance of voting studies and the development of the arts of statistical manipulation have created new opportunities for the purveyors of bloc votes and new difficulties for the interested but necessarily amateur citizen and public official. How are they to evaluate these important political claims backed up by impressive and complicated arrays of data?

The usual argument is that if one or another candidate captures the allegiance of a particular bloc that bloc's pivotal position in a state or large population will enable the fortunate aspirant to capture all of the electoral votes and thus win the election. It is incorrect to speak of any one combination of states totalling more than a majority of electoral votes as in any sense more critical valuable or pivotal than any other such combination. In a fairly close election the defection of any number of combinations of states to the other side would spell the difference between victory or defeat.

An important point to remember is that appeals to various groups are necessarily conditioned by time place and circumstance. There is little doubt that under *some* conditions during

some elections *some* social characteristics of voters and candidates may have *some* relevance to the polling results. Finding the conditions under which specified social characteristics become relevant to voter choice is most difficult. The problem cannot be solved by slogans advertising the alleged potency of this or that group at the polls. We know that in a competitive political system various participants (parties interest groups leaders) put forward candidates and issues designed to capture the allegiance of various groups of people. Rarely is it possible to appeal to one group and one group alone not only because there are so many different groups with all sorts of conceptions of policy but also because each individual may have many social characteristics which are potentially relevant to his voting decision. While some men may be so single minded that they have only one interest that is important in determining their vote—color religion, ethnic background income—most of us have multiple interests which sometimes conflict. Much depends on the movement of events which may bring one or another interest to the forefront of the voter's consciousness and incline him toward the candidate he believes best represents his preferences on that matter.²⁶ In addition the appeals which were relevant at the turn of the century have slowly lost their effectiveness and have given way to a period when national economic and foreign policy issues or matters of style of living in the suburbs have assumed primary importance to many children of immigrant parents. Long term social trends as well as the strategies of candidates have much to do with the impact of appeals to bloc votes.

In this context we can appraise the impact of John F. Kennedy's appeal to his fellow Catholics in the 1960 election.²⁷ Let us distinguish between two kinds of claims. One is the minimal claim that Kennedy's Catholicism helped him more than it hurt him in the election. This is correct. And it is largely correct because Catholics are disproportionately located in areas where they could contribute to Kennedy's majorities in states

with large electoral votes." If the claim is expanded to state however that something called the "Catholic vote" was the single factor which gained Kennedy's victory, then it is incorrect.

Two hard facts stand out from the welter of imponderables in the 1960 Presidential election: (1) there was probably a Catholic vote of some magnitude; (2) the increase in the votes of Catholics as compared to 1956 was not sufficient in and of itself to ensure Kennedy's victory. He also needed increases in the Democratic votes of Negroes, Jews, and other groups.

Both poll and electoral data strongly suggest that there was both a Catholic vote and an anti-Catholic vote in the 1960 election. According to the Gallup poll, the percentage of Catholics supporting the Democratic candidate rose from 51% in 1956 to 78% in 1960. Moreover, 62% of the Catholics who voted for Eisenhower in 1956 actually voted for Kennedy in 1960, while only 3% of the Catholics who voted for Stevenson in 1956 switched to Nixon in 1960. Although we do not know how many of the Catholics who voted for Eisenhower and Kennedy would also have voted for a Protestant Democrat in 1960, it seems safe to assume that by no means all would have done so. The presumption that there was a Catholic vote is further strengthened by the 1960 election returns which show that there is a high and positive correlation between the percentage of Catholics in a state and the percentage gun for the Democratic party over 1956. While part of these results may be accounted for by other demographic variables such as urbanization, it appears unlikely that this conclusion about the Catholic vote will be shaken.

These figures, it must be said, do not necessarily validate the claim that Catholics had been moving from the Democratic party and that the presence of a Catholic candidate brought them back into the fold. Another Gallup poll shows that 75% of the Catholics who voted in the 1958 Congressional election supported Democratic candidates, a total just three percentage points less than Kennedy received in 1960. It is possible therefore that the



relatively low vote of Catholics for Adlai Stevenson represents a switch to the magical name of Eisenhower rather than a desertion of the Democratic party

Unfortunately we are not in a position to say whether or not Kennedy lost a considerable number of votes from Protestants Gallup tells us that Kennedy received 38% of the votes by Protestants while Stevenson received only 37% in 1956 But we know from other surveys that Stevenson's overall personal popularity in 1956 lost ground from 1952 In addition he faced the handicap of running against the extraordinarily popular incumbent President Eisenhower Any Democratic candidate in 1960 was expected to do better than Stevenson did in 1956 Since we are not permitted the luxury of running a laboratory test in which a Protestant Democrat runs against Nixon there appears to be no certain way of determining how many Nixon voters who are Protestant would have gone Democratic if Kennedy had not been on the ballot The closest thing to such a test is a study done by the Simulmatics Corporation which predicted electoral outcomes from survey data on voting intentions carefully broken down into the characteristics of voters The analysis concluded that

The religious issue cut both ways Not only did some Protestants reject Kennedy but also some Catholic Republicans swung to him The shift of one in ten American voters on religious grounds cost Kennedy one and a half million votes or 2.3% of the total vote But while Kennedy lost in the popular vote he gained in electoral votes on the religious issue The best fit simulation indicates that Kennedy achieved a net gain of 22 electoral votes because of the religious issue The bunching of the Catholic shift in large closely fought industrial states and the location of much of the Protestant shift in "safe" Southern states gave Kennedy this net advantage despite a popular vote disadvantage By our calculations Kennedy lost by the religious issue the following states he otherwise would have won Kentucky (10) Tennessee (11) Florida (10) Oklahoma (8) Montana (4) Idaho (4) Utah (4) California (32) Oregon (6) Virginia (12) and

Washington (9) He won the following states he would otherwise have lost Connecticut (8) New York (45) New Jersey (16) Pennsylvania (32) Illinois (27) and New Mexico (4) ²⁹

A study has also been made which shows that Democratic candidates for Congress in Wisconsin suffered defeat in close districts probably because of Protestant defection due to Kennedy's candidacy ³⁰ Finally a plausible guess has been made by the Michigan Survey Research Center It estimated what the "normal" votes of Catholics and Protestants for Democratic Presidential candidates would be Then calculating the 1960 divergence from this hypothetical "normal" pattern, they concluded that Kennedy was shy about 2.2% of the two party vote a large proportion of the defections coming from the South ³¹ On balance it appears that Kennedy was hurt somewhat in the Southern and Border states and perhaps in the Midwest and Mountain states as well but he more than made up for it in the Northern and Midwest industrial states whose electoral votes were far larger

In terms of popular votes Kennedy received 49.7% to Nixon's 49.6% out of a total vote of 68,832,670 a hair breadth margin if there ever was one The exceedingly close popular and Electoral College vote makes it unlikely that increased votes by Catholic voters alone could have been sufficient to give Kennedy victory Virtually any group—Jews or Negroes for example—could claim that a shift of their few thousand votes in a few critical states made the difference between victory and defeat ³²

Two brief examples may be cited to support this conclusion Illinois and Texas together account for 51 electoral votes Out of the approximately 4.7 million votes cast in Illinois Kennedy's margin of victory was 8,858 Where a shift of 4,500 votes by any group would have been enough to spell the difference, it would not be difficult to find any number of groups which could be considered necessary for the victory Gallup reports that on a national basis the votes of Jews increased from 75% to 81% Democratic over 1956 and the votes of Negroes from 61% to 68%

Evidently Kennedy needed the additional votes from the Jews and the Negroes who live in Illinois in order to have won there. In Texas Kennedy's margin was 46,233 out of 2.3 million votes cast. There could easily have been a shift by as many as 25,000 Texas Negro voters toward Kennedy.³

What then do the 1960 election returns have to teach us about the requirements for future non-incumbent Democratic Presidential candidates? If a candidate wants to get elected President on the Democratic ticket he had better get many more votes from Catholics, Jews, Negroes and other groups traditionally providing support for his party than was the case in 1956. If the best he can do is to get 38% of Protestant voters he had better look for exceedingly strong support from other groups. Common sense suggests that if a candidate can increase his support among Protestants he need not be so dependent upon other groups. As a postscript to Kennedy's victory we might add that it is also advisable to be personally attractive, energetic, photogenic, wealthy, skilful, determined and to run against Richard Nixon rather than Dwight Eisenhower.

¹ The picture of voters and interest groups we have drawn thus far can be generalized. Presidential elections and election campaigns are events which activate the personal loyalties of voters. The amount of new information about candidates or issues which citizens need in order to participate at the minimal level of voting or in order to hold casual conversations about the election is slight because the political component of their personal identities is reasonably stable and familiar to them. Party loyalty and membership in interest groups provides a short cut to voter preferences and minimizes the costs of getting information about the specifics of the issues and candidates in any particular election year.

Interest groups are intermediary agencies that help voters to identify their political preferences quickly. They perform this function in two ways: by actively soliciting their members' interest in behalf of specific candidates and parties and more

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importantly by providing still another anchor in the voters identity. This helps the voter fix his own position quickly and economically in what otherwise would be a confusing and contradictory political environment.

PARTIES

A third aspect of the social framework which will help us to account for the strategies of participants in Presidential elections is the nature of political parties in this country. These can best be explained as organizations devoted to maintaining or increasing their own opportunities to exercise political power.

By political power we mean the ability to make decisions or to influence the making of decisions of government. Instrumental to this goal is the achievement of access³⁴ to those offices and officials legally entitled to make governmental decisions. Access in turn depends in part upon ones participation in staffing the government either by selecting officials to fill appointive offices (patronage) or by significantly influencing the nomination and election of elected officials. Since elected officials are usually empowered to select appointed officials, access to them is often instrumental to the dispensation of patronage. There are, of course, numerous ways of gaining access to public officials, but the original selection of these officials is the primary avenue of access used by political parties.³⁵

At each level of government the elected chief executive (Mayor, Governor, President) generally has the most political power, and as a result the party organizations depend more upon controlling these offices than on any other source for their political power. In addition, parties are accountable for the activities of chief executives elected under their endorsement. Accountability means that when the party endorses a man, it designates him as its agent before the electorate. The fortunes of the party depend on the success of party candidates. Candidates come and go, but parties and electorates remain. The party

the party's elected officeholders for a variety of reasons. Many elected officials see their party leaders as potential threats to their positions; many party leaders see the officeholders as ungrateful louts with whom the organization is unfortunately saddled.

Even so, what party leaders ordinarily care about most is getting their men into office and keeping them there. Other considerations are usually secondary. Party leaders are neither for nor against policies in the abstract; they are concerned with policies as means to the ends of officeholding. If new policies help win elections, they are for them; if they help lose elections, they are against them.

Though party leaders try to espouse policies which they believe will enhance their political power and try to avoid very unpopular points of view, this does not mean that they are necessarily indifferent to the substance of policy questions. Because they are more interested and active than most citizens, they also tend to care more about the policies with which they have to deal. In fact, some politicians who hold public office make a specialty of being policy-oriented. At times they may deliberately incur some unpopularity in order to serve their policy preferences, although they are unlikely to go so far as to knowingly lose the election for which they are a candidate. The experience of the 1964 election, which we take up at length in Chapter 4, provides an extreme case which is instructive in this connection. But in general, party leaders regard policy to a certain extent as a result of an interaction among legitimate political demands—as a bargainable product—and not as a set of logical or ideological imperatives.³⁶

Political parties in America are not organizations with elaborate procedures of membership, dues, and formal organizational structure. They are constituted differently in different localities and exist primarily to make nominations for and elect candidates to a variety of state and local elective offices. They are regulated by state law and are often quite cohesive up to the state level.

disproportionately located in specific geographic areas and who demand separate recognition. State organizations therefore become infused with the purposes of groups of citizens who use their state parties for the recognition and enhancement of their separate identities and needs. Italians in Rhode Island, Jews and Negroes in New York, Germans in Wisconsin, wheat growers in Kansas, and many others make the idea of a decentralized party system a living reality.³⁹ The state parties are composed of different personnel with somewhat different interests to protect and demands to make. Control over these organizations must be exercised from within each state since the various states do not control one another and the national party cannot exercise this control. Thus we take it is the very essence of what is meant by a decentralized party system in which power is dispersed among many independent state bodies.

Thus our national parties are coalitions of state parties which meet every four years for the purpose of finding a man and forging a coalition of interests sufficiently broad to win a majority of electoral votes. This means bringing into the coalition state parties and party factions—Southern and Northern Democrats, coastal and Midwestern Republicans—who disagree on some major policy issues. As a result it is necessary to compromise and sometimes to evade issues which would split the parties and lead to drastic losses of support. A man and a set of policies, however loosely joined, must be found that can blend disparate party elements for the purpose of securing electoral victory.

The major parties, as we have seen, cull their electoral support from somewhat different groups in the population. But no party has a monopoly of support from any of these groups; each party draws significant and often indispensable support from almost all the categories.⁴⁰ How could Republicans hope to win without some support from wage earners or Democrats without some votes from business and professional people? The parties are sufficiently variegated to draw support from many

not only why the parties sometimes blur and avoid commitments on issues but also why they often commit themselves to policies more than their interest in acquiring or retaining office would appear to require

Part of the answer may arise from the fact that the parties serve slightly different functions for their own activists than for people who vote but are otherwise largely disengaged from politics. Party activists are people who are much more interested in politics and attentive to political issues than the general population is. The interest and attentiveness of political activists leads them to formulate and elaborate political opinions and preferences. Their desires to make these preferences internally consistent and consistent with the preferences of the party of their choice and the mutual reinforcement of activist opinions when activists interact with one another would certainly lead to demands upon the party leadership for policy positions which are reasonably clear and forthright.⁴¹

There are notable differences between the parties in the social identities of party activists. Activist Democrats are far more likely to come from working class backgrounds; activist Republicans on the other hand are disproportionately middle class. These differences may be reflected in the noticeable tendencies for the two parties to support policies intended to benefit the members of the social strata from which their active members are drawn.⁴²

The interest groups most closely allied with each party also make policy demands upon them which must be met to some extent. While it is true that voters are generally disinterested in specific policies, interest group leaders and their paid bureaucracies are manifestly concerned. If they feel that the interests they represent are being harmed, they may inform their members or even go so far as to withdraw support from the party at a particular election. Should voters find that groups with which they identify are opposed to the party with which they identify, they may temporarily support the opposition party or they may

withdraw from participation and not vote at all. Consequently, the party finds that it risks losing elections by ignoring the demands of interest groups. Since the demands of many of these groups conflict, however, the parties have no choice but to mediate among them, hoping to strike compromises which, though they give no one group everything, give something to as many groups as they can.

Finally, throughout the years the opposing political parties have become identified with somewhat different policies. When new candidates arise they may bring with them somewhat new policy preferences. But there are bound to be many areas of policy on which they are not informed or do not have strong preferences. In such cases the existing set of policies traditionally associated with the parties provides the candidates with a useful economizing device. They can accept the going positions and concentrate on the policies which they may wish to revise, supplant, or present anew. This tack is bound to be popular with the party faithful who have been brought up on the rallying cries of the past, who have learned to prefer what their party prefers, and who respond with vigor and enthusiasm to the cues provided by mention of their party's chief stocks in trade. Just as voters commonly use parties as a means of cutting their information costs on issues, and candidates and activists use them as reference groups, so may candidates use the parties' traditional policy positions to ease their burden of calculation.

THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE

Another element of the strategic environment within which the drama of a Presidential election is played is that peculiarly American institution, the Electoral College. American Presidential elections are not decided by popular vote, but rather the popular votes are collected within each state, and each state casts all of its electoral votes for the candidate receiving the most popular votes within the state. Thus "winner take all, loser take

ment of the Presidential election—money control over information and the Presidential office—in order to see what effects they have on election strategies

Money

Presidential campaigns are terribly expensive. Radio and television appearances, newspaper advertising, travel for the candidate and his entourage, mailings of campaign material, buttons and placards, maintaining a network of offices to run the campaign, taking polls—all cost a great deal of money. It is estimated that the various committees (the Republican and Democratic national committees, the House and Senate campaign committees of both parties, and various *ad hoc* volunteer committees that spring up in each campaign) at the national level spent approximately \$25 million in 1960 and over \$29 million in 1961.⁴³ There is no sign that costs are decreasing. And substantial sums were also spent by state and local organizations in behalf of the Presidential candidates. Total political costs for all candidates at all levels of government amounted to something like \$140 million in 1952, \$155 million in 1956, an estimated \$175 million in 1960, and approximately \$200 million in 1961.⁴⁴ The huge costs involved inevitably raise serious questions about the relationship between wealth and decisions in a democracy. Are Presidential nominating and electoral contests determined by those who have the most money? Do those who make large contributions exercise substantial or undue influence as a result of their largesse? Is the victorious candidate under obligation to "pay off" his major financial contributors? Do those who pay the piper call the tune?

First let us establish some basic facts. Republicans do spend more than Democrats in most places, but the difference is not as overwhelming as some would suppose. The Democratic percentage of total party expenditures from 1932 to 1961 has varied from a low of 57% in 1940 (when Roosevelt won) to a high of 63% in 1960 (when Kennedy won).⁴⁵ Although the Johnson forces spent more money in 1961 than Kennedy's had in 1960 (the

Democrats in 1964 managed to spend \$12 million) C. "Water forces spent \$17.2 million significantly more than Johnson's"⁴⁸ Thus total expenditures of both parties are high in absolute terms but outlays per voter per party are quite modest running in the 1960 election to about 16 cents for each of the 68.83 million voters⁴⁹ "Contrary to frequent assertion" says an author who has made a comprehensive study of party finance "American campaign monies are not supplied solely by a small handful of fat cats. Many millions of people now give to politics. Even those who give several hundred dollars each number in the tens of thousands."⁵⁰

Since 1956 roughly 10% of the population has been contributing in Presidential election years. Data from the Survey Research Center show that 10% of a national population sample said they had contributed in 1956, 12% in 1960 and 11% in 1964. Translating these numbers into individuals we find that 8 million people in 1956, 10 million in 1960 and 12 million in 1964 contributed in political campaigns.⁵¹ It remains true however that the bulk of the money to run campaigns comes from people who contribute over \$100. For the years before 1956 two thirds of the campaign war chests at the national level were made up of contributions of over \$500 and an additional one fifth came from contributions of over \$100. At the local level where approximately six sevenths of election expenses are met the proportion of gifts over \$500 declines to one half or one third. The figures on contributors for 1952 will perhaps give some idea of the numbers. Around 3 million people made some contribution. At least one gift of \$100 was made by 150,000 contributors, \$500 by 20,000 of these people and \$10,000 or more was given by 200 of these individuals.⁵²

The most obvious and most important conclusion in our view is that money does not buy election victories. The candidates and party with the most money do not always win. Otherwise Republicans would have won every election in the last thirty years and we know in fact that the Democrats have won with the sole

exception of the two terms of Dwight Eisenhower. Nor does there seem to be a correlation between the amount of money spent and the extent of electoral victory in national elections.⁵³ This is the more surprising because one would expect that money would flow into the coffers of the party which was believed to have the best chance of victory. There does not seem to be a single Presidential election in this century which any competent observer believes would have turned out differently if the losing candidate had spent more money than the winner. We can at once eliminate all the Democratic victories because the Democrats spent less than the Republican losers. Dwight Eisenhower was so popular that his two elections now seem to have been certain whether he had a substantial campaign surplus or not. No doubt part of the reason he had as much money to run with as he did was his personal appeal to the people who contribute to campaigns and they might well have given to him even if he had run as a Democrat. The Republicans who won in the period from 1900 to 1928 did so with substantial majorities as befits the party which then enjoyed the allegiance of a preponderant part of the voting citizenry. The problem then is not to explain why money is crucial but on the contrary to explain why it is not.

No one doubts that money is important: parties and candidates not to speak of ordinary mortals can hardly function without it. If a candidate could not raise any money or only a pitifully small amount he would be dreadfully handicapped and might not be able to run at all. But this situation has never arisen after the national convention has made its choice. The crucial question is not the total spent by each candidate but the *difference* in the amounts they spend. The first part of our explanation therefore is that the differences in spending have not been so great as to give any candidate an overwhelming advantage. So long as the poorer candidate can raise the minimum amount necessary to mount a campaign—that is to hire employees, distribute literature, go on the radio and television a few times, get around the country and so on—he can do most of what he has

to do. Another way of putting this would be to say that above the minimum amount necessary to run a campaign the additional expenditures do not appear to confer significant advantages. Like other goods, money is subject to diminishing returns. People may get tired of being bombarded with literature and harangued by speakers. The candidates sometimes worry about over exposure lest they go the way of certain television celebrities who were seen once too often. Criticism of "trying to buy the election" may arise if too much time is taken on television. Indeed there may be resentment at favorite programs taken off the air to accommodate a candidate who seems to have had more than his say. We know that many voters are relatively unperturbed by the opposition and all the handouts in the world will not make them change. The actual result of extensive assault by the richer party may be to increase the polarization of the electorate as those who oppose that party find additional reasons to intensify their opposition.

Given the necessary minimum amount of money on his side the less affluent candidate can count on a good deal of free publicity. Presidential campaigns are deemed newsworthy by the press and are extensively reported. While Democrats may get somewhat less space than Republicans in papers, they still get some, and they do better in the magazines and on the air. Thus they get through to their supporters. To some extent the candidates can make news. John Kennedy's grappling with the religious issue, Harry Truman's assaults on the opposition, Dwight Eisenhower's dramatic promise to go to Korea made headlines at little or no financial cost. The television debates in 1960 between Nixon and Kennedy attracted millions of viewers, numbers far in excess of the usual political broadcasts for which fees have to be paid.

The factor of skill must also be considered. Money can be spent for unrewarding purposes which actually rebound against the candidate. Democratic strategists during the 1930s were delighted at the expenditures made by the Liberty League on be-

half of the Republican candidate because they considered it to be an ideal target for their charges that the Republicans were the party of privilege. Money may be expended unwittingly getting the opposition to the polls. A poor performance on television may do the candidate no good no matter how much is spent. The man who says the wrong thing may deeply regret the wealth which made it possible for him to disseminate his statement widely.

Other things being equal of course it would be nice to have more money to spend than the other fellow. But conditions are rarely if ever equal. The fundamental party allegiances of the population, the state of the economy, religious and ethnic affiliations, personalities of the candidates—all appear to be more significant in determining the outcomes of elections than the differences in total party spending. Despite the understandable cries of harried party money raisers, the Democrats always seem to come up with enough to get by. There is always the hope of victory. The winner can expect to have his deficits covered at the next round of party "victory" fund raising drives. It remains true that the most expensive election is the one you lose.

Money is probably more important at the nominating rather than the electoral stage. Eisenhower and Taft spent about \$2.5 million each on their nominating campaigns in 1952.⁶⁴ The candidate who wishes to enter primaries and conduct a national drive to obtain delegates may be dissuaded through lack of the minimum amount necessary to get started. The lower visibility of primaries and the lesser attention paid to them by citizens may give an advantage to those with more to spend. Money, however, is only one factor. Estes Kefauver put on a vigorous campaign despite his relative lack of wealth. Had he not been bitterly opposed by party leaders or had he won all the primaries he entered, as Kennedy did, he might have won the nomination. As it was, Kefauver lost to Stevenson whose command of wealth was the least of his political assets.

Other candidates may, however, have been adversely affected

by lack of funds Nelson Rockefeller is a curious example. Apparently he decided not to contest the Republican nomination in 1960 in part because he could not raise the cash.⁵⁵ During the 1960 Kennedy-Humphrey primary campaigns in West Virginia charges of vast Kennedy spending were made. Certainly Kennedys ready cash did him no harm. In retrospect however it does appear that he was decidedly more popular with the voters than his rival Hubert Humphrey. Would more money have enabled Humphrey to turn the tide? Humphreys campaign was badly managed and severely underfinanced and in part this led the press to accord him less serious treatment than he might otherwise have merited. Had Humphrey had as much money to spend on campaigning as Kennedy for as long a period of time the tide might conceivably have run in the other direction. There were nonetheless other candidates—Johnson and Symington for example—who had plenty of money but who chose not to contest the primaries.⁵⁶

It is exceedingly difficult to get reliable information on an event that involves a decision *not* to act. Such an event would be a decision by a political candidate not to run because he could not raise the money. There is of course no literature on this subject. But there have undoubtedly been some men whose inability to raise the cash has proven fatal to their chances of being considered for the nomination. While this is most regrettable a more important question concerns whether there has been systematic bias in favor of or against certain kinds of men that consistently alters the outcome of Presidential nominations. We can immediately dismiss the notion that the richest man automatically comes out on top. If that were the case Rockefeller would have triumphed over Goldwater, Taft over Eisenhower and neither Nixon nor Stevenson would have been nominated.

The ability to raise money is not only a matter of personal wealth but of being able to attract funds from others. Does this mean that only candidates attractive to the wealthy can run? It might be said that the problem is not so much whether it helps

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to be rich but whether men who favor the causes of the rich have the advantage over those who favor the poor. There is little evidence to support such a view. Given the nature of the American electorate, no candidate would openly admit to being the candidate only of the rich. Candidates holding a variety of views on economic issues—most of which are highly technical—manage to run for the nominations of both parties. If candidates are generally chosen from among men who differ but little on most substantive issues, the reason is not because the rich are with holding their money from more radical candidates but rather because the distribution of opinions in the electorate renders the cause of such men hopeless. Our conclusion is that it is nice to be rich, some men who lack funds may be disadvantaged. From the standpoint of the total political system, however, the nomination process does not appear to bar types of men who are otherwise acceptable to the electorate.

Although the difference in ability of the two parties to raise money is not in any sense a critical determinant of national elections, large sums of money are necessary to run campaigns. May not those who contribute or raise money in large amounts thereby gain influence not available to others? Aware that the answer to this question is not a simple one, we would say "Yes, but not overly much." What contributors or fund raisers (the financial middlemen) get to begin with is access to centers of decision making. Control over money certainly makes it easier to get in and present one's case. Men of wealth, however, are likely to have substantial economic interests which would provide them with good access whether or not they made contributions. If no significant interest feels disadvantaged by what these contributors want, they may well be given the benefit of the doubt. But in matters of great moment, where the varied interests in our society are in contention, it is doubtful whether control over money goes very far with a President. There are many reasons for this.

In the first place, there are many issues on which a candidate

is likely to be already publicly committed. Suggestions that a candidate change his position during the campaign are likely to be met with little favor. If the matter is important enough to be mentioned it has to be considered in relation to its vote-getting potential. Forced to make a choice, nominees are far more likely to prefer votes to dollars. And even if a miscalculation is made in public, candidates generally prefer not to reverse their field and appear vacillating and inconsistent. Money may be given in the expectation of future favors. To spell this out in detail would appear unseemly, however, and is likely to be rejected outright. The moral sense of the candidates would most likely forbid such a thing; if not the good political sense of their advisors would suggest that the consequences of discovery are much worse than any possible benefits. Thus, any strings attached to a gift are likely to be vague and cloudy, subject to all sorts of interpretations.

Once a President assumes office, he is in a much stronger bargaining position. Contributors are likely to need him much more than he will need them; he can do more to affect their fortunes than they can to affect his. A President may at that point refuse to acknowledge any alleged agreement of policy concessions in return for contributions. Wealthy contributors frequently give to both parties and in any case are often found on opposite sides of public issues. For candidates to give in to one of them may simply incur the wrath of others.

A decline in contributions from one source may be made up by funds from another. The President's need to gain or maintain support from the voters, the limits placed on his powers of decision by what Congressmen, bureaucrats, and interest groups will accept, his own preferences, all serve to place drastic limits on benefits contributors get from campaign contributions. In brief, money simply becomes much less important to the things a President needs to do while he is in office. Contributors may be heard to complain in the hurt tones of Henry C. Frick, who after visiting Theodore Roosevelt at the White House said "We

"ought the son of a bitch and then he did not stay bought"⁸⁷ The Interpolair analysis should help to explain why Presidential politicians do not "stay bought" whatever their debt to their financial supporters.

Though it is true that the parties usually seem to raise enough money to get by, finding money is likely to be a traumatic experience. There is a day-by-day scramble which must be enervating. The Republicans are somewhat better off not only because of their ability to collect in the business community but also because they go about the task much more systematically than do the Democrats. Personal solicitation has been found to be the best method of collecting funds. So Republicans arrange for comprehensive coverage on a local basis of all likely contributors and they have a good deal of central coordination which assures that the national organization receives its share. Democratic efforts are to say the least chaotic. Aside from the union strongholds, contractors and textile people, they do not have a visible group in many parts of the country whom they can count on to give a little. Unlike the Republicans, they have not hired a professional moneyraiser sympathetic to their cause who will take on the job over a long period of time.⁸⁸ As a result each financial campaign tends to be run by different people who have to start from the beginning. Experience is not accumulated as it might be. When Adlai Stevenson was nominated in 1952, he downgraded large contributions and appointed Beardsley Ruml who tried to get most of what he needed from small contributions. Ruml did get more than usual from that source but not nearly enough.⁸⁹ Edwin Pauley, who raised funds for Truman, was an oilman who had a wide acquaintanceship among men of wealth and who was adroit in having his claims recognized by groups like road builders and construction firms who could expect to benefit from Democratic policies. Until the Kennedy campaign the Democrats continued to live at best from hand to mouth, day to day, crisis to crisis. President Truman in 1948—few wished to contribute to a sure loser—found himself stranded without

funds in the middle of Oklahoma on his campaign train. Where upon the Governor and a few others on that train decided that this could not be allowed to continue and found the money. Again the essential wherewithal was forthcoming but the attendant tension is hardly the best atmosphere in which to conduct a political campaign.⁶⁰ In 1964 "when Republican chances of victory over Johnson were never rated much brighter than those of a snowflake in Austin" the Republicans raised more money than they had in any previous campaign. And contrary to previous campaigns the money came not from big business but primarily from small donations sent in by hundreds of thousands of contributors many of whom had never before contributed to a national campaign.⁶¹ The GOP collected 651 000 small individual contributions in 1964.⁶²

The fund raising dinner has in recent years become a major source of money. To the accompaniment of rubbery chicken or in the more affluent affairs good steak the well heeled come to listen to exhortations at up to \$1000 a plate. The advantages of this system to the parties are many. Attendance is visible. Those who do not come may be conspicuous by their absence. Those who wish to be regarded favorably by the parties officeholders may decide that it is a good idea to come. Dinners are easy to organize and a large profit is usually cleared. Such disadvantages as there may be to this system do not seem to accrue to the party coffers so much as to the party faithful. These loyal souls may if fund raising meals continue to proliferate find it necessary to give up one of their expensive hobbies politics or eating.

Control Over Information

Control over information is another major political resource. Information does many things besides help voters to change their minds—that rare phenomenon. It helps people keep in touch with the progress of the campaign gives the party faithful indications of the effectiveness of their side acquaints voters with the major

public affairs do not get much space.⁶⁷ Advertising is gained by convincing businessmen that it will pay them in terms of increased sales. The periodic appeals of conservatives requesting businessmen to place or withhold advertising is a form of political coercion usually fall on deaf ears because the motives of those who pay are commercial rather than political. Both the paper and its advertisers are likely to shy away from many forms of political controversy: it tends to make enemies rather than friends and is commonly believed to be "bad for business." The result is that much of the time newspapers are rather bland. Such political opinions as they do express are watered down so as not to give offense. Their political opinions far from being their central concerns tend to be sporadic and aimless rather than representing a coherent political ideology.⁶⁸

These tendencies are strengthened by a prevailing belief that papers ought to be nonpartisan in their news stories and present both sides of the issues of the day. However much the norm of impartiality may be honored in the breach, it provides a standard which serves to some extent to hold down partisanship. More than that, the belief that it is a newspaper's function to report what happens rather than to editorialize in its news columns has many other attractions for editors. It enables them to escape to some extent from the hostilities engendered by political controversy: it lessens problems of editorial judgment, thus decreasing the amount of work they have to do; it enables them to select items that they think will enhance their readership; it provides editors with a rationale for defending themselves against the charge of giving too much prominence to causes and candidates which may be unpopular with advertisers or some influential readers. This norm leaves the papers open to manipulation by political strategists who can create sensational news stories. During the heyday of Senator McCarthy, for example, newspaper men slowly became aware of the extent to which they had aided him by publicizing his charges, because they were "news" rather than ignoring or carefully evaluating them.⁶⁹ During Presidential

impression contrary to that preferred by the owners of the paper. Such appeared to be the case with John F. Kennedy who was popular with the reporters and the extra attention he received resulted in complaints from Richard Nixon who was not so popular with them.¹²

Dependent upon business interests for advertising and devoted pretty much to the status quo, most papers usually endorse Republican candidates and favor them in editorials and (to a lesser but real extent) in their news columns. However bland this advocacy has become, it certainly has existed in all recent elections except 1964.¹³ But it is a far cry from acknowledging this situation to a conclusion that citizens are actually influenced in their opinions and voting choices by the newspapers they take. We use the word "take" advisedly because the fact that a newspaper enters a home is no guarantee that its political news and editorials will be read. Most people pay little enough attention to politics; they often read nothing or just scan the headlines without taking away much of an impression. Analyses of tons of newspaper clippings showing political propaganda by newspapers means nothing insofar as the effect is concerned if these stories are never read.

When stories and editorials are perused with some care, the reader's perception of what has been written may differ markedly from the intentions of the writer on the newspaper. An editorial may not be clear in intent, particularly if it is hedged by qualifications or watered down to minimize offense as is often the case. Frequently the reader pays attention only to those parts of the piece which substantiate his own opinions. Opinion studies have demonstrated the remarkable capacity of people to filter out what they do not wish to hear and come away with quite a different impression than an objective analysis of an editorial or article would warrant. Indeed the reader may interpret the story to mean precisely the opposite of what it intends: a criticism of Harry Truman for being vituperative, for example, could be taken as a commendation of his fighting spirit.¹⁴

Stories and editorials may be interpreted as they were meant to be and still be rejected as invalid. There is a great deal of suspicion of the press in the United States. Party identification is so powerful a force that it is likely to overwhelm most anything a paper says. Obviously millions of citizens have no difficulty remaining and voting Democratic while reading Republican news papers. Group loyalties are another force which may lead to rejection of opinions in newspapers. Face to face groups in unions, on the job in fraternal religious and ethnic organizations may generate opinions of their own. If these differ from those in the newspaper the members of the groups are provided with defense against the persuasion of the press. Group pressures of this kind are likely to be far more influential than what is written in a paper. The group may also reinforce what the paper says but this represents an intensification rather than a change of opinion.⁷⁵

No doubt the monopoly position of most newspapers in local communities makes the dissemination of opposing views more difficult than it might be in the presence of competition from a newspaper of a different outlook. But there are ways of getting around this. Other publications may enter the home: magazines and pamphlets which are religious, ethnic, union, fraternal and even political in their focus and these may contain contrary notions of public policy and candidate preference. True, only a relatively few persons read the political magazines. But these people are likely to be opinion leaders, people who take an active interest in public affairs and who are looked up to by others for advice. The availability therefore of little magazines of many shades of opinion permits the opinion leaders to receive and then disseminate information on a personal basis which may counteract whatever is in a newspaper.

Consider a puzzle concerning the political impact of the *New York Daily News*, a sensational tabloid with a circulation in the millions. It is apparent that if those who read the *News* had voted against Franklin D. Roosevelt as the paper repeatedly recommended in vitriolic terms, Roosevelt would certainly never have

carried New York City by the huge margins he did. At the same time it seems strange that so many people who not only voted for but revered FDR in New York continued to read a newspaper whose editorials bitterly attacked their hero. The Democratic readers of the *New York Times* apparently managed to get the best of both possible worlds. They read the paper they liked and voted for the man they favored without noticing the apparent contradiction—because for them there was no contradiction. They either did not pay attention to the editorials or blocked out the unfavorable ones completely or interpreted them to mean something favorable to FDR. Voting studies document instances where people who wanted to vote for Harry Truman in 1948 convinced themselves that the incumbent President was against price controls; some people who preferred Dwight Eisenhower in 1956 apparently had no difficulty in believing that he surely favored medical care for the aged.¹⁶

Or let us consider the case of the opposite of the New York *Daily News*, the good gray sober responsible New York *Times*. After the *Times* came out for John F. Kennedy in the closing weeks of the 1960 Presidential campaign, various political pundits speculated as to the probable impact of the fact of this endorsement by so august and respectable a source. Our theory about voting behavior would lead us to be wary of claiming much influence for the *Times*, not because its readership was too indifferent to heed this call to reason but because of the kind of people who read this paper. One has to be terribly interested in politics to read through the *Times* as far as the editorial page. People who read that far are among the small, interested minority who comprise the core of the strong party identifiers. Precisely because of their interest, they are likely to identify with a major party and to be resistant to changing their allegiance. A call from the *Times*, therefore, however respectable, could hardly shake these devoted party people in their fundamental loyalty. The vacillating, the doubtful, and the uninformed who cannot make up their minds are far more likely to read *True Confessions*.

or *Modern Romance* than the *New York Times* with its surfeit of news about seemingly dull political events

What then is the significance of newspapers in Presidential campaigns? We have suggested that the press is by no means immensely influential. Its major importance probably lies in two directions: presenting some kind of information about the candidates and the campaign to its readers; and intensifying the pre-dispositions held by people who tend to agree with the paper's preferences. If one asked the candidates they would undoubtedly prefer to have the press on their side instead of against them. But they can and do win in the face of opposition from the press. It may be that the newspaper a person reads subtly conditions his attitudes in ways now unsuspected, and that this has some effect on his opinions and voting choice.⁷⁷ There is no evidence, however, to indicate that this point has much force in Presidential elections, and evidence does exist which suggests severe limits to what newspapers can do. Undoubtedly, whatever impact the press has varies enormously with circumstances. Against a well known and immensely popular President like Franklin Roosevelt in 1936 or Lyndon Johnson in 1964, with substantial publicity resources of his own, the impact of the press may be negligible. Against a little known candidate like Adlai Stevenson in 1952, the attitudes communicated by the press—say aloofness over intellectuality, indecisiveness—may be more significant. Yet we know from voting studies that in 1952 Stevenson was favorably regarded by Democrats who identified him with his party.⁷⁸ Perhaps the press counts for more on issues that are relatively far removed from the direct experience of the voters, such as corruption in government (where voters are prepared to believe the worst) and which may be blown out of proportion by hostile coverage. But the sheer number of different issues which may become relevant during a Presidential campaign, especially if they are "pocketbook" issues that are grasped with relative ease by voters, may also neutralize the influence of the press.

The Presidency

The Presidency is one resource which in any given election year must of necessity be monopolized by one party or the other. When an incumbent President seeks re election he enjoys many special advantages by virtue of his position. He ■ to begin with much better known than any challenger can hope to be. Every thing the President does is news and is widely reported in all the media of information. The issues to which the President devotes his attention are likely to become the national issues because of his unique visibility and capacity to center diffused public attention on matters he deems important. To this extent he is in a position to focus public debate on issues he deems most advantageous. The President can act and thereby gain credit. Should he face a crisis in foreign affairs and these are many he can gain by doing well or by calling on the patriotism of the citizenry to support its Chief Executive when the nation is in danger. An example of this occurred during the 1964 campaign when United States vessels in the Bay of Tonkin were fired upon and President Johnson took to the airwaves to promise rigorous defensive measures. In late July, just before the incident he attracted 59% of the voters to 31% for Goldwater. In early August just after the incident the President's score went up to 65% and Goldwater's declined to 29%.⁷⁹

As the symbol of the nation the President can travel and make "nonpolitical" speeches to subtly advance his candidacy while his opponent ■ open to charges of "blind partisanship" in what are becoming unceasingly troubled times. Should his opponent claim that he can do a better job the President need hardly make the obvious response that he is the only candidate who has had experience in a job for which there exists no completely appropriate prior training.

The life of the incumbent however is not necessarily one of undiluted joy. If the economic situation takes a turn for the worse if a race riot erupts if another nation comes under Communist influence he is likely to be blamed as the man who was

in office at the time. Whether he is really to blame or not, whether or not any man could possibly deal with an intractable world in the realm of foreign policy, he is deemed responsible and has to take the consequences. His opponent can to some extent permit himself to be irresponsible or carried away by exuberance. The President cannot detach himself from office while campaigning, however, and he must recognize that other nations are listening when he makes statements. The President's very superiority of information may turn out to be a handicap as he cannot make certain statements or reveal his sources for others without committing a breach of security. His opponent can attack his record, but the incumbent may have difficulty finding a comparable record to assail on the other side.

Yet the incumbent President's advantages are probably sufficient to overcome these disabilities. It is the candidate who seeks to succeed an incumbent of his own party who suffers the most. His is the unhappy lot, as Nixon and Stevenson discovered, of getting the worst of all possible worlds. He suffers from both the disadvantages of having to defend an existing record and of being a new man. He cannot attack the administration in office without alienating the President and selling his own party short, and he cannot claim he has experience in office. It may be difficult for him to defend a record he did not make and may not wholly care for. His is the most difficult strategic problem of all the candidates.

CONVERTIBILITY OF RESOURCES

Clearly the social framework within which Presidential election strategies must be pursued distributes advantages and disadvantages rather importantly between the parties.

We have attempted to explain why the unequal distribution of key resources such as money and control over information do not necessarily lead to election victories for the parties and candidates which possess and use most of these resources. Might

there not however be a cumulative effect which would greatly assist those who possessed both more money and more control over information? This effect may exist but it could obviously not be of overwhelming importance since the Democrats who are usually disadvantaged in these respects have won most of the recent elections. We can suggest three reasons for Democratic strength despite these disadvantages. First the Democrats are able to convert other resources into money and control over information thereby narrowing the gap during campaigns. Second the Democrats have superior access to other important resources—especially the numerically dominant party identifications in the voting population—which may overwhelm the Republican superiority in money and control over the media of information. Third the Democrats are better able in general to convert some resources into others than are their opponents.

Once the Democratic party assumed the Presidency in 1933 and held it for twenty years it was able to use the resource of official position to collect more campaign funds because contributors want access to the winner and to get greater news coverage because the President's activities are newsworthy no matter what his party. The alliance of the Democrats with the large industrial unions has at times meant that the party received contributions in the coin of personal labor in electioneering for which the Republicans had to lay out cash or do without. The superiority (perhaps the mere existence) of Democratic organizations in cities of large population with strategic impact on the Electoral College has sometimes led to the availability of election workers who did not have to be paid in cash—at least not during the campaign and not at all if the party lost the election. The appeals of the Democrats to ethnic racial and religious groups has meant that publications of these specialized groups might serve to offset the preponderant Republican orientation of the daily press.

The fact that the Democrats have approximately a three to

two lead over Republicans in party identification is perhaps the most effective resource in the Democratic arsenal so effective indeed that it is apparently more than enough to compensate for whatever advantages the Republicans gain through wealth and the mass media. For unless the Republicans manage to do something special the voters will elect a Democrat by following their usual partisan dispositions. To be sure other things such as turnout for example are not always equal otherwise the Republicans would never win. But with respect to sheer numbers of nominal supporters the Democrats are ahead at the start.

Implicit in these remarks is the proposition that the Democrats in our era are better able to convert their resources into success at the polls than are the Republicans. That is the party identification of a significant majority of the electorate can more easily be turned into electoral victory than can money or control over information be turned to winning the allegiance of citizens to a different party. Party identification changes but slowly and changes significantly only under the impact of events in the society which profoundly affect the mass of citizens. No one really knows short of that how to go about changing the party identifications of masses of people in the same partisan direction.

The Republicans can use their advantage in turnout to overcome the Democratic advantage in party identification. They can try to make party identification seem less relevant at election time by putting up an attractive candidate who is "above" partisanship. They can capitalize on errors by Democrats or on dissatisfaction with a Democratic administration. No one can claim to predict the outcomes of elections yet to come certainly we cannot. Nothing that has been said here means that a Republican might not win handily as Eisenhower did in two particular elections. Speaking in terms of probabilities over several elections however it seems to us that the Democrats are likely to win more often than they lose.

SUMMARY

As politicians develop their strategies for winning nomination and election to the Presidency they will have to keep in mind numerous facts that are given in their political environment and probably not subject to change by anything they may do. Among these are the facts that

- 1) Most voters are not sufficiently concerned with specific policies to change their votes in response to policy appeals
- 2) Rather they vote the way they do out of party habit
- 3) They may or may not *turn out* in great numbers however and therefore it is necessary to activate intermediary organizations and party activists in order to help turn out one's own voters
- 4) Parties seek to win elections as their major goal
- 5) Either party has a reasonably good chance to win the election: the Democrats because they are in the majority, the Republicans because they are much more likely to turn out and because they have better access to money and greater sympathy in the press
- 6) Intermediary organizations such as interest groups and party organizations can be activated by policy commitments and reaffirmations and promises of access to governmental decision making
- 7) Each of the parties consists of a loose coalition of interest groups and state and local parties
- 8) The Electoral College puts a premium on votes from large two-party states

Most or all of these basic facts are well understood by Presidential candidates and their managers. They understand that getting nominated and getting elected present two separate though interrelated problems. Let us now see what sorts of political strategies they devise to master these problems.

cent " (p 102) See also Gordon M Connelly and Harry M Field "The Non Voter—Who He Is What He Thinks" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 8 (Summer 1944) 175-187 The work of Angus Campbell and his associates at the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center to which we will refer again is based on numerous sample surveys of the entire American voting population These studies which have been going on since 1948 have through the years increased in breadth and sophistication and at the moment represent the largest pool of data we have on the political habits of Americans The work of Paul Lazarsfeld Bernard Berelson and their associates at the Columbia Bureau of Applied Social Research has been going on since 1940 Rather than national sample surveys the BASR group has collected data of a more focused kind, often limited to a single community The BASR group pioneered in the use of panel surveys which consist of series of re interviews with a sample of respondents For a description and critique of these and other materials we shall be using, see Peter H Rossi "Four Landmarks in Voting Research" in *American Voting Behavior* eds Eugene Burdick and Arthur J Brodbeck (Glencoe 1959) Chapter 1

3 Bernard Berelson Paul F Lazarsfeld and William N McPhee *Voting* (Chicago 1954) p 25 Campbell *et al* *The American Voter* pp 475-483 Key *Public Opinion and American Democracy* pp 195-199

4 Campbell *et al* *The American Voter* pp 120-145 Robert E Lane concludes "Over the long run party identification has more influence over a person's vote decision than any other single factor" *Political Life* (Glencoe 1959) p 300

5 The authors of *The American Voter* write that in comparison to habitual party identifiers "Independents tend as a group to be somewhat less involved in politics They have somewhat poorer knowledge of the issues their image of the candidates is fainter their interest in the campaign is less their concern over the outcome is relatively slight, and their choice between competing candidates seems much less to spring from discoverable evaluations of the elements of national politics" (Campbell *et al* p 143) See also Berelson *et al* *Voting*, pp 25-27 and for a somewhat different treatment Robert Agger "Independents and Party Identifiers" in *American Voting Behavior* eds Burdick and Brodbeck Chapter 17

6 Berelson *et al* *Voting*, pp 215-233 George Bellknap and Angus Campbell state that "for many people Democratic or Republican attitudes regarding foreign policy result from conscious or unconscious adherence to a perceived party line rather than from influences independent of party identification" "Political Party Identification and Attitudes Toward Foreign Policy" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 15 (Winter 1951-52) 623 Campbell and his associates speak of "the electorate's profound loyalty to the existing parties Our [Survey Research Center] studies regularly have shown that three-quarters of the adult population grants outright its allegiance to the Republican or Democratic Party and that most of those who call themselves Independents acknowledge some degree of attachment to one of the parties These partisan identifications appear highly resistant to change" (Campbell *et al* *The American Voter* pp 552-553)

7 The various voting studies previously cited all contain substantial discussions of this subject See especially Robert E. Lane "Fathers and Sons Foundations of Political Belief" *American Sociological Review* 24 (August 1959) 502-511 Campbell *et al* *The American Voter* pp 146-147 II II Remmer "Early Socialization of Attitudes" in *American Voting Behavior* eds Burdick and Lebeck pp 55-67 Key *Public Opinion and American Democracy* pp 293-314 sums up in these words "Children acquire early in life a feeling of party identification they have sensitive attitudes and since they are imitative animals soon take on the political color of their family" (p 294) see especially Fred I. Greenstein *Children and Politics* (New Haven 1965) Chapter 4.

8 "People are more likely to associate with people like themselves—alike in political complexion as well as social position" (Berelson *et al* *Voting* p 83)

9 Paul Lazarsfeld Bernard Berelson, and Hazel M. Gaudin *The People's Choice* (New York 1944) pp 16-23

10 *Ibid* Angus Campbell and Homer C. Key Group Differences in Attitudes and Votes (Ann Arbor 1957) Howard and Roper "Political Activity of American Citizens" in Key *Public Opinion and American Democracy* pp 121-131 Berelson *et al* *Voting* pp 54-76 Unfortunately *Why We Vote* Our Own Kind (Santa Barbara 1960) has Presidential elections only from the usual Eisenhower elections

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11 V O Key Jr *Southern Politics* (New York 1950) pp 75-81 223-228 280-285

12 V O Key Jr "A Theory of Critical Elections" *The Journal of Politics* 17 (February 1955) 3-18 Campbell et al *The American Voter* p 160 See more generally James Q Wilson, *Negro Politics* (C'encoe 1960)

13 See Duane Lockard *New England State Politics* (Princeton 1959) Dahl *Who Governs?* pp 33-51 216-217 Elmer E Cornwell, "Party Absorption of Ethnic Groups The Case of Providence R I" *Social Forces* 38 (March 1960) 203-210 J Joseph Huthmacher *Massachusetts People and Politics* (Cambridge Mass 1959) pp 118-120

14 Samuel Lubell *The Future of American Politics* (New York 1951) pp 129-157

15 Campbell et al *The American Voter* pp 55-57 525-528 537 Herbert H Hyman and Paul B Sheatsley "The Political Appeal of President Eisenhower" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 19 (Winter 1955-56) 26-39

16 The portions of this analysis which deal with voters and issues are taken from Chapter 8 "Public Policy and Political Preference" in Campbell et al *The American Voter* pp 163-187

17 In a methodologically excellent national sample survey conducted in 1954 which was designed to discover the concerns of the American people on subjects relating to Communism and civil liberties Samuel Stouffer found "The number of people who said that they were worried either about the threat of Communists in the U S or about civil liberties was even by the most generous interpretation of occasionally ambiguous responses less than 1 per cent Even world problems including the shadow of war did not evoke a spontaneous answer from more than 8 per cent (Stouffer *Communism Conformity and Civil Liberties* p 59) See Hazel Gaudet Erskine "The Polls The Informed Public" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 26 (Winter 1962) 669-677 This article summarizes questions asked since 1947 of national samples of Americans designed to ascertain their information on current news topics Similar data for 1935-46 are contained in Hadley Cantril and Mildred Strunk *Public Opinion 1935-1946* (Princeton, 1951)

18 The data on which this conclusion is based refer to issues in

rather general categories such as "economic aid to foreign countries influence of big business in government" and "aid to education (Campbell *et al* *The American Voter* p 182) It is highly probable that the proportion of people meeting the three requirements would be substantially reduced if the precise and specific policies within these general issue categories formed the basis of questions in a survey

19 The authors of *The American Voter* tentatively conclude that in the Eisenhower years covered by their study people who paid little attention to politics were contributing very disproportionately to partisan change (Campbell *et al* p 264)

20 Philip E Converse Information Flow and the Stability of Partisan Attitudes *Public Opinion Quarterly* 26 (Winter 1962) 578-599

21 V O Key Jr with the assistance of Milton C Cummings Jr *The Responsible Electorate Rationality in Presidential Voting 1936-1960* (Cambridge Mass 1966)

22 Campbell *et al* *The American Voter* pp 153-160 Key A Theory of Critical Elections 3-18 Stouffer *Communism Conformity and Civil Liberties* p 87 says that Americans are concerned not with world problems but with personal problems He adds "a business recession finds a path into almost every home—whether it is that of a factory worker or that of a butcher who finds his sales of meat declining It becomes a threat that is immediate and personal"

23 Key asserts that as has been demonstrated the citizen's identification with party tends to produce a tie consistent with his policy preferences (*Public Opinion and American Democracy* p 460) See also Lazarsfeld *et al*, *The People's Choice* Chapter 9

24 This notion is developed by Anthony Downs *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York, 1957)

25 See Raymond A. Bauer Itzhel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter *American Business and Public Policy* (New York 1963) pp 323-399 especially p 373

26 See Seymour M Lipset, Paul F Lazarsfeld Allen H Barton, and Juan Lanz, "The Psychology of Voting An Analysis of Political Behavior" in *Handbook of Social Psychology* ed. Gardner Lindzey (Cambridge Mass 1954)

27 This discussion is drawn largely from Aaron I Wildavsky

"The Intelligent Citizens Guide to the Abuses of Statistics: The Kennedy Document and the Catholic Vote" *Politics and Social Life* ed. Nelson W. Polsky, Robert A. Denker and Paul A. Smith (Boston, 1963) pp. 5-511. See also Thomas Flinn "How Nixon Took Off" *Western Political Quarterly* 15 (June 1962) 270-279. Philip L. Converse, Angus Campbell, Warren L. Miller and Donald L. Stokes "Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstituting Election" *American Political Science Review* 55 (June 1961) 269-280. Andrew R. Nagales "Religious Influence on Wisconsin Voting, 1929-1960" *American Political Science Review* 56 (March 1962) 60-70 and Nisichin *Our Own Kind*.

28 See Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson, and Samuel L. Popkin *Candidacies: Issues and Strategies* (Cambridge Mass. 1964) pp. 117-118.

29 *Ibid.* pp. 103-111.

30 Nagales "Religious Influence on Wisconsin Voting, 1929-1960" 60-70.

31 Converse, Campbell, Miller and Stokes "Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstituting Election" 269-280.

32 See Wildavsky in Folsby *et al.* *Politics and Social Life* pp. 825-844.

33 At least a quarter of a million Jews and over a million Negroes live in Illinois. Over a million Negroes live in Texas and 171,397 of them are registered to vote according to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission ("Voting" 1961 *U.S. Commission on Civil Rights Report* 301). The conclusion is far from implausible.

34 "Access" is the opportunity to press claims upon decision makers. This does not imply that those who have more access are more successful in pressing their claims, but it is generally supposed that claims have a better chance of realization when they are presented repeatedly and auspiciously to decision makers and by "known" rather than "unknown" claimants. See David B. Truman *The Governmental Process* (New York 1951) pp. 261-270.

35 Our interpretation of parties is based largely on Pendleton Herring *The Politics of Democracy* (New York 1940). V. O. Key, Jr. *Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups* 4th ed. (New York 1958). David B. Truman "Federalism and the Party System" in *Federalism: Mature and Emergent* ed. Arthur Macmahon (New York 1955),

Chapter 8 Anthony Downs *An Economic Theory of Democracy* and a burgeoning literature (some of it already cited) on state and local political party organizations See especially Truman, *The Governmental Process* pp 262-287

36 Herring *The Politics of Democracy* especially pp 272-287
See also Edward C Banfield *Political Influence* (New York, 1961)

37 The structure of American political parties is treated among other places in Key *Politics Parties and Pressure Groups* Hugh A Bone *American Politics and the Party System* (New York 1955) and William Goodman, *The Two Party System in the United States* (New York, 1956)

38 See Warren E Miller "Presidential Coattails: a Study in Political Myth and Methodology" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 19 (Winter 1955-56), 28-39

39 William S Livingston "A Note on the Nature of Federalism" *Political Science Quarterly* 67 (March 1952) 81-95

40 See Robert R Alford *Party and Society* (Chicago 1963) Chapter 8 "The United States: The Politics of Diversity" This reanalysis of a variety of surveys suggests that class-oriented voting in the United States while it exists does not polarize voters to the extent that can be found in Great Britain or Australia

41 Herbert McClosky Paul J Hoffman and Rosemary O'Hara "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers" *American Political Science Review* 54 (June 1960) 406-427 The authors who compared large samples of Democratic and Republican leaders on twenty four major public issues conclude that "the belief that the two American parties are identical in principle and doctrine has little foundation in fact. Examination of the opinions of Democratic and Republican leaders shows them to be distinct communities of co-believers who diverge sharply on many important issues They add, "Little support was found for the belief that deep cleavages exist among the electorate but are ignored by the leaders One might indeed, more accurately assert the contrary to wit that the natural cleavages between the leaders are largely ignored by the voters" (pp 425-426)

42 Key *Public Opinion and American Democracy* p 439 observes "Of Democratic high participators only 34 per cent fall into white-collar occupations, of the Republican group comparable in

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political activity 48 per cent are from white-collar occupations. Substantially more Democratic than Republican high participators are blue-collar workers. Occupational differences between the party identifiers become more marked as level of political participation increases."

43 The unit rule is not prescribed in the Constitution or by Federal law. Rather it is the result of individual state action which provides in all states that Electors for party nominees are grouped together and elected *en bloc* on a "general ticket" such that a vote for one Elector is a vote for all the Electors on that ticket with the majority vote electing all Electors for the state. Senator Thomas Hart Benton said in 1824 "The general ticket system was the offspring of policy. It was adopted by the leading men of [ten states] to enable them to consolidate the vote of the state."

Thomas Jefferson had earlier pointed out that "while ten states choose either by legislatures or by a general ticket it is folly and worse than folly for the other states not to do it. In short, once a few states maximized their impact by using the unit rule the others followed suit. See *Motion for Leave to File Complaint, Complaint and Brief, Delaware v. New York*, No. 28 Original U.S. Supreme Court, October term 1966 and Neal R. Peirce "The Electoral College Goes to Court" *The Reporter* October 6 1966.

44 The 1960 figures are

Alaska 50 773 votes three electoral votes or one electoral vote for every 18 924 voters

New York 7 258 921 votes 45 electoral votes or one electoral vote for every 161 309 voters

California 5 506 578 votes 32 electoral votes or one electoral vote for every 203 330 voters

45 For 1960 figures see Herbert E. Alexander *Financing the 1960 Election* (Princeton 1962) p. 10. Figures for 1964 are contained in Herbert E. Alexander and Harold B. Meyers "The Switch in Campaign Giving," *Fortune* (November 1965) 103-108.

46 Alexander Heard *The Costs of Democracy* (Chapel Hill 1960) pp. 7-8. Herbert E. Alexander "Financing the Parties and Campaigns" in *The Presidential Election and Transition 1960-61* ed. Paul T. David (Washington, 1961) pp. 116-118. Alexander and Meyers "The Switch in Campaign Giving."

47 Heard, *The Costs of Democracy* pp 18-22, 39 Alexander "Financing the Parties and Campaigns" p 118 Alexander and Meyers "The Switch in Campaign Giving"

48 Alexander and Meyers "The Switch in Campaign Giving"

49 Alexander "Financing the Parties and Campaigns" p 117

50 Heard *The Costs of Democracy* p 6

51 *Ibid* p 41 Herbert E Alexander *Financing the 1964 Election* (Princeton 1966) pp 68-69

52 Heard *The Costs of Democracy* pp 49-53

53 For expenditure figures see *ibid* pp 17-24 and, for 1960 see Alexander *Financing the 1960 Election* pp 9-13 The following table is adapted from figures in both these books

	Democratic Percentage of Two-Party Vote	Democratic Percentage of Two-Party Expenditures
1932	59	49
1936	62	41
1940	55	35
1944	52	42
1948	52	39
1952	44	45
1956	42	38
1960	50	45
1964	61	41

On the state level, our conclusion may not be correct however See Murray Levin and George Blackwood *The Compleat Politician* (Indianapolis 1962) pp 227-243

54 Alexander "Financing the Parties and Campaigns" p 119

55 See Theodore H White *The Making of the President 1960* (New York 1961) pp 71-74

56 See *ibid* pp 92-110 and Harry Ernst *The Primary That Made a President West Virginia 1960* (New York, 1962) especially pp 16-17 29-31 Several factors appear to have contributed to Humphreys difficulty in raising money First and probably foremost, he had very little of his own to draw upon Second Adlai Stevenson was being indecisive By refusing to withdraw himself his backers were encouraged to wait and see rather than switch monetary

support to Humphrey. Had Stevenson not been in contention Humphrey might have gotten more money. And third Humphrey apparently was unwilling to do things which would severely alienate the other candidates or otherwise jeopardize his future associations in the party. He may therefore have been restrained from actions which would have aided him. A revealing passage in White (pp 109-110) indicates what may have been involved.

In New York from which so much Stevenson money had originally come to Humphrey's coffers Governor Abraham Ribicoff acting on Kennedy's instructions warned all Stevensonians that if they continued to finance the hopeless campaign of Hubert Humphrey Adlai Stevenson would not even be considered for Secretary of State. Where necessary Kennedy lieutenants were even rougher. In Connecticut, Boss John Bailey informed former Connecticut Senator William Benton that if he continued to finance Humphrey (Benton had already given Humphrey \$5 000 earlier in the spring) he would never hold another elective or appointive job in Connecticut.

57 Jasper B. Shannon *Money and Politics* (New York 1959)

p 35

58 Heard *The Costs of Democracy* pp 212-232

59 *Ibid* pp 249-258

60 See *ibid* and Shannon, *Money and Politics* p 59. On pages 13-65 Shannon presents a colorful history of American experience in raising money for Presidential campaigns.

61 Alexander and Meyers "The Switch in Campaign Giving," 103-108

62 Television stations have few programs of news commentary and these are not usually overtly partisan. (To be sure the wealthier party may buy more TV time for its candidate but we have already discussed the real limitations of this resource.) Radio news commentary is more ubiquitous but as we know only those who initially agree with commentators are likely to tune in regularly.

63 See Nathan B. Blumberg *One Party Press? Coverage of the 1952 Presidential Campaign in 35 Daily Newspapers* (Lincoln Neb 1954) Edwin Emery and Henry L. Smith *The Press in America* (Englewood Cliffs 1954) pp 714 ff Arthur Edward Rowse *Slanted*

News A Case Study of the Nixon and Stevenson Fund Stories (Boston 1957)

64 *Editor and Publisher*, October 31 1965 p 5

65 See for an example on the local level Dahl *Who Governs?* pp 77 256-267

66 A. J. Loebling with characteristic pungency puts the proposition this way "With the years the quantity of news in newspapers is bound to diminish from its present low The proprietor as Chairman of the Board, will increasingly often say that he would like to spend 75 cents now and then on news coverage but that he must be fair to his shareholders" *The Press* (New York, 1961) p 5

67 Bernard C. Cohen in *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, 1963) presents figures from a variety of sources on foreign affairs news (Chapter 4) His conclusion "The volume of coverage is low"

68 Following is an example atypical but illuminating of this aimlessness at work Former House Speaker Joseph Martin in his memoirs describes the appearance of an editorial mildly critical of Presidential candidate Thomas E. Dewey in Martin's own newspaper (Martin was editor and publisher) on the day of Dewey's arrival in Martin's hometown during the 1948 campaign "Behind all this fuss was a very simple explanation. Having a small staff the *Evening Chronicle* bought boilerplate editorials prepared by a syndicate The day of Dewey's visit, the editorial in question happened to be on top of the pile and a man in the composing room slapped it into the paper Ironically he was one of the most ardent Dewey supporters in North Attleboro As for myself I never read the editorial until it was well on its way to fame" Joseph W. Martin, Jr. *My First Fifty Years in Politics* as told to Robert J. Donovan (New York, 1960) pp 196-197

69 See Richard Rovere *Senator Joe McCarthy* (New York, 1959) pp 137 162-169

70 See Frank Luther Mott *The News in America* (Cambridge Mass. 1952) p 110 and Emery and Smith, *The Press in America* pp 541 ff

71 See William L. Rivers "The Correspondents After 25 Years" *Columbia Journalism Review* 1 (Spring 1962) On p 5 he says "In 1960 57 per cent of the daily newspapers reporting to the *Editor and Publisher* poll supported Nixon, and 16 per cent supported

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Kennedy In contrast there are more than three times as many Democrats as there are Republicans among the Washington news paper correspondents slightly more than 32 per cent are Democrats and fewer than 10 per cent are Republicans More than 55 per cent of the correspondents for newspapers consider themselves liberals 26.9 per cent consider themselves conservatives"

72 See White *The Making of the President 1960* pp 333-338 On Barry Goldwaters press relations see Charles Mohr "Requiem For a Lightweight" *Esquire* (August 1965) 67-71 121-122

73 See the findings previously cited in footnotes 63 64 70

74 Elmo Roper has observed that On the civil rights issue [in 1948] Mr Dewey draws the support of voters favoring exactly opposite things and more than that each side thinks Dewey agrees with them" Bone *American Politics and the Party System* p 447

75 This paragraph summarizes the major findings of researchers on what has come to be called the "two-step flow" of information. See Elihu Katz and Paul F Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (Glencoe 1955)

76 Key *Public Opinion and American Democracy* p 453

77 An example would be in instances where candidates were not known to voters before the campaign and where they ran without benefit of party labels as in local nonpartisan elections See Charles R Adrian, "Some General Characteristics of Nonpartisan Elections" *American Political Science Review* 46 (September 1952) 766-776 Charles H Gilbert and Christopher Clague "Electoral Competition and Electoral Systems in Large Cities" *The Journal of Politics* 24 (May 1962) 323-349 especially p 344

78 Campbell, *et al* *The American Voter* pp 58 530

79 American Institute of Public Opinion Survey released October 18 1964 For other examples see Nelson W Polsby *Congress and the Presidency* (Englewood Cliffs 1964) p 26

Chapter 2

The Nominating Process

NATIONAL PARTY conventions are notoriously puzzling to casual observers both foreign and domestic. The tumult and the shouting, the threats and bargains, the claims and counter claims seem so confusing that it is tempting to say the events make little sense. It is, therefore, worthwhile to show that a great many convention practices and events can be related to basic rules and circumstances of American politics.¹ The observer who understands for example that parties generally look for a winner and that primaries, platforms, and demonstrations may perform important functions in communicating the strength of the various candidates is in a much better position to appreciate what is happening than the person who attends only to the surface noise.

In our view the patterns of events at national conventions are largely a product of three factors: the goals of the politicians who do business there; the disparity between the information these politicians need in order to pursue their goals and the information at their disposal; and their power relationships. After a brief exposition of these factors, it will be possible for us to account for the strategies of the participants as they go about making the crucial choices which help determine the final outcomes.

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS

Goals

The delegates to national party conventions are selected state by state in conventions or primaries or by a combination of the two methods.² They represent the outcomes of processes that are slightly different in their legal requirements and political overtones in each of the states the District of Columbia and the territories—all of which send delegations to both party conventions. But when delegates arrive at the convention they enter into a social system in which their roles are reasonably regularized. Not surprisingly, they try to behave in a way that will maximize their political power. The rational dice player will place his bets in accordance with his chances of winning under the rules of the game he is playing. Similarly the "rational" delegate will be expected to be reasonably well informed about how his behavior affects his chances of achieving his goals and will behave in accordance with his information, his position in the game and the goals he is intent upon achieving.

American national parties are loose federations of independent state parties representing somewhat different combinations of economic, ethnic, religious, sectional and other interests. Therefore the great search at most conventions is for "The Man Who Can Win" for without hope of victory over the years there would be little reason for a heterogeneous party to stay together. Even if the parties were far more cohesive than they are today they still could not disregard the need to get into office now and then by nominating a popular candidate.

The desire to nominate a winner is widespread but it is not equally distributed among delegates. It is weaker among delegates with deep and intense policy commitments and stronger among those who are not so fiercely committed to specific policies. Since state parties represent various interests and live somewhat diverse lives we find that they differ in the nature and

intensity of their policy preferences. Within the Democratic party for example outside of the South, "Those states in which a powerful Democratic party organization predated Franklin Roosevelt tend to be moderate those states in which the local Democratic party is a creation of the New Deal and of organized labor in politics tend to be the liberals" ³ Ideological divisions are even more pronounced within the Republican party. Certain states consistently vote for conservative candidates. "Of the 23 states that supported Taft in 1952 only one North Dakota failed to cast a majority of its votes for Goldwater twelve years later" ⁴ Along another dimension the desire to nominate a winner is strongest among delegates from states with a high degree of party competition or where the party is weak. Both of these groups of delegates need a popular candidate in close states to increase their vote, and in states where the party is weak to bring them some patronage. On the other hand, winners are least needed in areas where the party is overwhelmingly dominant such as the South in the case of the Democrats where local fortunes will continue to be good regardless of what happens in the national election. But the one party areas have long since ceased to control the conventions and competition seems to be growing in many formerly one party areas ⁵

Capitalizing on the understandable desire to nominate a winner candidates seek to demonstrate that they can win and others cannot. Candidates cite polls and make complicated electoral analyses in order to convince delegates on this point. Frequently there appear to be several strong candidates and disagreements about which one is the most probable winner often take place because the delegates have private preferences and lack enough information about what the voters are likely to do ⁶

Politicians seek to maintain or increase their own political power. In order to do so most of them feel that they must in general increase the potential vote for candidates whom they sponsor. The more leaders who agree on a candidate and the more interest groups and state party organizations that are work

ing for his election the greater are the chances that he will win office and provide those politicians who supported him with access to political power. Party unity therefore is perceived by politicians as an important prerequisite to the achievement of victory. Unless party leaders achieve a consensus among themselves the chances are diminished that they will be able to elect a President. Parties tend as a result to nominate candidates who at the least are not obnoxious to and ideally are attractive to as many interest groups and state party leaders as possible.⁷ If winning becomes less important or ideology more important, or both the incentive to find a candidate with broad appeal will decline.

The members of each party may love their party on a sentimental basis. But do they love one another? The convention tests party unity by determining whether the disparate elements which make up each party can agree on one man to represent them—a man who cannot possibly be equally attractive to all of them. Party unity may aid in securing victory and this provides an incentive for keeping all the factions under the same party umbrella. But the differences among delegates may be so great that no one is quite sure whether they can agree. The much maligned party platform is exceedingly important in this regard not so much for what it makes explicit but for the fact that it is written at all. The platform tests and communicates the ability of the many party factions to agree on something even if on some crucial points major differences have to be papered over.⁸

One of the important estimates which rival party leaders must make is how far they can go in attaining their preferences without completely alienating some faction resulting in its withdrawal from the convention. This information may not be available until party factions begin to bargain at the convention.

Delegates not only want to unify the party around a probable winner they also want to make certain that they have a claim on him so that he will consider their requests favorably. Thus they seek either a candidate who is known to be friendly to them

whose policy views tend to coincide with theirs, or who will be indebted to them because they have provided support toward his nomination. Jim Farley's famous list establishing priorities for distributing patronage—FRBC (For Roosevelt Before Chicago)—illustrates this point. It helps to explain the rush to get on the bandwagon by delegates who wish access to the winning candidate. But more than one bandwagon may appear to be in the making and delegates and their political leaders may have difficulty deciding when the best time is to make the jump and gain the greatest bargaining advantages for themselves.

It must never be forgotten that delegates come from state parties with internal lives of their own. The delegates spend over 1400 days every four years as members of their state parties and less than a week at the national convention. To commit acts at the convention—supporting a candidate unpopular in that state, insisting on a unit rule for delegation voting against the intense opposition of a strong minority—which would lead to years of bitter internal rivalry would be unwise. Yet it is not always possible to avoid mistakes. Delegates may misjudge who will run well in their state and provide a "coattail effect." Sometimes nominees run better in states which opposed them at the convention than in those which gave them support.⁸ In any event, it is clear that in order to interpret or predict a state's behavior one may have to know a great deal about internal party conditions. One of the first requirements imposed on any Presidential aspirant is that he acquire information on internal party affairs which may prove indispensable to planning his strategy and may enable him to take advantage of or to avoid dangerous party splits.

We have seen that some delegates have strong policy preferences. Negroes and Southerners may care deeply about racial questions. Union officials and industrial executives may be unwilling to support candidates presumed to be hostile to the interests they represent. Delegates from the District of Columbia may consider home rule to be of paramount importance while the men

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from Tennessee may be adamant about public power. There are consistent liberal and conservative blocs in both major parties. To some extent therefore intense policy preferences may restrict the actions of delegates who share them: they may seek the man who has the best chance of winning among those candidates who meet their specifications on crucial policies.

The major goal of the Presidential aspirant in the convention is to win the nomination, but in addition he rightly regards the nominating convention as the first part of the election campaign. This means that even while prospective candidates are belaboring one another in an attempt to get the nomination, they must give due consideration to the necessity for party unity in case they win. There are several ways in which this party unity is achieved. One device available to the winner of a contested nomination is to select the disappointed Presidential aspirant with the second most votes in the convention as a Vice Presidential nominee, as Kennedy selected Lyndon Johnson in 1960.

Incumbent Presidents and other obvious choices such as Richard Nixon in 1960 are in a better position to treat the convention as the opening gun of their campaign. They can participate wholeheartedly in the party rituals, the speech making, informal social gatherings, and the self-congratulation that give the party faithful at the convention a sense of identity and mission, and project over television an image of unity, purpose, and togetherness. Such nominees also can manipulate the party platform to offset their real or imagined weaknesses with the electorate and to capitalize on their strengths. In contested conventions the platform must be negotiated among representatives of the leading contenders and major segments of the party, and so it is less easy to write a platform that the eventual winner can comfortably campaign on.

Thus we can describe quickly the major goals of most delegates to national conventions. They want to gain power, to nominate a man who can win the election, to unify the party, to obtain

ing on the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party challenge to the Mississippi delegation by seating the latter but allowing the former the status of observers ¹²

Uncertainty

It is far easier to describe goals than to attain them. The attainment of each participant's goal requires a great deal of information about the future. What will the electorate do at the polls months after the convention? Who will other delegates to the convention support and for how long? What will be the effect of initial declarations and switches of support on other delegates? What bargains can a particular candidate make? What will be the consequences of the nomination for one's state party?

Answers to these and other questions about pre-convention and convention events are characteristically difficult to obtain and uncertain at best. *There are good reasons for this.* The answers depend first on national and world conditions which we have not learned how to predict—war, depression, inflation. To pick an extreme example, the candidate who appears likely to win in peacetime may not be able to command the support of the electorate during open warfare unless he happens to be the incumbent President. Second, the answers depend on a complex series of events involving the actions, reactions, and intentions of others. To obtain a claim on the winner, a delegate (or delegation) often must contribute to his support at the convention by guessing who will win in time to "get on the bandwagon." But a delegation's estimate of who will win may be determined in part at least, by the estimate it makes about what other delegations are going to do. And their behavior in turn may be influenced by what still others do or say they are going to do. This situation may result in a self-fulfilling prophecy where a delegation's estimate of who is most likely to win leads to actions which influence others in the same direction and confirms its original expectation. A third difficulty in acquiring the necessary information results because delegates are required not merely to predict an isolated

set of occurrences (although this would be difficult enough) but to gauge the outcome of complex chains of events. If nominee A receives support from delegation II and wins decisively in primary C then he will be in a position to bargain with delegation D and to use this leverage to gain support from party leader E which in turn will lead to the possibility of heading off rival nominee F and so on.

There are some potentially reliable sources of information—primaries, polls, balloting on procedural motions or on the platform, successive nominating ballots, shifts by key delegations—which are avidly observed. But these publicly available indicators of what might happen in the future do not necessarily have meaning in themselves; they are given meaning by interested observers. Unless the significance attributed to the indicators is widely shared and clear beyond any doubt, so that one overwhelming favorite emerges, the delegate is still left with the troublesome problem of interpretation.

Many of the standard indicators may be perceived to be ambiguous. Did Senator John F. Kennedy emerge from the 1960 Wisconsin primary with a margin of *only* 100,000 votes, or did he win by *the substantial* margin of 100,000? ¹² Perceptions (and hence interpretations) of identical indicators may vary widely depending on the delegates' predispositions or on the amount of reinforcement or counterinterpretation to which he is subjected. Unless a delegate's interpretation of events coincides with those made by others, his predictions and the actions based on them may be invalidated. At best, the delegates swim in a sea of uncertainty.

The belief of delegates about what is happening determines the premises of many decisions. One report on this subject was made by Colonel Jack Arvey who led the forces in Illinois which wanted to draft Adlai Stevenson in the 1952 Democratic Convention.

Cook County Chairman Joe Gill and I were having dinner when one of our ward committeemen came running over

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to tell us an important roll call vote was under way on the seating of Virginia. Gill and I hurried back into the hall. Illinois had already been recorded 45-15 against seating Virginia. It suddenly dawned on us what was happening. The strategy of the Kefauver backers and the Northern liberal bloc was to try and make impossible demands on the Southern delegates so that they would walk out of the Convention. If the total Convention vote was thus cut down by the walkout of delegates who would never vote for Kefauver then the Tennessee Senator would have a better chance of winning the nomination. Our Illinois delegation quickly huddled and then changed our vote to 52-8 in favor of seating Virginia.

The eight opposed included Senator Douglas and other backers of Kefauver.¹¹

Now whether or not Arvey correctly guessed the strategy of the Kefauver forces this anecdote provides a vivid picture of the premises on which the action of the Stevenson group was based.

Power

A relatively few party leaders control the decisions of a large proportion of the delegates to conventions. Delegates to national conventions are chosen after all as representatives of the several state party organizations apportioned according to a formula laid down by action of previous national conventions. While it is true that official decisions are made by a majority vote of delegates, American party organizations are centralized at state and local levels. This means that such hierarchical controls as actually exist on the state and local level will assert themselves in the national convention. Since the probabilities are fairly good that both major parties at any given time will have succeeded in electing a substantial number of Governors and Mayors of important cities, the chances are also fairly good that a substantial number of delegates will be controlled hierarchically. Some states of course may be badly split with no one holding the lever to much more than his own vote.¹²

And there are also cases when effective leadership is exercised

by men who are not the highest elected officials. In 1956, for example, it was quite clear that party leader Carmine DeSapio had more to say about what the New York delegation did than did Governor Averell Harriman. Leadership in the state organization may belong to a national committeeman, a Congressman, a coalition of county officials, or an elder statesman.

The power of elected leaders over their state party organizations varies as well. Governor Dewey was able to wield virtually absolute control over the New York Republican delegation when he was in office.¹⁸ Other Governors may be able to throw their votes to certain candidates but not to others because the delegates would not permit it. The delegation may agree to stick with its leader for a specified number of ballots and no further. Then internal bargaining may take place with the Governor acting as first among equals, but no more than that. The desire to maximize the delegation's bargaining power by maintaining a united position may cause a Governor to make concessions to some of his delegates.

Barring catastrophic events—depression, war, scandal—the President's power is most certainly strong enough to assure him of renomination within the limits imposed by the Anti Third Term (the 22nd) Amendment to the Constitution. This is not merely because his is the greatest, most visible office in the land with all sorts of patronage and other controls over potential delegates. There is, in addition, the fact that his party can hardly hope to win by repudiating him. To refuse him the nomination would, most politicians feel, be tantamount to confessing political bankruptcy or ineptitude.

The Presidential power over national conventions has historically extended to (1) the right to renomination, or to designate the party nominee, effectively exercised in seventeen of the nineteen conventions since the Civil War in which the President interested himself in the outcome; (2) the power to dictate the party platform; (3) the power to designate the officers of the convention; (4) the power to select many delegates—especially

potent in the case of Republican delegations from the one party Democratic South where Republican Presidents until the passage of the Hatch Act drew upon a corporal's guard of Federal patronage appointees to man this sizable convention bloc

The constitutional amendment limiting Presidents to two terms may eventually change the power of a two-term incumbent radically but we doubt it The party still must run on the Presidential record and the outgoing President still seems likely to control the management of the convention Before President Roosevelt broke the two term tradition outgoing Presidents controlled conventions even when no one expected them to run again And President Truman was also very influential in 1952 when he was not a candidate for re election ¹

In the absence of hierarchical control by an incumbent President decision making at conventions is ordinarily coordinated by a process of bargaining among party leaders We think of bargaining as a method by which activities are coordinated in situations where controls between individuals approach equality where no leader by himself can fully dominate another Each leader represents a state party or faction within a state which is independently organized and not subject to control by outsiders In the presence of disagreement and the absence of coercion leaders must persuade one another compromise and form coalitions if they are to gain sufficient support to carry the day Although the leaders may differ in their preferences among possible candidates they believe that participating in the bargaining process will aid them in achieving their goals and inform them of the goals and tactics of others which in turn may help them in attaining their goals

Prerequisites to bargaining may be summarized as (1) no hierarchical controls (2) interdependence of bargainers (3) disagreement among bargainers and (4) expectation of gain When the President is of the opposite party or chooses not to intervene the convention becomes a bargaining system because no political leader besides the President is in a position to control

the national convention by himself. The interdependence of party leaders may be established by reference to the custom of American democracy which allows the voters to replace the elected officials of one party with those of another at general elections. In order to mobilize enough nationwide support to elect a President, party leaders from a large number of constituencies must be satisfied with the nominee. Without agreement on a nominee, none of them is likely to enjoy access to the eventual President; hence party leaders are interdependent and expect to gain from the outcome of the bargain. Because of the different amounts of access to different aspirants which delegates carry with them into the convention, the preferences of delegates are likely initially to disagree.¹⁸ Most politicians believe that bargaining is necessary and not dishonorable. By challenging the moral basis of this belief, Senator Goldwater took the position in 1964 that the gains to be expected by bargaining were greatly outweighed by the loss of ideological purity and commitment.

PRE CONVENTION STRATEGIES

The selection of a Presidential nominee is the business which dominates the convention. From this it follows that decisions preceding the Presidential nomination are important or unimportant largely depending upon their implications for the Presidential nomination. Decisions not taken unanimously which precede the Presidential nomination in the convention are almost always tests of strength between party factions divided as to the Presidential nomination. These decisions are usually more important for the information they communicate on the strength of the candidates than for their actual content.¹⁹

Perhaps the first strategic decision facing an avowed candidate is whether to attempt to become a front runner by entering primaries, barnstorming the country and publicly seeking support at state conventions. The advantage of this strategy is that a candidate may build up such a commanding lead (or appear to

do so) that no one will be able (or will try) to stop him at the national convention. The disadvantage is that an open campaign may reveal his inability to acquire support or may lead other candidates to band together in order to stop him. Adoption of this position depends for its success then, upon the front runner's ability to predict accurately both how he will fare compared to others in open competition and what others will be able to do when they discover his lead. He may for example try to anticipate whether his activity will stimulate a coalition of opponents who are otherwise unlikely to get together. If such a coalition seems likely the candidate may issue communications playing down the extent of his support. But this tactic may discourage new supporters who would have been attracted by a display of strength. Candidates can never be entirely certain that they are striking the right balance between reticence and aggressiveness which may explain why unabashed attempts to use bandwagon or dark horse strategies in relatively undiluted form are quite common.

The dark horse is an avowed candidate who avoids primaries and much open campaigning. Like Stuart Symington in 1960 or Richard Nixon in 1964 he is content to be everyone's friend and no one's enemy.² As Abraham Lincoln wrote to a supporter in 1860 describing his dark horse strategy: "My name is new in the field and I suppose I am not the first choice of a very great many. Our policy then is to give no offense to others—leave them in a mood to come to us if they shall be compelled to give up their first love."³ The strategy of the dark horse is to combine with others to oppose every front runner. His hope is that when no front runner is left he will appear as the man who can unify the party by being acceptable to all and obnoxious to none. The dangers the dark horse faces are that he will enter the convention with too little support to make a strong bid or that some other dark horse will prove preferable. How much support is enough to make a serious bid but not enough to be shot at as a front runner? How far behind the front runner can a candidate permit

himself to get without becoming entirely lost from sight? Either an intuitive ability to guess or an exceedingly accurate apparatus for collecting information on the present strength of candidates as well as on the likely effect of different levels of strength on other delegates, must be part of the serious dark horse's equipment.

Primaries

Primaries are important largely because the results represent an ostensibly objective indication of whether a candidate can win the election. The contestants stand to gain or lose far more than the small number of delegate votes which may be at stake. Thus a man situated as was Richard Nixon in 1960 would be ill advised to enter a primary unless the information at his disposal led him to believe that he was quite certain to win. This stricture applies with special force to any candidate who is well ahead in delegate support. All he can gain is a few additional votes while he can lose his existing support by a bad showing in the primary since this would be interpreted as meaning that he could not win in the election. The candidate who is far behind or who has to overcome severe handicaps however has little or nothing to lose by entering a risky primary. If he wins he has demonstrated his popularity; if he loses he is hardly worse off than if he had not entered the primary at all. Such was the case when John F. Kennedy quieted the apprehensions of Democratic politicians about the religious issue by winning in Protestant West Virginia.²² Goldwater needed a primary victory in California to show uncommitted delegates that he had voter appeal even though at the start of the primary campaign he had been a prominent candidate. He accepted the risk of losing the nomination if he lost the primary because his need for proof of popularity to get the votes necessary for nomination outweighed his fear of the possibility of losing the primary contest.²³ The man who is ahead needs more certain information about how primaries are likely to turn out because he takes the greater risk.

The man who is behind in securing convention support or whose ability to win is in doubt engages in strategies of enticement in which he issues siren calls inviting the leading contenders into a primary. He suggests that they are cowardly, lacking in fighting spirit, afraid to face the public. By luring them into a primary, he hopes to deal a severe blow to their chances and thereby boost his own. In order to avoid this trap, it may be necessary for candidates to publicize their disdain for primaries to specify in advance all the reasons why such a contest would be unnecessary, unfair, and a waste of time. The candidate who finds himself in a primary (and wishes to live and fight again another day) does well to have alibis ready to explain away seemingly disadvantageous results.

In a primary in which there are many contenders, a defeated candidate may attempt to gain advantage from what may be regarded as an ambiguous result by claiming that the man who actually won was allied to him ideologically. The results may then be viewed as a victory for the ideology rather than defeat for the candidate. After La Follette had won an overwhelming victory in the 1912 Republican primary in North Dakota, Theodore Roosevelt issued a statement "claiming an immense progressive victory." He even went beyond this to count the La Follette delegation as part of the Roosevelt camp once it had cast "a complimentary vote for La Follette."²⁴ In the same way, Rockefeller supporters in 1964 hailed the New Hampshire Republican primary, which was won by Henry Cabot Lodge, as a defeat for Goldwater and a victory for the moderate wing of the Republican party.

One strategy for primaries, the write-in, offers the maximum possibility of gain with the minimum possibility of loss. If a candidate gets virtually no votes, he can easily explain this by saying that he did not campaign and that it is difficult for people to write in names. If he receives over 10 per cent of the vote, he can hail this as a tremendous victory under the circumstances. In Nebraska in 1964, Nixon received 35% of the vote as a write-in.

in the primary and it was "claimed that 'Nebraskans have nominated the next Republican candidate for President'—a claim that was forgotten after the Nixon debacle in Oregon just three days later"²⁵

If a candidate should win he can build it up to the sky, stressing the extraordinary popularity required to get people to go to all the trouble of writing in a name.²⁶ But the man who is behind cannot rest content with being able to explain away a poor showing—he must win to establish himself as a contender. The strategy of the write in, consequently, is most accessible to the man who is ahead and hopes to solidify his position while minimizing his risks.

The foregoing discussion should help us to understand why those who win primaries sometimes do not win the nomination. Part of the reason is that there are not many primaries and not all of those actually commit delegates to vote for a candidate. Of greater significance, however, is the fact that primary activity is often (though by no means always) a sign that a candidate has great obstacles to overcome and must win many primaries in order to be considered for the nomination at all. The image communicated to political professionals by a few primary victories unless they are overwhelming may be less that of the conquering hero than that of the drowning man clutching at the last straw.

Thus entering and winning primaries may be of little value unless the results are widely interpreted in such a way as to improve a candidate's chances. The contestant who "loses" but does better than expected may reap greater advantage from a primary than the one who wins but falls below expectations. It is therefore manifestly to the advantage of a candidate to hold his claims down to minimum proportions. Kennedy tried in 1960 to follow this advice in Wisconsin—he claimed Humphrey had been Wisconsin's third Senator—but the press, radio, and TV took note of his extensive organization and of favorable polls and in advance pinned the winner by a landslide label on

facts about the New York Democratic party organization to people throughout the country. The response encouraged a follow up pamphlet which presented without comment the New York gubernatorial vote in every county since 1916. It was intended to be impressive testimony of FDR's vote-getting ability. When many people wrote back expressing an interest in FDR's candidacy offering suggestions or just saying "thanks" Farley replied with a personal message and endeavored to keep up the contact through further letters, phone calls, and even a phonograph record. Later in 1931 Farley took a trip through the West ostensibly to visit the Elks Convention in Seattle but actually to contact over 1 000 party leaders in all but three states west of the Mississippi. Upon his return, every one of Farley's contacts received a personal letter.³⁰

The well-organized candidates contact the delegates personally or through close associates. They may show a winning personality, make implied promises of good things to come, discuss or avoid controversial issues of special importance to the locality as seems best calculated to increase their support. If a favorable public opinion poll is handy or can be arranged, this will often be cited to substantiate the claims of victory which must be made to convey the impression that it would be a good idea to climb on the bandwagon. More than one can play at this game, however, and "pollsmanship" is becoming a common art whose practitioners know how to secure the desired impression and blunt harmful ones. There are good reasons to suppose that the number of polls taken exceeds the number made public since sometimes the news they disclose disappoints the candidate who paid for them.

AT THE CONVENTION

The national convention is a mass meeting in which the participants necessarily play widely varying and unequal roles. The candidates and their chief supporters are busily, perhaps

frantically perfecting their organization and trying to influence as many delegates as they can. The leaders of "bossed" or "pledged" delegations are either actively supporting their candidate or negotiating for the disposal of the votes they command within the limits of discretion which their delegation places on them. These are the men who conduct negotiations among the delegations when an *impasse* develops. There are also factional leaders and independent delegates within state delegations who play an important part in determining what their delegation or a part of their delegation will do. They bargain *within* their delegation rather than *among* the various state delegations. The ordinary delegate however whose vote may have been pledged in a primary or who is controlled by others may have little to do. He stands and waits important only if the nomination becomes closely contested and circumstances operate to release him from prior commitments and the control of his state party organization. Only then will he be assiduously wooed occupying a place in the scheme of things much like the independent delegates. In setting the stage for the balloting therefore we will deal first with the convention activists—candidates and their organizations party "bosses" and leaders of large delegations independent delegates and state factional leaders—and then with the rank and file delegates.

Candidates and Their Organizations

There is an extraordinarily wide divergence among candidate organizations. They range from the comprehensive integrated and superbly effective to the fragmented uncoordinated and virtually nonexistent. We can only suggest the range of organizational accomplishment through some general comment and a few examples.

In 1960 Senator John F. Kennedy wanted a communications network which would provide him with a continuing and accurate stream of vital information.³¹ He wanted detailed personal information about as many delegates as possible in order to know

organization's estimate of their delegate strength was proven correct within a one vote margin ³²

The danger of confusion and mishap is multiplied during the balloting because the convention floor is filled and it is difficult to move about freely. The Kennedy organization arranged for telephones on the convention floor. Six telephones were set up beneath the seats of chairmen of friendly delegations who were seated around the gigantic convention hall. These phones were connected to the Kennedy headquarters outside the hall. Inside the headquarters staff members sat near the telephone and simultaneously scanned several television sets to look for possible defections. Had the telephones failed to work (they were pre tested) walkie talkie radios were available to take their place ³³

By comparison with the Kennedy efforts most of the organizations which have successfully nominated Presidential candidates in American history have been uncoordinated, diffuse affairs. For example in 1952 none of the various factions in the Democratic party that favored the nomination of Adlai Stevenson had the wholehearted cooperation of their candidate. Information gathering was casual, tactical maneuvers were in some cases hit upon accidentally or as afterthoughts. The factions working for the Stevenson nomination did not cooperate with one another to a significant degree and in fact squabbled among themselves on occasion. Yet Stevenson was nominated, his success came about because he was the second choice of an overwhelming number of delegates who could not agree on any of their first choices and the first choice of a significant number of leaders in spite of his disinclination to pursue the nomination in an organized fashion ³⁴

Delegates

We can identify two categories of delegation activists (1) party bosses and state leaders who control many votes other than their own and who participate in high level negotiations on the disposition of these votes and (2) delegates of independent

standing who may control only their own votes or those of a faction within their home state but who because of their special skills at negotiation and maneuver or because of their high personal prestige or simply because of the open and unbossed character of their state delegation play significant roles at the convention. From this latter group are drawn the delegates who man the key subcommittees and committees on the platform and on credentials and they often have a real voice in determining the vote of their delegation.

The roles of these activists may be contrasted with the activities of rank and file members of bossed delegations—delegations pledged by primary law or in the hands of local and state party leaders. It is not uncommon for large state delegations to split their votes into halves or thirds so as to enable a large number of the party faithful to make the trip to the convention city but these votes are not often independently cast. Essentially party leaders of the large delegations determine the disposition of these votes. The delegates who in a formal sense hold the votes are thus left with little or no political decision making to participate in. They spend their time milling around and conversing with one another. Some delegates may sample the recreational facilities of the convention city. Others may visit the campaign headquarters of the candidates. The more fortunate ones return home at least with something to talk about and perhaps a word from a famous television newscaster who could be counted a celebrity. But for the most part these delegates find themselves crushed by the masses of people, uncertain of whom to speak to (especially before delegates' badges are issued as identification) and subject to rebuff. Many of these delegates are important people back home but at the convention they often feel like "a little fish in a big pond" and worry about their status in the new environment.

As the convention provides an environment conducive to anxiety, so it also provides opportunities for adjustment. Anxiety induced by strangeness of place can be mitigated but not erased.

adjourned³⁸ Twenty years later at another Republican Convention Senator Bricker of Ohio asked Chairman Joseph Martin for a recess before the sixth ballot This would have given the Taft and Dewey forces time to make a deal Partial to the Willkie cause however Martin refused the request and the balloting continued to be ended by victory for Willkie³⁹

Unless victory appears assured it may be unwise for a candidate to challenge a popular chairman An alternate strategy is to accept an unfavorable chairman but to put forth a stream of publicity stressing the chairman's partiality so that he feels under continuous scrutiny and may bend over backward to avoid charges of favoritism Nowadays however the usual practice is for representatives of the leading candidates to agree upon major personnel of the convention—keynoter, permanent chairman platform committee chairman—by negotiation well ahead of the convention itself

Virtually any action can take on added significance if it reveals information hitherto unavailable to all In the 1932 Democratic Convention a vote on seating a contested delegation was taken under conditions which freed many of the delegates from the unit rule This showed observers which delegations were closely divided information which imposition of the unit rule had helped to hide⁴⁰

Such apparently trivial matters as the date or the place in which the convention meets may take on special meaning if those decisions are believed to affect the fortunes of candidates The fact that the 1814 Democratic Convention was delayed while Van Buren's letter opposing the annexation of Texas was having its effects was known at that time to be prejudicial to his chances Locating the 1928 Democratic Convention in Houston Texas was widely interpreted as a move to mollify people in the South and led to the conclusion that this was necessary because party leaders intended to nominate Al Smith

While candidates are being nominated and during the balloting demonstrations—partly spontaneous largely prearranged—

take place on the floor. This raucous display is meant to let every one know that a candidate has many loyal supporters. Hopefully a demonstration at a crucial moment might succeed in igniting the spark of enthusiasm among the multitude of uncertain delegates. But as supporters of Adlai Stevenson learned in 1960, this has the possibility of working only when delegates are really uncertain and uncommitted.

Despite the fact that everyone seems aware of what is going on, the same old tricks are played at every convention. Part of the reason is that once this practice has begun, unanimous consent is necessary to eliminate it; otherwise the candidate who received no ovation would be deemed to have no support or not enough sense to stimulate it artificially. Another part of the rationale behind demonstrations should be clear from our argument. Reliable information may be so scarce that despite all warnings delegates may be swayed (as was the Republican Convention of 1940 that nominated Wendell Willkie) by the most immediate, tangible evidence before them—the roar of the crowd.⁴¹

The Balloting

The one route to political power open to all delegates in the convention is to contribute to the majority essential for the nomination of the man they believe will be the winner. This explains the so-called "bandwagon" behavior which can be seen in operation at many conventions. When delegates believe that one Presidential aspirant is certain of nomination, they will attempt to record themselves as voting for that aspirant as quickly as possible. Delegates committed to a favorite son candidate will trade their votes for access (or what they hope will be access) to the candidate they think most likely to win nomination. Note the differences in these two statements. In the first, delegates know which candidate will win and hope to earn his gratitude by voting for him. In the corollary, delegates are less certain of the outcome; hence their commitment to an aspirant is more costly for him. The prospective candidate in these circumstances

often makes promises of access to delegates in return for their support

An aspirant who leads in votes for the nomination must actually win the nomination by a certain point in time or else his chances of eventually winning decline precipitously even though he remains in the lead temporarily. This is true when delegate support is given candidates because of the expectation of victory. When this victory falls short of quick materialization delegates may question their initial judgment. Thus the longer a candidate remains in the lead without starting a bandwagon the greater the chance that his supporters will reassess his chances of victory and vote for someone else. In order to maximize access, delegates prefer to support the eventual winner before he achieves a majority. They are therefore guided by what they expect other delegates to do and are constantly on the alert to change their expectations to conform to the latest information. This information may be nothing more substantial than a rumor, which quickly takes on the status of a self fulfilling prophecy as delegates stampede in response to expectations quickly realized about how other delegates will respond. The strategies which a candidate adopts depend therefore, not only on showing that he can win but also on his position in the convention. The front runner must score an early victory or resign himself to defeat. So long as he keeps gaining support no matter how slightly, he is still in contention because it is assumed that he may have more strength in reserve. But the front runner who begins to manifest any decline, or even in some cases a leveling-off in votes on successive ballots can expect to see uncommitted delegates conclude that he has shot his bolt and begin to shift their support to more hopeful prospects.

Considered as a source of information the balloting may be viewed as indicating not merely each candidate's vote but also whether he is moving up toward hope or down to despair. One strategy sometimes used in this connection is to "hide" a few votes on early ballots by giving them to others and reclaiming

them little by little so as to show a steady increase⁴² Or a candidate may decide to bide his time and delay making his bid In that case a weak initial total of votes is not likely to be commented upon because the front runner occupies the center of attention Later a dark horse may occasion surprise by his rapid climb and hope that most delegates will decide to hitch their wagons to a rising star

Aspirants sometimes combine their voting strength in the convention in order to prevent a front running candidate from gaining a majority They will then negotiate the nomination among themselves If the front runner's victory promises other aspirants insufficient access they may defeat him by preventing a bandwagon in his favor An apparently successful case of combining against the front runner occurred in 1920 when Harry Daugherty Harding's manager realizing that General Leonard Wood had to be defeated to give Harding a chance offered to lend Governor Lowden every vote he could spare until the Governor passed Wood in the balloting Then the alliance would be terminated "Certainly you couldn't make a fairer proposition" Lowden responded and the agreement was consummated⁴³

The rational aspirant who leads but lacks a majority will therefore promise access to leaders representing the requisite number of votes if he believes that no bandwagon will appear unstimulated The front runner may reasonably expect to win without cost (that is without making such promises) unless leaders of opposing factions reach agreement on a ticket, and appear likely to combine against him Early front runners often win nominations precisely because they face a divided opposition

The case of the Democrats in 1960 is a perfect example of this In the pre-convention maneuvering Adlai Stevenson might have cut into John Kennedy's liberal and labor support, had he made himself available as a candidate Many party regulars from the urban political machines and in particular ex President Truman had no special liking for Kennedy, and Senator Johnson could draw on a rather substantial reservoir of strength from

Southern delegations determined not to walk out even though they knew they would not approve of the civil rights plank of the platform.

These groups could not get together and settle on a candidate who was more satisfactory to all of them than the front runner Senator Kennedy. Labor clearly would accept no one to the right of Kennedy; the Southerners could abide nobody to the left of him. Adlai Stevenson was perhaps the leading candidate whose ideological location, prominence in the party, and public record could pass muster with these groups, but he had alienated Truman and in any case refused to go to work on his own behalf. And so Kennedy's opposition stayed divided.

The time may come when a front runner finds that he cannot win with his existing support. Then he bargains. He may offer the Vice-Presidential nomination to one or more leaders of important states; he may hint at cabinet posts, patronage, or preferred treatment; he may explore concessions on policy. But this account is too simple. Before he can bargain, the candidate must know with whom to bargain. And among those delegations which might be swayed must be found the ones amenable to what the candidate can offer. The necessity of maintaining an apparatus for obtaining this information is evident.

If a candidate thinks he can win on his own, he may be reluctant to risk sacrificing his ambition by "making a deal" to combine against a front runner. Yet if he hesitates too long, he may lose all. This is apparently what happened to Thomas E. Dewey in the 1940 Republican Convention. As Senator Arthur Vandenbergh recorded in his diary: "I offered to flip a coin with Dewey to see which side of the ticket each would take. Dewey never saw me again until the final voting. But it was too late. He missed the boat when he clung to his own first place ambitions. Between us we could have controlled the convention if it had been done in the first instance."⁴⁴

The candidate who wishes to get support must show that he already has some to begin with. This is particularly the case

when one contender is considering throwing his support to another in order to assure the latter's nomination. There would be no point in sacrificing one's chances in favor of another candidate who would then not have enough votes to win. This kind of situation occurred around the time of the fiftieth ballot at the 1924 Democratic Convention. Al Smith informed Senator Oscar Underwood of Alabama that if two more Southern states would give Underwood their support, Smith would also give the Senator his support. The Underwood forces accepted the offer but they were unable to find other Southern states who would support their candidate and so the scheme fell through.⁴⁵

The bargaining process itself may be an excellent source of information on what important delegates are likely to do under a variety of circumstances. A series of probing actions may be carried out to discover what these delegates want, what they will take, what they will give in return. Out of the negotiations which are being carried on among leaders may emerge the beginnings of a commonly held picture of the shape of events to come.

Bargains may be tacit rather than explicit, made through intermediaries rather than by principals. Exactly what was promised may not be entirely clear or may be distorted later on if this is deemed advantageous. The man who wishes to collect what he believes to be his due may have trouble securing effective guarantees. Thomas Dewey never quite manifested the same understanding that Charles Halleck did about an offer of the Vice Presidency in return for support in the Republican Convention of 1948.⁴⁶ One delegate to the 1960 Democratic Convention told reporters that he was the nineteenth person to be offered the Vice-Presidency by the Kennedy forces. Under the circumstances he allowed as how he would take cash.

It is possible that much less comes out of the convention in terms of reward for support than is commonly supposed. An incoming President, for example, may well decide to handle patronage through the dominant party faction in a state rather than suffer the disabilities of supporting a weak dissident faction.

that helped him at a convention. Nevertheless, if delegates believe that rewards are likely to follow support, as many apparently do, their actions will conform to this belief.

One by one the leading candidates try their luck. Timing is of the essence. Each candidate seeks the strategic moment to push his candidacy. A miscalculation, a decision perhaps to move ahead before sufficient support is available for the final push, may prove fatal to a candidate's chances. In a closely contested convention the prize may go to the candidate who possesses sufficient information about the intentions of others to make the successful move.

Whispering campaigns are begun, saying "Candidate X is certain to win; get on the bandwagon while you still have a chance." Rumors appear that a crucial delegation will swing to a particular candidate. The balloting may remain substantially unchanged and reveal no secrets. It is difficult to know what to believe. No mass meeting of thousands of delegates can hope to find out who is acceptable to most of them. It is up to the leaders to take over.

In the absence of quick agreement at the convention, the demonstrations and adjournments give party leaders time to meet and see if a candidate can be found who can receive a majority of votes. Generally the most important leaders are Governors who exercise considerable influence in their state and may be able to control the votes of its delegates. National committeemen, state chairmen, elder statesmen, and Congressmen may be among those who attend. This is the "smoke-filled room" of convention lore. Its participants try to work out an agreement which will meet their desires. But they are severely limited in their choice by their estimate of what the people will accept at the polls and what the other delegates will stand for. The leaders are men of independent influence and differing interests, and there may be only a limited range of agreement among them.

Little is known about negotiations among party leaders at conventions. But what we do know suggests that the essential

trick is to convince others that one's preferred view of what will happen or must happen is the correct one. This is apparently what took place in the 1920 Republican Convention when Harry Daugherty succeeded in convincing party leaders that a deadlock was inevitable and that only Harding could break it. Much the same kind of thing occurred in 1844 when Gideon Pillow and George Bancroft spread the word that Cass Calhoun or Van Buren could not possibly win but that Polk would carry the day.⁴⁷

In order to break a deadlock, it is necessary to convince some delegates that the candidate they prefer cannot win and that they would be well advised to switch to a man who can. The leaders at the 1920 Republican Convention decided to communicate this point convincingly by calling for several additional ballots during which nothing changed.⁴⁸ This also helped to assure losing party factions that their candidates had had a fair chance. At the 1924 Democratic Convention, however, which went to 103 ballots, the lengthy voting apparently did not communicate the hopelessness of their cause to the leading candidates. Not only did incompatibility and intransigence block bargaining but short-lived booms kept arising, an indication that the delegates shared no common view of future events.⁴⁹ The shock to loyal party members was so great that John Nance Garner chose to submerge his own chances and throw the 1932 convention to Franklin Roosevelt rather than risk another agonizing stalemate.⁵⁰

The Vice Presidential Nominee

When the convention finally selects its Presidential candidate it turns to the anticlimactic task of finding a running mate. Vice-Presidential nominees are chosen to help the party achieve the Presidency. Party nominees for President and Vice President always appear on the ballot together and are elected together. Since 1804 a vote for one has always been a vote for the other.

The Vice President occupies a post in the legislative branch

of the government which is mostly honorific and his powers and activities in the executive branch are determined by the President.⁵¹ The electoral interdependence of the two offices gives politicians an opportunity to gather votes for the Presidency. Therefore the prescription for an ideal Vice Presidential nominee is the same as for a Presidential nominee with two additions. He must possess those desirable qualities the Presidential nominee lacks and he must be acceptable to the Presidential nominee.

The Vice Presidency is the most important position from which Presidents of the United States are drawn. Just a third of our thirty-six Presidents have been Vice Presidents (Three were elected in their own right, eight first took office upon the death of a President.) American history has given us eleven good reasons—one for each man who succeeded to the Presidency—for inquiring into the qualifications of Vice Presidents and for examining the criteria by which they are chosen.

The Presidential candidate who has firm control over his nomination is in a position to use the Vice Presidential slot to help win the election. This is what Abraham Lincoln did in 1864 when he chose a "War Democrat," Andrew Johnson, who he hoped would add strength to the ticket. In the same way John F. Kennedy chose Lyndon Johnson to help gather Southern votes especially in Texas and Richard Nixon chose Henry Cabot Lodge to help offset the Democratic party advantage in the Northeast. These two Vice Presidential candidates were distinguished men who had a great deal to recommend them. But the help they could offer their parties was undoubtedly an important consideration.

Sometimes a Presidential candidate will try to help heal a breach in the party by offering the Vice-Presidential nomination to a defeated party-faction. Or the Presidential candidate may try to improve his relationships with Congress by finding a running mate who has friends there. Harry Truman was chosen by Franklin Roosevelt for both these reasons.

There have been times when a President has insisted on having his personal choice selected as Vice President. Andrew Jackson was adamant about running with Martin Van Buren and Franklin Roosevelt went so far as to write out a refusal to accept the Democratic nomination in 1940 when party leaders balked at the thought of Henry Wallace.

The Presidential nominee clearly is expected to have a lot to say about whom he will run with on the party ticket. More and more in recent years the expectation has been that the Presidential candidate would make the choice himself after due consultation with party leaders. Indeed, failure to act decisively may well be regarded now as a sign of weakness. Yet there have been times when Presidential candidates have not wished to become involved in internal party battles and have let the convention decide. William Jennings Bryan would not even allow his own Nebraska delegation to vote on the Vice Presidential nomination at the 1896 Democratic Convention and Adlai Stevenson preferred to let Estes Kefauver and John F. Kennedy fight it out for the prize in 1956.

As the world has become a more dangerous place to live in, the need to have a capable Vice President has become more evident and the parties have apparently decided to restrict their choices to men of ability who, whatever electoral assets they may have, give promise of measuring up to the highest office in the land. Since World War II both parties, Republican and Democratic, have generally nominated men of experience and distinction with some notable qualities for high office. Presidents and party leaders have chosen among qualified men to find those who met their requirements. But while Vice Presidents may be talented, they have not historically been chosen mainly for their talents.

When especially able men have appeared in the office from time to time, this may have been due more to the blessings of Providence than to wise actions on our part. If good results require noble intentions, then the criteria for choosing Vice

Presidents may leave much to be desired. Why should the great parties we might ask not set out deliberately to choose the man best able to act as President in case of need? Should ticket balancing and similar considerations be condemned as political chicanery?

In a speech to the Harvard Law School Forum in 1956 former Vice President Henry A. Wallace declared "The greatest danger is that the man just nominated for President will try desperately to heal the wounds and placate the dissidents in his party. My battle cry would be—no more deals—no more balancing of the ticket." In 1964 the Republican party evidently also endorsed this view. The selection of the 1964 Republican nominee William Miller was intended to violate criteria used in the past for balancing the ticket. Although he came from a region different from Barry Goldwater and is a Catholic, he was chosen primarily because of his ideological affinity with the Presidential candidate. The special style of Goldwater and his supporters required that consistency of views, opposition to the other party on as many issues as possible, and refusal to bargain prevail over the traditional political demands for compromise, flexibility, and popularity, and most of the one hundred and thirty-odd Goldwater delegates we interviewed at the Republican Convention were prepared to sacrifice victory if victory meant becoming a "me too" party or "going against principle" by adopting what they termed the "devious and corrupt" balanced tickets of the past.

On the Democratic side, and in line with conventional practice of recent years, President Johnson chose a man of more evident Presidential calibre who was not a threat to him within the Democratic party but rather was helpful in unifying the party and maintaining its good electoral prospects. Johnson's own credentials as a liberal Democrat down through the years have not been strong; his choice as Vice President in 1960 was opposed on these grounds by many labor leaders and by leaders from several of the most important urban Democratic strongholds.

Thus the 1964 choice of Senator Humphrey a long time liberal leader did much to cement relations within the party and to unify Democrats of many shades of political preference solidly behind the national ticket In choosing Humphrey President Johnson adhered to a familiar strategy of "ticket balancing"

Thus a Republican Presidential candidate from the East will try to pick a Vice President from the Mid or Far West though both will probably reside in large two party "swing" states A liberal Democrat running for President will try to find a more conservative running mate And so on If it is impossible to find one man who combines within his heritage personality and experience all the virtues allegedly cherished by American voters the parties console themselves by attempting to construct out of two running mates a composite father son image of forward looking—conservative rural—urban energetic—wise leadership which evokes hometown ethnic and party loyalties among a maximum number of voters That at least is the theory behind the balanced ticket

What can we say in general evaluation of these alternative strategies? From the standpoint of the electoral success of candidates balancing the ticket seems only prudent But there are reasons as well for ordinary citizens to prefer that candidates make an effort in this direction One of the chief assets of the American party system in the past has been its ability (with the exception of the Civil War period) to reduce conflict by enforcing compromise within the major factions of each party A refusal to heal the wounds and placate dissidents is nothing less than a declaration of internal war It can only lead to increased conflict within the party Willingness to bargain and make concessions to opponents is part of the price for maintaining unity in a party sufficiently large and varied to be able to appeal successfully to a population divided on economic sectional racial religious and ethnic grounds To refuse entirely to balance the ticket would be to risk changing our large heterogeneous parties into a multiplicity of small sects of "true believers" who care more about

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maintaining their internal purity than about winning public office.

This is not to suggest that the President and Vice-President must be worlds apart in their policy preferences in order to please everyone (or no one). There is obvious good sense in providing for a basic continuity in policy in case a President should die or be disabled. But this need not mean that the two men should be identical in every respect even were that possible. Within the broad outlines of agreement on the basic principles of the nation's foreign policy and of the government's role in the economy, for example, a President would have no great difficulty in finding a variety of men who were somewhat more or less liberal than himself who appealed to somewhat different groups or who differed in other salient ways. To go this far in favor of party unity, factional conciliation, and popular preference should not discomfort anyone who realizes the costs of failing to balance the ticket in some important way.

Actually there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that Vice-Presidents add or detract from the popularity of Presidential candidates with the voters. By helping unite the party, however, and by giving diverse party leaders another focus of identification with the ticket, a Vice-Presidential nominee with the right characteristics can help assure greater effort by party workers which may bring results at election time.

Even if balancing the ticket does not help the party at the polls, it may indirectly help the people. The act of balancing the ticket may aid our political parties in maintaining unity within diversity and thereby in performing their historic function of bringing our varied population closer together rather than pulling it further apart.

THE FUTURE OF NATIONAL CONVENTIONS

It may be that one of the lessons of recent Presidential elections is that national conventions are declining in importance.

as decision making bodies¹¹ They are not now taken seriously as decision making instruments of the party of an incumbent President The turnover of delegates from convention to convention is very high averaging about 60% This suggests the introduction of large numbers of delegates who are recruited by national candidates rather than by local parties The success of both Senator Kennedy in 1960 and Senator Goldwater in 1964 make it plausible to argue that increasingly commitments are being made earlier and earlier in the nomination process even when the nomination of the out party is being contested among several factions

Number of Presidential Ballots in National Party Conventions*

Year	Democrats	Republicans
1928	1	1
1932	4	1
1936	1	1
1940	1	1
1944	1	1
1948	1	3
1952	3	1
1956	1	1
1960	1	1
1964	1	1
First Ballot Total	8/10 (5 incumbents)	8/10 (2 incumbents)
Combined (Democrats and Republicans) First Ballot Nominations		
Nonincumbents 9/13		
Incumbents 7/7		

* Nominations won by incumbents are in *italics*

The large number of first ballot nominations (see the preceding table) in recent years suggests that important things are happening even in the out party before the convention meets

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States	Method of Selecting Delegates to National Conventions	Candidate's Consent Needed to be on Ballot	Preferential Primary—Advisory or Binding	Open or Closed Primary
Alabama	primary if contest ¹	no	optional ²	closed
Alaska	state conventions	no	no	
Arizona	state executive committees	no	no	
Arkansas	state committee	no	no	
California	primary	yes	optional ²	closed
Colorado	district delegates by district conventions delegates at large by state convention	yes	yes—advisory	closed
Connecticut	state conventions	no	no	
Delaware	state conventions	no	no	
District of Columbia	primary	no	no	
Florida	primary	no	yes—binding	closed
Georgia	Republicans—state convention Democrats—state committee	no	yes—advisory	closed
Hawaii	state conventions	no	no	
Idaho	state conventions	no	no	
Illinois	district delegates by primary delegates at large by state convention	no	no	
Indiana	state conventions	yes	yes—advisory	closed
Iowa	state conventions	yes	yes—binding	closed
Kansas	state conventions	no	no	
Kentucky	state conventions	no	no	

In practice this means that Democrats use primaries Republicans use state and district conventions
 If held advisory
 A preferential primary must be held by a Presidential candidate's party if such candidate so petitions the state committee six months prior to the national conventions If a preferential primary is held it is binding on delegates

<i>States</i>	<i>Method of Selecting Delegates to National Conventions</i>	<i>Candidate's Consent Needed to be on Ballot</i>	<i>Preferential Primary— Advisory or Binding</i>	<i>Open or Closed Primary</i>
Louisiana	district delegates by district conventions delegates at large by state convention	no	no	
Maine	Republicans—district conventions Democrats—state convention	no	no	
Maryland	state conventions	yes	yes—binding	closed
Massachusetts	primary	yes	yes—binding	closed
Michigan	state delegate convention	no	no	
Minnesota	district delegates by district conventions delegates at large by state convention	no	no	
Mississippi	state conventions	no	no	
Missouri	state conventions	no	no	
Montana	state conventions	no	no	
Nebraska	primary	no	yes—advisory	closed
Nevada	state conventions	no	no	
New Hampshire	primary	no	yes—advisory	closed
New Jersey	primary	no	yes—advisory	closed
New Mexico	state conventions	no	no	
New York	delegates at large by state convention others—primary	no	no	closed
North Carolina	Republicans—district & state conventions Democrats—state convention	no	no	
North Dakota	state conventions	no	no	

* Only if a delegate's statement of Presidential preference appears on the ballot.

* Binding if and only if the delegate has pledged himself to a Presidential candidate on the ballot.

Voters must be registered with a party but can ask for either party's ballot.

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States	Method of Selecting Delegates to National Conventions	Candidate's Consent Needed to be on Ballot	Preferential Primary—Advisory or Binding	Open or Closed Primary
Ohio	primary	yes	yes—advisory ¹	closed
Oklahoma	state conventions	no	no	
Oregon	primary	no	yes—binding	closed
Pennsylvania	primary	no	yes—advisory ¹	closed
Rhode Island	state conventions	no	no	closed
South Carolina	state conventions	no	yes—advisory	closed
South Dakota	primary	no	yes—advisory	closed
Tennessee	state conventions	no	yes—advisory	closed
Texas	state conventions	no	no	
Utah	Republican—district & state conventions Democrats—state convention	no	no	
Vermont	state conventions	no	no	
Virginia	state conventions	no	no	
Washington	state conventions	no	no	
West Virginia	primary	yes	yes—advisory	closed
Wisconsin	primary	yes	yes—advisory ¹	open
Wyoming	state conventions	no	no	

5) with regard to the legal standing of the preferences expressed in the primary. In some states the Presidential preferences of voters in the primary are regarded as advisory on the state delegation. In others the delegation is legally bound to support the candidate designated until released or as long as the candidate has a chance to win.

NOTES

1 Much of the discussion in this chapter is drawn from our own observations of the nomination process over the mass media, for one of us in person at the Democratic National Convention of 1960 and the Republican National Convention of 1964 and from a set of basic

4 *Ibid* 378-379

5 See for example Donald S Strong *Urban Republicanism in the South* (University Ala 1960) E E Schattschneider *The Semi sovereign People* (New York 1960) Chapter V "The Nationalization of Politics" John C Donovan *Congressional Campaign Maine Elects a Democrat* Eagleton Series Number 16 (New York 1958) and Research Division Republican National Committee *The 1962 Elections* (mimeo Washington 1963)

6 See Paul Tillett ed *Inside Politics The National Conventions 1960* (Dobbs Ferry N.Y. 1962) and Aaron B Wildavsky "The Intelligent Citizens Guide to the Abuses of Statistics" in *Politics and Social Life* eds Nelson W Polsby Robert A. Dentler and Paul A Smith (Boston 1963) pp 825-844

7 Key in *Politics Parties and Pressure Groups* p 443 states succinctly the qualities of the ideally "available" Presidential candidate. He includes such factors as residence in a large politically uncertain state. He also says "a man must be a Protestant [This was published in 1958] of good American stock and name to be available. He should not be too closely affiliated with any particular interest or group nor should he have committed himself on a great and contentious issue before the time is ripe. Yet he must stand for something or a complex of things—a general point of view—in public life." Other factors listed are appearance, personal vigor, the possession of an attractive wife and children, and the luck to be in the right place, age group and so on, at the right time.

8 See Herring *The Politics of Democracy* pp 203-224. Edward F Cooke "Drafting the 1952 Platforms" *Western Political Quarterly* 8 (September 1955) 465-480 and Part III of Tillett *Inside Politics The National Conventions 1960*.

9 This is a point made by David Goldman and Barn *The Politics of National Party Conventions* pp 398-404.

10 Richard M Nixon *Six Crises* (New York 1962) pp 313-314.

11 Karl A Lamb "Civil Rights and the Republican Platform Nixon Achieves Control" in *Inside Politics The National Conventions 1960* ed Paul Tillett pp 55-84. Nixon was also concerned to see

that his party made a good impression on television Nixon, *Six Crises* pp 313-320

12 See Theodore H White *The Making of the President 1964* (New York 1965) Chapter 9

13 See Harry W Ernst, *The Primary That Made a President West Virginia 1960* (New York, 1962) p 5 and Theodore H White *The Making of the President 1960* (New York, 1961) pp 94-95 for indications that participants were not at all clear at the time how to interpret these results

14 Jack Arvey as told to John Madigan "The Reluctant Candidate" *The Reporter* (November 24 1953)

15 In 1960 for example Minnesota Democrats split among delegates friendly to Senator Humphrey and Governor Freeman—and to both of them Freeman nominated John F Kennedy for President. Senator Eugene McCarthy nominated Adlai Stevenson And most of the delegation ended up voting for Humphrey

16 David, Moos and Goldman, *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952* II 155-166

17 Harry S Truman, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City 1956) pp 499-503 and Alben Barkley *That Reminds Me* (Garden City 1954) pp 225-232.

18 For a general discussion of bargaining, see Robert A. Dahl and Charles E. Lindblom *Politics Economics and Welfare* (New York 1953) *passim* and several works by Charles E. Lindblom that have been written since then, especially his *Bargaining The Hidden Hand in Government* (Santa Monica, 1955) and *The Intelligence of Democracy* (New York, 1965)

19 One famous example has already been cited The seating of Virginia in the 1952 Democratic Convention See Allan P Sandler "The Unsolid South," in *The Uses of Power* ed. Alan Westin (New York, 1962) pp 230-283 See also Abraham Holtzman, *The Loyalty Pledge Controversy in the Democratic Party* Eagleton Series Number 21 (New York, 1960) Another example is, of course the seating of Texas delegates at the 1952 Republican Convention. See Malcolm C. Moos *The Republicans* (New York, 1956) pp 468-479 William S White *The Taft Story* (New York, 1954) pp 176-183 and

David Moos and Goldman *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952* pp 69-85

20 See the articles on Symington in Eric Sevareid ed. *Candidates 1960* (New York 1959) and Ralph G Martin and Edward Plaut, *Front Runner Dark Horse* (Garden City 1960) See also Nixon *Six Crises*

21 Carl Sandburg, *Abraham Lincoln The Prairie Years* (New York 1926) II 330 To an Indiana leader Lincoln wrote that Republicans should "Look beyond our noses and say nothing on points where we should disagree"

22 See Ernst *The Primary That Made a President White The Making of the President 1960*

23 James Reston *New York Times* June 3 1964 p 30

24 Elting E Morison *The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt* (Cambridge Mass 1954) p 525 See also George E. Mowry *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement* (Madison, 1946)

25 Robert H Novak, *The Agony of the G.O.P. 1964* (New York 1965) p 308 In the 1964 Nebraska Republican primary the results were

Goldwater	67,369	49%
Nixon (write-in)	42,811	35%
Lodge (write-in)	22,113	16%

26 General Eisenhower's write-in vote of over 100 000 in Minnesota in 1952 is of course the example we have in mind. See David Moos and Goldman *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952* I 32

27 Ernst *The Primary That Made a President White The Making of the President 1960*

28 Cf Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge Mass 1960)

29 See Aaron B Wildavsky "What Can I Do? Ohio Delegates View The Democratic Convention" in *Inside Politics The National Conventions 1960* ed Paul Tillett pp 112-130

30 James A. Farley *Jim Farley's Story* (New York, 1948) pp 11-13 and his *Behind the Ballots* (New York 1938) p 70 see also John F Carter *The New Dealers* (New York 1934) p 34

31 Material on the Kennedy organization in 1960 is drawn from

Fred G. Burke "Senator Kennedy's Convention Organization" in *Inside Politics: The National Conventions 1960* ed Paul Tillett pp 25-39

32 *Ibid* p 39

33 Recognizing the importance of communication at the Republican Convention of 1860 a supporter of Abraham Lincoln carefully seated all the solid Seward states close together and as far as possible from the states whose delegates were in some doubt about whom to support Glyndon G. Van Deusen *Thurlow Weed Wizard of the Lobby* (Boston 1947) p 253

34 See David Moos and Goldman *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952* I Robert Elson "A Question for Democrats: If Not Truman, Who?" *Life* (March 24 1952) Albert Votaw "The Pros Put Adlai Over" *New Leader* (August 4 1952) Douglass Cater "How the Democrats Got Together" *The Reporter* (August 19 1952) Arvey and Madigan "The Reluctant Candidate: An Inside Story" and Walter Johnson *How We Drafted Adlai Stevenson* (New York 1955)

35 Presidents Andrew Johnson and Arthur are the only clear exceptions since the Civil War. Coolidge and Wilson may also have had vague hopes of renomination.

36 See Ostrogorski *Democracy and the Party System in the United States* pp 145-160 for excellent descriptions of convention confusion. Tillett, *Inside Politics: The National Conventions 1960* contains up-to-date material in the same vein. White *The Making of the President 1964* in contrast describes the order and efficiency of conventions like those in 1964 when there was no real contest for the nomination (see especially pp 201-202). See also Ralph G. Martin, *Ballots and Bandwagons* (Chicago 1964).

37 See Roy V. Peel and Thomas C. Donnelly *The 1932 Campaign: An Analysis* (New York, 1935) pp 92-93. Arthur Schlesinger Jr. writes that strategist James Farley opposed the attempt to attack the two-thirds rule "knowing well that not all delegates who were for Roosevelt were against the rule and fearing that a defeat on this issue might set back the whole Roosevelt drive." Roosevelt backed down just in time. *The Crisis of the Old Order 1919-1933* (Boston 1957) pp 299-300. See also Robert Morss Lovett "Big Wind at Chicago" *The New Republic* (July 13 1932) p 228.

38 Wesley Bagby "The Smoke-Filled Room and the Nomination of Warren G Harding" *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 41 (March 1955) 657-674 the *New York Times* June 12 1960 p 13

39 Caroline T Harnsberger *A Man of Courage—Robert A Taft* (Chicago 1952) p 146 See also Joseph Martin's memoirs *My First 50 Years in Politics* (New York 1960)

40 Peel and Donnelly *The 1932 Campaign An Analysis* pp 95-96 One thing which television viewers of the national conventions can observe at the stage when balloting takes place is the extent to which the various state delegations impose the unit rule on their members. When this rule is employed as it is only at Democratic Conventions the vote of the entire delegation is cast according to the decision of a majority within the delegation. Since having their delegation vote as a unit enhances the bargaining resources of state leaders one would naturally assume that the unit rule is universally employed. But in fact this is not the case. On the contrary the decision to adopt the unit rule is a ticklish one. Some state political leaders are faced with an intense dissident minority within their delegations. Others may fear infringement upon the independence of their allies within the state party. While the adoption of unit voting assures leaders of a solid bloc of votes with which they can bargain hard feelings may linger on within the state. When a minority element within a state is strong enough to gain representation on a convention delegation muzzling it by imposing the unit rule is seldom wise. The unit rule is used to best advantage by those delegations whose members generally feel more strongly about preserving the bargaining advantages of a bloc vote than they do about any particular candidate. In a delegation firmly committed to a particular aspirant the unit rule is superfluous although it may still be used. But it is sometimes avoided by a leader who wants to reward delegates who stick together on the delegation's first choice. He releases them to vote as they individually please on their second choice if the first choice is removed from contention. Hence state delegations governed by the unit rule may well be relatively uncommitted in their Presidential preferences and comparatively homogeneous in their political outlooks and allegiances.

41 Crowd sentiments of course are largely determined by the distribution of the tickets. Normally these are apportioned by the

national committee among state party organizations big financial contributors and supporters of the various prominent candidates for President on as equitable and neutral a basis as party leaders can arrange. Thus a gallery overwhelmingly in favor of a particular candidate is a rare phenomenon and suggests a rather more organized behind the scenes movement than meets the eye.

42 For instance on the Roosevelt election of 1932 "Farley had held a few votes in reserve for the second ballot, knowing the importance of showing an increase each time round." Schlesinger *The Crisis of the Old Order 1919-1933* p 306

43 Harry Daugherty *The Inside Story of the Harding Tragedy* (New York, 1932) pp 36-46 and Mark Sullivan *Our Times* (New York 1926-1935) II 54. See also Wesley Bagby "The Smoke Filled Room and the Nomination of Warren G. Harding," pp 657-674

44 Arthur Vandenberg, Jr. ed. *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg* (Boston 1952) p 6

45 Frank R. Kent, *The Democratic Party* (New York, 1928) p 493

46 See Jules Abels *Out of the Jaws of Victory* (New York, 1959) pp 65-68

47 See Edward Stanwood, *A History of the Presidency from 1788 to 1897* (Boston 1898) pp 206-225

48 Mark Sullivan *Our Times* VI 35-67. See also Daugherty *The Inside Story of the Harding Tragedy* pp 41-55

49 See Kent, *The Democratic Party* pp 483-505

50 Ferdinand Lundberg, *Imperial Hearst* (New York 1936) pp 273-275 and Schlesinger *The Crisis of the Old Order 1919-1933* pp 304-308

51 See Irving G. Williams *The American Vice Presidency* *New Look* (New York 1954)

52 William Carleton, "The Revolution in the Presidential Nominating Convention" *Political Science Quarterly* 72 (June 1957) 224-240

The Campaign

ONCE the conventions are over the two Presidential candidates "relax" for a few weeks. On Labor Day they ordinarily begin their official campaigning. From that date onward they confront the voters directly, each carrying the banner of his political party. How do the candidates behave? Why do they act the way they do? And what kind of impact do their activities have on the electorate?

For the small minority of party workers, campaigns serve as a signal to get to work. How hard they work depends in part on whether the candidates' slogans, personalities, and visits spark their enthusiasm. The workers may "sit on their hands" or may pursue their generally unrewarding jobs—checking voting lists, mailing campaign flyers, ringing doorbells—with something approaching fervor. They cannot be taken for granted, activating them and imbuing them with purpose and ardor is perhaps the first task of the candidate.

For the population at large, much of which is normally uninterested in politics, campaigns call attention to the advent of an election. Some excitement may be generated and some diversion provided for those who were not aware until they turned on the TV that their favorite program had been preempted by a political speech. The campaign is a great spectacle. Talk about politics increases, and a small percentage of citizens may even

become intensely involved as they get caught up in campaign oratory

For the vast majority of citizens in America campaigns do not function so much to change their minds as to reinforce their previous convictions. As the campaign wears on the underlying party identification of most people rises ever more powerfully to the surface. Republican and Democratic identifiers are split further apart (polarized) as their increased awareness of party strife emphasizes the things that divide them.¹

Three-quarters of American adults identify with a party. Among these the Democrats enjoy a 3 to 2 advantage.² But Democrats tend to turn out less often. Given these facts the outstanding strategic problem for Democratic politicians is to get their adherents to turn out and to vote for Democratic candidates. No need to worry about Republicans or Independents if Democrats can do their basic job. Democrats stress appeals to the faithful. They try to raise in their supporters the old party spirit. One of their major problems as we have seen is that most citizens who identify with them are found at the lower end of the socio-economic scale and are less likely to turn out to vote than are those with Republican leanings. So the Democrats put on mobilization drives and seek in every way to get as large a turnout as possible. If they are well-organized they scour the lower income areas. They try to provide cars for the elderly and infirm, baby sitters for mothers, and occasionally inducements of a less savory kind to reinforce the party loyalty of the faithful. The seemingly neutral campaigns put on by radio, TV, and news papers to stress the civic obligation to vote, if they have any effect at all, probably help the Democrats more than the Republicans.³

The Republicans face a different strategic problem. They must, to be sure, try to get out their party adherents. But even if they do this well it will not be enough. They must not only encourage people with Republican leanings to register and vote, they must also attract more than their share of the uncommitted,

and they must persuade at least some of the Democratically inclined to forego their usual preference. This means playing down partisan appeals. Republicans ask voters to vote for the man and not for the party since this gives the party its best chance of winning.

For Republicans involved in Presidential nominating politics the most important fact of life is that their party is without question the minority party in the United States. What is more the Republicans can claim the allegiance of what seems to be a minority of citizens that has shrunk steadily over the last twenty five years.

Percentage of adults identifying themselves as

	<i>Republican</i>	<i>Democratic</i>	<i>Other</i>
1940 ^a	38	42	20
1950	33	45	22
1960	30	47	23
1964	25	53	22

SOURCE: AIPO News Release November 8, 1964

The Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan has found repeatedly that about three quarters of those in its samples eligible to vote claimed a party identification of these three fifths were Democrats.⁴ In Presidential elections in which considerations of party are foremost and allowing for the greater propensity of Republicans to turn out and vote it has been plausibly argued that the Democrats could expect to win with around 53% or 54% of the vote.⁵

This is close enough to kindle hope justifiably in Republican breasts despite the clear Democratic majority in this country it must be assumed that either major party can win a Presidential election. But over the last thirty years it has generally been necessary for the Republicans to devise a strategy that could not only win but win from behind.

With the handwriting so plainly on the wall the strategic alternatives available to Republicans can hardly be regarded as secret. They can be boiled down to three possibilities. First Republicans can attempt to deemphasize the impact of party habit as a component of electoral choice by capitalizing upon a more compelling cue to action. The nomination of General Eisenhower the most popular hero of the Second World War overrode party considerations and is a clear example of the efficacy of this strategy.⁶ Efforts to play upon popular dissatisfaction in a variety of issue areas also exemplify this strategy but these dissatisfactions must preexist in the population and must be widespread and intense before they will produce the desired effect. When issues do come to the fore in a compelling way, the payoff to the advantaged party is sometimes enormous because these are the circumstances under which new party loyalties can be created.

Another possible Republican strategy similar in some ways to the first, also seeks to depress the saliency of party in the minds of voters by blurring the differences between the parties by seeking to efface certain of the stigmata that have been attached to the party over the years as stereotypes having general currency (e.g. "party of the rich").⁷ This strategy gives full recognition to the arithmetic of Democratic superiority and also to the unit rule of the Electoral College which weighs disproportionately votes cast in the large states that so often contain the heaviest concentrations of traditional allies of the Democratic party.⁸ Although it has been used often by Republican nominees such as Willkie, Dewey and Nixon with results that always fell short—sometimes barely short—of victory this "me too" strategy has over the years become increasingly controversial among Republicans. The fact that no Republican candidate has actually been able to win with it has created doubts about its efficacy.⁹ The "me too" strategy may entail the advocacy of policies generally favored by most American voters but this approach apparently does not correctly mirror the political sentiments of Repub-

ican activists¹⁰ Critics of the "me too" approach have argued that this strategy merely alienates potential Republican voters while failing to attract sufficient Democrats Alienated Republicans so goes this argument seeing no difference between the policies espoused by the major parties withdraw from politics into apathy¹¹

Thus a third strategy whose claim of victory is based upon the presupposition of a hidden Republican vote can be identified This was the strategy pursued by the Goldwater forces in 1964 It has as its main characteristic the attempt to sharpen rather than blur party lines on matters of substantive policy We will analyze this strategy in Chapter 4

THEORY AND ACTION

The contents of election campaigns appear to be largely opportunistic The swiftly changing nature of events makes it unwise for candidates to lay down all embracing rules for campaigning which cannot meet special situations as they arise A candidate may prepare for battle on one front and discover that the movement of events forces him to fight on another Yet on closer examination it is evident that the political strategist has to rely on some sort of theory about the probable behavior of large groups of voters under a few likely conditions For there are too many millions of voters and too many thousands of possible events to deal with each as a separate category Keynes pointed out years ago quite rightly that those among us including politicians who most loudly proclaim their avoidance of theory are generally the victims of some long dead economist or philosopher whose assumptions they have unknowingly assimilated The candidates must simplify their picture of the political world or its full complexity will paralyze them the only question is whether or not their theories both explicit and implicit will prove helpful to them

What kind of organization shall they use or construct? How

shall they raise money? Where shall they campaign? How much time shall they allocate to the various regions and states? What kinds of appeals shall they make to what voting groups? What kind of personal impression shall they seek to create or reinforce? How far should they go in castigating the opposition? These are the kinds of strategic questions to which Presidential candidates need answers—answers which necessarily vary depending on their party affiliations their personal attributes whether they are in or out of office and on targets of opportunity that come up in the course of current events. Let us take up each of these questions in turn taking care to specify the different problems faced by “ins” and “outs” and by Democrats and Republicans. For purposes of illustration we shall turn often to the 1960 contest between John Kennedy and Richard Nixon and the 1964 Barry Goldwater–Lyndon Johnson battle.

INS AND OUTS

In choosing a campaign strategy much depends on whether the candidate is an incumbent or is trying to dislodge a man who is already in office. The man in office has the advantage of having had huge amounts of publicity. For better or for worse he is probably better known than any challenger can be. He is experienced and people have learned to depend upon him. While he is in office he may be in a position to take actions which will help him such as acting decisively in foreign affairs as Johnson did in the Bay of Tonkin incident taking “nonpolitical” trips to drum up support and little things like making sure that veterans administration checks get mailed out promptly or even a little ahead of time.¹²

The incumbent also has to face a number of disadvantages inherent in his position. Inevitably Presidents have to do things which dissatisfy some people. Resentments build up. Should economic or military conditions appear to change for the worse the President seeking re-election may well be the victim of a protest

vote Herbert Hoover felt the sting of this phenomenon deeply when the people punished the "ins" for a depression which Hoover would have given much to avoid. Moreover the incumbent has a record. He has or has not done things and he may be held to account for his sins of omission or commission not so the man out-of-office who can criticize freely without always presenting viable alternatives or necessarily taking his own advice once he is elected. The "missile gap" turned out to be something of a chimera after Kennedy got into the White House and he never found it possible to act much differently toward the Matsu Quemoy situation than did Dwight Eisenhower despite their over publicized "differences" about this question during the campaign. The incumbent is naturally cast in the role of the defender of his administration and the challenger as the attacker who promises better things to come. After all we would hardly expect to hear the man in office say that the other fellow could probably do as well or to hear the challenger declare that he really could not do any better than the incumbent although both statements may be close to the truth.

The challenger has his own problems. He may not be well known and may find that much of his effort must be devoted to publicizing himself. All the while the President is getting reams of free publicity and is in a position to create major news by the things he does—an administrative action to help Negroes, a call to the summit, an announcement of a new advance in space research.

The candidate aspiring to office may find that he lacks information which puts him at a disadvantage in discussing foreign policy and defense issues. On the other hand he may deliberately forbear from finding out too much for fear that he be restrained in his criticism by an implied pledge not to use information the President has furnished to him. Perhaps the major advantage the challenger possesses is his ability to criticize policies freely and sometimes in exaggerated terms whereas the incumbent is often restrained by his current official responsibilities.

sabotage his efforts Should he enlist the cooperation of the old party men knowing that he may thereby lose some control over his campaign? Should there be two centers of campaigning with the inevitable duplication and problems of coordination? There is apparently no costless solution to this problem There always seems to be grumbling from party professionals and the candidate's own men about their relationship

All candidates seek special volunteer organizations to help attract voters who prefer not to associate themselves with the party organizations The distaste with which some middle and upper class people regard the rather earthy and predominantly lower class party organizations is difficult to overcome It is easier to construct new organizations in which they can feel ennobled by attachment to an Eisenhower or Stevenson rather than (as they may feel) associating with a group of vulgar politicians The danger here is that the volunteer organizations will take on lives of their own and attempt to dictate strategy and policy to the candidates A few of the volunteers may transfer to the regular party and thus may lead to serious internal dissension as happened in the successful move to oust Carmine DeSapio of Tammany Hall in New York City The candidates need the volunteers but it is advisable for them to follow the lead set by Kennedy and Nixon in keeping tight reins on them to assure reasonable coordination of efforts and to avoid being captured

The mechanics of electioneering are no simple matter they cannot be entrusted wholly to amateurs Not only must the candidate get to his various speaking engagements when he is supposed to but he also needs to have some good idea of whom he is speaking to and what kind of approach to take In the hurly burly of the campaign where issues and plans may change from day to day where yesterday's ideas may have to end up in the wastebasket to make room for today's problems where changes of schedule are made in response to the opportunities and dangers suggested by private and public polls a poor organization can be

severely damaging. The troubles of Adlai Stevenson present a case in point. His apparent distaste for the niceties of organization in 1956 hurt him badly. He was excessively rushed going from one place to another so that he lost the valuable assets of composure and thoughtfulness which should have been his stock in trade. If he continually made speeches which were inappropriate for his audiences it may have been because he was badly informed about who his audience would be, not because he was talking "over people's heads." For instance, he once went to New Haven during the 1956 campaign and made a speech redolent with allusions to Yale and Princeton with punch lines depending on knowledge of what the "subjunctive" was to an audience which happened to be composed largely of old time Democratic party workers from around Connecticut.¹⁸ To be sure, some mix ups if not a few outright fiascoes are inevitable given the frantic pace and the pressure of time. Resilience is not the least qualification of a Presidential candidate.

WHERE TO CAMPAIGN?

In deciding where to campaign the candidates are aided by distinctive features of the national political structure which go a long way toward giving them guidance. They know that it is not votes as such that matter but electoral votes which are counted on a state by state basis. The candidate who wins by a small plurality in a state gains all the electoral votes there are for that state. The candidates realize that a huge margin of victory in a state with a handful of electoral votes will not do them nearly as much good as a bare plurality in states like New York and California with large numbers of electoral votes. So their first guideline is evident. Campaign in states with large electoral votes. There is however not much point in campaigning in states where a candidate is bound to win or to lose. Thus states which almost always go for one party receive only perfunctory attention. Hence the original guideline may be modified to read: Campaign

in states with large electoral votes which are doubtful. In practice a "doubtful" state is one where there is a good chance for both parties to capture the state and politicians usually gauge this chance by the extent to which the state has delivered victories to both parties at some time in recent memory. Republicans and Democrats thus spend more time in the large doubtful states such as New York, Ohio, Texas, and California than they do in the deep South which will probably go Democratic or upper New England which will probably go Republican. And even if one or two of these one party states should change in one election, the likelihood of such an event is too slim and the payoff in terms of electoral votes too meager to justify extensive campaigning when time might better be spent elsewhere. As the campaign wears on, the candidates take soundings from the opinion polls and are likely to redouble their efforts in states where they believe a personal visit might turn the tide.

Here we once again come across the pervasive problem of uncertainty. No one really knows how much value in changed votes or turnout is gained by personal visits to a particular state. Most voters have made up their minds. Opponents of the candidate are unlikely to go to see him anyway and one wonders what a glimpse in a motorcade will do to influence a potential voter. Yet no one is certain that whistle stop methods produce no useful result. Visiting localities may serve to increase publicity because many of the media of communication are geared to "local" events. It also provides an opportunity to stress issues like public power or race relations which may be of special significance to citizens in a given region. Party activists may be energized by a glimpse at or a handshake with the candidate. New alliances such as the one that emerged in 1964 between Goldwater and many long time Democratic sectors of the deep South can be solidified. And so rather than let the opportunity pass, the candidates usually decide to take no chances and get out on the hustings. They hedge against uncertainty by doing all they can.

Consider the case of John Kennedy in Ohio. He traversed that

pivotal state several times in the 1960 campaign and exerted great physical effort in getting himself seen traveling across the state. But when the votes were counted he found himself at the short end. The future President professed to be annoyed and stumped at why this happened. An analysis of the voting returns showed that Kennedy's vote was correlated in a high and positive degree with the percentage of Catholic population in the various counties.¹⁸ Kennedy made a considerable improvement over the Democratic showing in 1956 but that was not enough to win. Despite evidence of this kind which suggests that personal appearances may well be overwhelmed by other factors, visits to localities will undoubtedly continue. Who can say to take a contrary instance that Kennedy's visit to Illinois did not provide the bare margin of a few thousand votes necessary for victory?

There was a time when Presidential nominees faced the serious choice of whether to conduct a front porch campaign or to get out and meet the people. A candidate like Warren Harding who his sponsors felt would put his foot in his mouth every time he spoke was well advised to stay home. More hardy souls like William Jennings Bryan took off in all directions only to discover that to be seen was not necessarily to be loved. An underdog like Harry Truman in 1948 went out to meet the people because he was so far behind. A favored candidate like Thomas Dewey in 1948 went out to meet the people to avoid being accused of complacency. Everybody is doing it probably because it is the fashion and the spectacle of seeing one's opponent run around the country at a furious pace without following suit is too nerve wracking to contemplate. That no one knows whether all this does any good is beside the point. Some future candidate might want to consider running a different kind of campaign taking account of the fact that radio and television make it possible to reach millions without leaving the big metropolitan areas. Such a candidate might fix upon something like a half or a full dozen regional centers and make his appearances and speeches in these places. The added time for reflection and the

additional reserves of energy he would gain over the previous method might do something to improve the quality of his campaign. And should he happen to be elected, he might become the only President elect in recent history not to be utterly exhausted on Election Day.

PARTY IDENTIFICATION

We have seen that most votes are determined most of the time by party identification. The candidates are keenly aware that this is the case. Moreover, they know that a substantial majority of voters favor the Democratic party. Consequently, if an election is widely perceived as a straight contest between the parties, the Democratic candidate is likely to win. The strategic implications are clear. Democratic candidates go around invoking the name of their party over and over again. If they feel it is advisable to criticize an opponent like General Eisenhower, they know that they have a good target in the Republican party. The objective of the Democrats is to have as many voters as possible identify their candidate with the Democratic party label, since it is the preferred party of most of the population.¹⁷

A Republican strategy that faces up to this problem of party identification can be inferred from Nixon's tactics during the 1960 campaign. He refused to make the contest into a party fight and called for support from all men of good will. He played down his Republicanism and attempted to divide Kennedy from the Democratic party by saying that the old party greats—Jefferson, Jackson, and Wilson—would have had no truck with the alien radical philosophy of this upstart Kennedy. Nixon asserted that Kennedy had grievously departed from the true principles of the Democratic party (whatever they were supposed to be) and no longer deserved the support of the members of that great organization. In fact, Nixon implied that he was a better "real" Democrat than Kennedy. So anxious was Nixon to bask in the warmth of the Democratic sun that he talked of appointing good Democrats to

office. If he could have had his way, no Democrat need have believed that Nixon's feelings about the party were so hostile as to necessarily justify a vote against him on these grounds.¹⁸

DOMESTIC ISSUES

On the broad range of domestic affairs and "pocketbook" issues, the Democrats are highly favored as the party most voters believe will best meet their needs. Statements like "The Democrats are best for the workingman" and "We have better times under the Democrats" abound when people are asked to state how they feel about the Democratic party. The Republicans, on the other hand, are viewed as the party of depression under which jobs are scarce and times are bad. A campaign in which the salient issues are domestic, therefore, is more likely to aid the Democrats than the Republicans.¹⁹

Domestic policy thus occasions little difficulty for the Democratic party. Its task is to be liberal in several senses of that word. It promises something for everyone. There are sizable extensions of social welfare programs financed by the Federal government: increased minimum wages for the underpaid, medical insurance for the aged, high price supports for the farmer, irrigation for arid areas, flood protection and power dams for the river basins, and so on. No one is left out, not even businessmen who are promised prosperity.

Republicans are clearly on the defensive in the realm of domestic policy, a situation stemming from the fact that they were in office when the Great Depression took place. They try to play down domestic issues. They do best when emphasizing foreign policy ("bring the boys back from Korea"), style issues ("mink coats and five percenters"), general management of government ("we can do it better") or an outstanding personality ("I like Ike"). When domestic issues are debated, a Republican candidate like Richard Nixon takes care to stress that he is in favor of the New Deal's social reforms whatever else he may say about it.

And he adds that he is in favor of helping farmers, laborers old people pensioners teachers and other worthy folk extend their gains That he will do this better and cheaper becomes his refrain and the major point of difference with his opponent He is understandably upset at Democratic insinuations that he and his party have not become fully reconciled to Social Security Over and over again in his television debates with Kennedy Nixon insisted that he and his opponent agreed on goals of domestic policy and that the only difference separating the two men was the *minor matter of means* ¹⁰ For if the gulf between the parties was thought to be wide on "pocketbook" issues a majority of voters would unhesitatingly choose the Democrats

Both parties of course have some difficulty in reconciling their Presidential and Congressional wings but in the realm of domestic policy the Democrats have an easier task The crucial electoral votes come from large states where the labor union and minority group interests reinforce the Presidential aspirant's demand for liberal policies Democratic conservatives who are in any event in a minority even in Congress can be and largely are ignored except perhaps for lip service to the idea of a balanced budget A strong civil rights stand risks loss of Southern support but Negroes are strategically placed in states with the highest number of electoral votes Since Franklin D Roosevelt all Democratic Presidential candidates have decided that they can win without the South but not without the large states in other sections of the country Television and radio make the old practice of saying different things in different parts of the country rather more dangerous than it used to be In fact a kind of reversal has set in Contemporary candidates are more likely to get favorable publicity if they attack segregation before Southern audiences This not only comes immediately to the attention of admiring audiences in the Northern Negro strongholds but also not incidentally demonstrates the courage and integrity of the candidate Whether from conviction or calculation of advantage

Democratic candidates have no trouble coming out strongly for civil rights

The Republicans face much more difficult problems of internal dissension. Their Congressional contingent is cohesive and generally conservative. The result is that Republican Presidential candidates more often than not repudiate their Congressional brethren. Party conservatives do not like the "me too" implications of the stands taken by their Presidential candidates like Nixon. They felt he ought to have hit harder at what they regard as Democratic statism and looseness with the public purse. But the numbers of strategically placed voters or the groups from whom they take their cues who disagree with this approach in domestic affairs is too great for a Republican candidate who wants to win to forget them. Though Nixon talked tough at times in remarks directed to selected Republican audiences, he understandably refused to alter the tenor of his remarks in general. Like all Republican candidates since 1936 with the exception of former Senator Goldwater, he apparently concluded that there were not enough conservatives to elect him, that they had no place to go, and that he would get their votes anyhow as indeed he did. Nixon continued to send conservatives out on the hustings to mollify the right wing, but he refused to commit political suicide by making wholesale attacks on the Democratic party and its domestic policies.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

In the realm of foreign affairs the Republicans have the advantage. The fact that the Democrats occupied the Presidency during World Wars I and II and the Korean War apparently convinced most voters that Democrats tend to lead the country to war. This belief may be reinforced by the war in Vietnam. Republicans have escaped this stigma and are known as the party of peace.²¹ Whether this impression is any more useful or valid

than that of Republicans as the party of depression is beside the point for present purposes

We are after the strategic implications which are important. For if foreign affairs issues can be made sufficiently important to enough voters the Republicans stand a better chance of winning. Republicans do best by building up foreign affairs and playing on the fear that Democrats are not competent in this field. Democrats have the choice of deemphasizing foreign policy something that has become increasingly difficult to do or trying to show somehow that they are more peace loving than Republicans though also at least as tough on Communism. So President Johnson combines military action in Vietnam with "peace offensives." A Republican outcry against the United States involvement in Vietnam might regain them their reputation as the party of peace at the expense of demonstrating ideological inconsistency. However a Republican stand supporting escalation in Vietnam could be interpreted by the voters either as the Republicans wanting more fighting (war party) or the Republicans wanting the boys home sooner (peace party).

How this used to work in practice can be seen in Richard Nixon's campaign as the lamb of domestic controversy turned into the lion of foreign affairs. Nixon sought to differentiate himself as much as possible from Kennedy in the field of foreign affairs. He suggested that he was uniquely capable of securing peace without surrender and that Kennedy was not. He tried to strengthen the prevailing impression of the Democratic party as the party of war. He implied alternatively that Kennedy would permit the Communists to make unwarranted advances (for example in Matsu and Quemoy) and that the Democrats would make rash moves (Cuba). Even Nixon's espousal of an aggressive line such as he took regarding Matsu and Quemoy helped him because in foreign affairs voters trust the Republicans. On the other hand, Kennedy's equally aggressive stand toward Cuba in his speeches did not correspondingly help him.²

All this may appear paradoxical but it is perfectly under

standable in the light of our knowledge of voting behavior Kennedy did not succeed in convincing most voters that issues of foreign policy were more important than domestic concerns. He won on his party affiliation on domestic issues, and on his appeal to Catholics.²³ Had he accomplished his purpose of alerting voters to the importance of foreign affairs there is every reason to believe he would have lost support since voters in line with their previous inclinations would have decided that the perilous times called for a Republican in the White House.

The television debates reflected this. Those viewers of the debates who were especially attentive to foreign policy issues were more likely to be pro Nixon than pro Kennedy just the reverse of the situation in domestic affairs. A summary of public opinion surveys on the debates concludes: "The evidence suggests that foreign affairs was the paramount issue during the entire campaign and since Nixon was generally conceded to be the more expert and experienced in foreign affairs—he was far ahead of Kennedy in perceived ability at handling the Russians and keeping the peace—the focus on foreign affairs was clearly to Nixon's advantage."²⁴

PRESENTATION OF SELF

Another set of strategic problems concerns the personal impression made by the candidates. A candidate is helped by being thought of as trustworthy, reliable, mature, kind but firm, a devoted family man and in every way normal and presentable. No amount of expostulation about the irrelevance of all this ordinariness as qualification for an extraordinary office wipes out the fact that candidates must try to conform to the public stereotype of goodness, a standard which is typically far more demanding of politicians than of ordinary mortals. It would be a rather excruciating process for a candidate to remodel his entire personality along the indicated lines. And to be fair the candidates are not so far from the mark as to make this drastic expedient

necessary or they would not have been nominated in the first place. What the candidates actually try to do is to smooth off the rough edges—that is, to counter the most unfavorable impressions of specific aspects of their public image to which they believe they are susceptible. Kennedy, who was accused of being young and immature, hardly cracked a smile in his debates with Nixon, while the latter, who was said to be stiff and frightening, beamed with friendliness. Kennedy restyled his youthful shock of hair, and Nixon thinned his eyebrows to look less threatening.

The political folklore of previous campaigns provides candidates with helpful homilies about how to conduct themselves. Typical bits of advice include the following: always carry the attack to your opponent; the best defense is offense; separate the other candidate from his party; when in doubt as to the course which will produce the most votes, do what you believe is ethically or morally right; guard against acts that can hurt you because they are more significant than acts that can help you; avoid making personal attacks which may gain sympathy for the opposition. Unfortunately for the politicians in search of a guide, these bits of folk wisdom do not contain detailed instructions about the conditions under which they may be applied.

The case of Adlai Stevenson suggests a familiar dilemma for candidates: Shall they write (or have written) new speeches for most occasions or shall they rest content to hammer home a few themes, embroidering just a little here and there? No one really knows which is better. Stevenson is famous for the care which he devoted to his speeches and the originality he sought to impart to his efforts. Had he won office he might have established a trend. As it is, most candidates are likely to follow Kennedy, Nixon, Johnson, and Goldwater in using just a few set speeches. In view of the pervasive inattention to public affairs and political talk in our society, this approach may have the advantage of driving points home (as well as driving mad the newsmen who must listen to the same thing all the time).²⁴

More important perhaps is the desirability of appearing con-

fortable in delivery Televised speeches may establish the major opportunity for a candidate to be seen and evaluated by large numbers of people Eisenhower's ability to project a radiant appearance helped him Stevenson's obvious discomfort before the camera hurt him On this point we have evidence that those who listened to Stevenson's delivery over radio were more favorably impressed with him than those who watched him on TV²⁶ With television occupying an important place in American life ability to make a good appearance is not a trivial matter There is little reason to believe however that we are headed for a society in which TV performers can run for public office and expect to win—except of course in California where party organizations traditionally have had little control over the selection of candidates to run for office

The major difficulty with the strategic principles we have been discussing is not that they are too theoretical but that they do not really tell the candidates what to do in case they are mutually incompatible Like proverbs one can often find principles to justify opposing courses of action ("Look before you leap" but "he who hesitates is lost") Nixon could not take full advantage of international affairs without hitting so hard as to reinforce the unfavorable impression of himself as being harsh and unprincipled Kennedy could hardly capitalize on the Rooseveltian image of the vigorous leader without attacking the foreign policy of a popular President The result is that the candidates must take calculated risks when existing knowledge about the consequences of alternative courses of action is inadequate Here hunch intuition and temperament necessarily play an important role in choosing among competing alternatives.

THE TELEVISION DEBATES

The famous TV debates between Nixon and Kennedy provide an excellent illustration of the difficulty of choosing between

competing considerations in the absence of knowledge as to the most likely results. With the benefit of hindsight many observers now suggest that Nixon was obviously foolish to engage in the debates.

Let us try to look at the situation from the perspective of each of the Presidential aspirants at the time Kennedy issued a challenge to debate on television. The possible advantages from his point of view were many. He could use Nixon's refusal to debate to accuse *him of running away and depriving the people* of a unique opportunity to judge the candidates. Among Kennedy's greatest handicaps in the campaign were his youth and the inevitable charges of inexperience. Television debates could and did help to overcome these difficulties by showing the audience not so much that Kennedy was superior in knowledge but that there was not that much difference in the information age and general stature of the two men. Whatever administrative skills or inside information Nixon might have would not and did not show up on the screen as the candidates necessarily confined themselves to broad discussions of issues known to all politically literate people. Kennedy could only guess but he could not know that Nixon would not stump him in an embarrassing way in front of millions of viewers. But Kennedy was in a position to know that despite the reams of publicity he had received he was unknown to many voters much less known than the Vice President. Here was a golden opportunity to increase his visibility in a sudden and dramatic way. And his good looks were not calculated to hurt him with those who like to judge the appearance of a man.¹⁷

Nixon was in a more difficult position. To say "no" would not have been a neutral decision; it would have subjected him to being called a man who was afraid to face his opposition. Saying "yes" had a number of possible advantages. One stemmed from the fact that the Republicans are the minority party in terms of adherents in the United States. Normally most people do not pay very much attention to the opposition candidate making it

difficult to win them over. They avoid contact with his statements and screen out his messages. Televised debates would provide a unique instance in which huge numbers of people attracted to both parties could be expected to tune in attentively. Nixon had good reason for believing that if he made a favorable impression he would be in a position to convince more of the people (the Democratic identifiers) he needed to convince than would Kennedy. The risk that Kennedy might use the opportunity to solidify the support of those attracted to a Democrat simply had to be taken. Another potential advantage which might have accrued to Nixon arose from the heritage of his previous political life. He had been labeled by some people as "tricky Dick," an immoral and vindictive man. This picture might have been supplanted on television by the new Nixon of smiling visage and magnanimous gesture who had it all over his opponent in knowledge of public affairs. Nixon had to judge whether his handicap was serious or whether it was confined to convinced liberals whose numbers were insignificant and who would never have voted for him in any event. He also had to guess whether it would be worthwhile to overcome this handicap even if it also meant giving Kennedy an opportunity to overcome his own disabilities.²⁸ Perhaps a record of success in debate situations going back to high school was not irrelevant in guiding Nixon to his eventual decision to go on television with his opponent.²⁹ Surveys taken after the event suggest that Nixon miscalculated.³⁰ But if he had won the election instead of losing it by a wafer thin margin, he would hardly have been reminded of any error on his part and there would probably have been discussions of what a brilliant move it was for him to go on TV.

The election of 1964 presented an entirely different set of circumstances. President Johnson, an incumbent enjoying enormous personal popularity at the head of the majority party, had nothing to gain and everything to lose by debating his rival. And so despite strenuous efforts by Senator Goldwater and his allies to involve the President in debates, none were held.

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The point is however that all these men won office as have many others who have been subject to similar aspersions

Even more instructive is the case of William Henry Harrison whom Democratic politicians derogated with the remark that he would be content to spend the rest of his life in a log cabin drinking hard cider His party seized on this to make him into a symbol of the common man and drowned out all attempts to discuss issues with cries about humble living in log cabins Van Buren the Democratic candidate was crushed with doggerel like this

*Let Van from his coolers of silver drink wine
And lounge on his cushioned settee
Our man on his buckeye bench can recline
Content with hard cider is he*

The candidate faces the difficulty of deciding what kind of invective to ignore as potentially damaging and what kind to turn to his advantage Franklin Roosevelt paid no attention to most accusations about him but seized on an attack involving his dog Fala to rib his opponents unmercifully for impugning a dog that could not reply "If all else fails it is always possible to take the advice attributed to a Chicago politician who said that in politics as in poker the way to meet scandalous charges was to "Call em and raise em If you are denounced as a fool call your opponent a damned fool if he says you are a crook, call him a robber if he intimates that you are careless with the truth tell your audience that he is a pathological liar"

Why we may wonder are men supposed to behave in a more exalted fashion in politics and in the midst of a passionately fought contest than we would expect of them in other areas of life? Successful public officials like successful businessmen and union leaders deal with man as he is not as they would wish him to be Campaigning is concerned primarily with winning support and secondary effects it may have such as educating the public are incidental If we wonder at the level of appeals made to us

in elections we need only look so far as our own qualities to get the answer. These are occasions when we might be thankful that our politicians do not fully reflect the ethical standards actually practiced (not preached) in society. Knowledge of our own character may explain the wish (and expose the fallacy) of expecting politicians to be better than we are.

FEEDBACK

As the campaign progresses the candidates attempt to take soundings from various sources and to modify their behavior as seems best suited to make the most of opportunities as they arise. But this process presents tremendous problems in the chaotic atmosphere of a campaign. Even under conditions of comparative tranquility, who knows what the world is like? In our everyday lives we make assumptions that simplify reality tremendously in order to make decisions. Consider then the poor candidate who must try to take hold of a complicated universe in which the actions and the reactions of millions of voters, his own staff, his opponents, party workers, the press, and other relevant publics have to be taken into account under widely varying conditions. There is, of course, hardly any time to think about these matters. The strategies adopted by the candidates surely depend on some notions about what the consequences of these strategies will be. In turn, it is necessary to make assumptions about how people are going to act in response to one's own actions. Yet, no one can be certain that the simple picture of the world in his mind corresponds to the complex reality.

The candidate evolves an organization and a staff whose purpose in part is to inform him of the state of the political world. But he comes to know soon enough that it is unwise to trust completely his closest associates. Their fortunes are identified with his; their future prospects may depend on his; and their very battles for him may warp their judgment. Will they come to think that bad news should be withheld lest it sap his will to

win? Will their hopes and fears color their judgment? Will the fact that they in turn depend upon other "loyalties" mean that those they trust are also unreliable? It is clear that the candidate has to place some sort of discount on the reports of his advisers. But it is not clear how much of a discount should be taken.

In trying to get a more objective estimate of the political situation a candidate has a number of devices available—polls, the mass media, audience reaction—which are better than nothing but which are ambiguous and difficult to interpret. The first question about a poll is whether or not to believe it. Perhaps the apparent findings are more an artifact of the way the questions are phrased and the kind of people who administer them than of any objective reality. When in doubt candidates may have two polls taken, though this is terribly expensive and find that they do not correspond. Then the candidates who have some reason to fancy themselves political experts may cast the polls to the winds and rely on their own observations. Moreover, polls are static things and conditions may change more rapidly than a polling organization can find out. The questions asked may be the important ones in the mind of the pollster but not necessarily in that of the voter. And if the results seem intolerably pessimistic the candidate may decide that there is no point in listening to the voice of doom anyhow. So he may turn next to the mass media. If newspapers happen to be on his side he risks the distortions of favoritism; if they are against him he risks the distortions of malice. If they are neutral he may wonder if they know any more about what is going on than he does. Yet he ignores what they say at his peril. The candidate cannot possibly read all the papers or listen to all the commentators; he requires summaries. Here again appears the risk of unconscious distortion by his eager staff.

Closest to the candidate's experience in the mad rush of the campaign are the audiences he addresses, and he may anxiously scan their response. At the beginning of the campaign he is likely to try out different approaches on audiences composed of

the party faithful. As a result, he may discover that what the "people" want are the kinds of traditional cries that rally those who are already disposed to vote for him but this at least for Republicans may not reach the voters he needs to convince. The Republican candidate discovers that the people want an end to disastrous government spending and the Democratic standard bearer learns that they want more welfare programs. As the campaign progresses, candidates begin to believe that the crowds are no longer so one sided and their varying size and enthusiasm may be read as significant portents. There are however many different possible reasons to explain why crowds turn out: curiosity, desire to heckle, nothing else to do, a look at a glamorous figure, as well as the desire to support a particular candidate. A large crowd may mean many things. It may mean that the candidate's managers have picked their spot wisely (such as a market day at a farm distribution center) and have brought their man to a crowd rather than a crowd to him. Or a large crowd may mean that the candidate has succeeded in gaining intense support from the strongest party identifiers but its enthusiasm may tell him nothing about his general prospects or the appeals he needs to make. The disparity between the roaring crowds and the vote in a state like Ohio may have brought home the reality of this kind of misperception to the Kennedy forces.²⁴

While the candidate is making his assessment as best he can others in his organization are doing the same. The party organizer for example may gauge the trend of the campaign by the number of people who show up at party headquarters willing to do some work. This may be as good an index as any. Like the mass meeting, however, attendance at headquarters may be an unreliable indicator of success. Party headquarters may be attracting an influx of a special, limited segment of the public attracted to a man like Adlai Stevenson or lonely people who find this a good way to meet others. The reports of workers in the various states may or may not be more useful. Although they may be wholly accurate, they are subject to the usual biases and

may be representative only of narrow portions of the public rather than a good sample of the electorate

After an election it may be amusing to note that an activity like Les Biffle's nationwide tour masquerading as a chicken farmer proved more reliable for Harry Truman than the polls³⁵ during the campaign however this was just one among a number of cues The candidates are always in the dark because they can never be sure which cues to believe or whether to believe any of them If they had lots of time they might pore over the various clues signals and hints and arrive at a composite estimate which might make sense Time is in terribly short supply however and so the Presidential candidate is reduced to a haphazard savoring of some of the relevant signs He may add some credence to one clue subtract from another, and ultimately rely on his own intuition The conduct of a campaign is far from being an established science at best it is a shaky art

One hears much about campaign blunders as if there really was objective assurance that another course of action would have turned out better for the unfortunate candidate The most famous of these in recent years was Thomas E. Dewey's decision in 1948 to mute the issues which was said to have snatched defeat from the jaws of victory³⁶ A vigorous campaign on his part it was said would have motivated many Republican identifiers in turn out would have taken steam out of Harry Truman's charges and would thus have brought electoral victory to Dewey Perhaps What we know of the 1948 election suggests that it provoked a higher degree of voting on the basis of economic class than any of the elections which have succeeded it³⁷ A slashing attack by Dewey therefore might have polarized the voters even further This would have increased Truman's margin since there are many more people with low than with high incomes Had the election gone the other way—and a handful of votes in a few states would have done it—we would have heard much less about Dewey's blunder and much more about how unpopular Truman was supposed to have been in 1948

A whole series of "mistakes" have been attributed to Richard Nixon. Here are two culled from a best selling book on the 1960 campaign. On the civil rights plank of the Republican platform "The original draft plank prepared by the Platform Committee was a moderate one. This plank, as written would almost certainly have carried the Southern states for Nixon and it seems in retrospect might have given him victory. On Monday July 25th it is almost certain it lay in Nixon's power to reorient the Republican Party toward an axis of Northern Southern conservatives. His alone was the choice. Nixon insisted that the Platform Committee substitute for the moderate position on civil rights (which probably would have won him the election) the advanced Rockefeller position on civil rights.³⁸ On Nixon's failure to protest the imprisonment of Martin Luther King during the campaign "He had made the political decision at Chicago to court the Negro vote in the North only now apparently he felt it quite possible that Texas, South Carolina and Louisiana might all be won to him by the white vote and he did not wish to offend that vote. So he did not act—there was no whole philosophy of politics to instruct him."³⁹

Apparently there are times when hindsight converts every act of a losing candidate into a blunder. Nixon, as a recent loser in a Presidential race, is now in a position to enjoy the fruits of the wisdom gained by his experience. If he runs again, however, he may still find it difficult simultaneously to woo the Negro and the South. Since the piecemeal accidents of a long history have thrown both of these groups largely into the Democratic camp, it would, we suggest, take more than the siren call of a Republican candidate to lure them both simultaneously and in public, to the Republican cause.

We have previously dealt with Nixon's decision to engage in television debates with Kennedy. Let us take a look at his decision on timing the campaign. Nixon calculated that the election was going to be very close because the Democrats were the majority party in the country and the Republicans lacked a candidate

with the special appeal of a national hero like Eisenhower Nixon reasoned therefore that the candidate who closed his campaign with the strongest spurt would be the winner⁴⁰ Consequently he held his fire somewhat until the latter part of October hoping thereby to peak his campaign while Kennedys was falling off This is precisely what he did and Kennedys supporters were worried that he had lost and Nixon had gained impetus in the last two weeks Nevertheless Kennedy won What lesson might a future candidate derive from this experience? Nixon's strategy of timing has a common sense ring to it Yet it is really difficult to say whether it had meaning Would he have done better to come to a peak earlier? Might the general public not have gotten tired of a full blast effort straight through? There is no way of knowing It is possible that Nixon lost because of his strategy that he gained though not enough or that the strategy had no effect whatsoever It would have been possible to use a successive survey of the same voters to check on whether votes were changed in his favor during the period he put on the steam but other factors could also affect the outcome of such a study Further there is no way of measuring how well he might have done had he pursued a different strategy

Should the candidate arrive at a coherent strategy which fits reasonably well with what is known of the political world he still will find that the party organization has an inertia in favor of its accustomed ways of doing things The party workers upon whom he is to some extent dependent, have their own ways of interpreting the world and he disregards their point of view at some risk Should the candidate fail to appear in a particular locality as others have done the party workers may feel slighted More important they may interpret this as a sign that the candidate has written off that area and they may slacken their own efforts Suppose the candidate decides to divert funds from campaign buttons and stickers to polls and television or to campaign trains? He may be right in his belief that the campaign methods he prefers may bring more return from the funds that are spent

But let the party faithful interpret this as a sign that he is losing—where oh where are those familiar signs of his popularity?—and their low morale may encourage a result which bears out this dire prophecy. An innovation in policy may shock the loyal followers of the party. It may seem to go against time honored precepts which are not easily unlearned. Could a Republican convince his party that a balanced budget is not sacred? A selling job may have to be done on the rank and file or otherwise they may sit on their hands during the campaign. It may make better political sense (if less intellectual sense) to phrase the new in old terms and make the departure seem less extreme than it might actually be. The value of the issue in the campaign may thus be blunted. The forces of inertia and tradition may be overcome by strong and persuasive candidates. The parties are greatly dependent on them and have little choice but to follow them even if haltingly. But in the absence of a special effort in the presence of enormous uncertainties and the inevitable insecurities the forces of tradition may do more to shape a campaign than the overt decisions of the candidates possibly can.

APPENDIX PREDICTING ELECTIONS

As the time for voting draws closer more and more interest focuses on attempts to forecast the shape of the outcome. This process of forecasting elections is not at all mysterious. It depends on well settled findings about the behavior of American electorates many of which have already been discussed. But it may be useful for citizens to understand how the "experts" go about picking the winner.

There are several ways to do it. One way popularized by journalists Joseph Alsop and Samuel Lubell is to go into neighborhoods where there are people who have in the past voted with great stability in one pattern or another and interview the residents. There are neighborhoods for example that always vote for the Republicans by a margin of 90% or better. Let us say that the interviewer finds that only 50% of the people he talks to tell him they are going to vote for the Republicans this time but when he visits areas voting

heavily Democratic respondents continue to support the Democratic nominee heavily. A finding such as this permits the reporter to make a forecast even though it is only based on a very small number of interviews which may not at all represent the opinions of most voters.

Reporters who use this technique very rarely make firm predictions about election outcomes. Instead they concentrate on telling about the clues they have picked up: what they learned in heavily Negro areas; what the people in Catholic areas said; what Midwest farmers say; what people from localities that always vote with the winner report; and so on.¹¹ This technique is impressive insofar as it digs into some of the dynamic properties of what goes into voting decisions. It reports what the issues are that seem to be on people's minds. It examines the different ways in which members of different sub-groups see the candidates and the campaign. It is also a technique which can be executed at relatively low cost. But it is unsystematic in that people are not polled in proportions reflecting the distributions of their characteristics in the population (so many men so many women so many white so many Negro and so forth) and thus the results of this technique would be regarded as unreliable in a scientific sense even though they may enhance people's intuitive grasp of what is going on. The results are also unreliable in the sense that two different journalists using this method may come to drastically different conclusions and there is no certain way of resolving the disagreement nor any prescribed method for choosing between their conflicting interpretations.

A second technique has been used most extensively by the economist and statistician Louis Bean and does not rely on interviews at all.¹² Bean it will be remembered contradicted all the polls and predicted that President Truman would be re-elected in 1948. The Bean method relies principally upon assumptions about 1) the stability of voting habits 2) the stability of the relationship between turnout and the two-party vote 3) the stability of the relationship between the two party distribution of the vote in one area and the two-party distribution of the vote in another and 4) the continuation of trends in voting in whatever direction they may be heading. Some of the e assumptions are quite dubious as we shall see and Bean customarily hedges his predictions by claiming that they will hold unless some issue or another intercedes to upset them. His method does not

provide a way for the impact of issues to be examined and in fact Bean does not demonstrate how the effects of issues have sustained or failed to sustain his predictions.

The basic material out of which Bean constructs his forecasts is a historical record of two-party voting. Let us suppose the Democratic percentage of the two-party vote has risen in each of the last five elections. The Bean technique continues the line on the graph in a simple extrapolation. Even when the percentage of the two-party vote does not describe a straight line on a graph it is possible to make an extrapolation by assuming that the historical pattern of fluctuation will be followed in the future.

Another type of analysis done by Bean made use of the September election results in Maine. Recently Maine moved its election day from September to November thus bringing its election day into line with practice in the rest of the country. But for many years it was possible to make a forecast based on the Maine results. Maine's distribution of the two-party vote, Bean said, bore a historically consistent relation with the national two-party vote distribution, rising and falling at about the same rate (but always somewhat below the nation on the Democratic graph and above the nation on the Republican graph). And so it was possible to forecast the outcome nationwide or in any state by noting the two-party ratio in the early Maine results and correcting it for two-party voting habits in the area whose result he wanted to predict.

The strength of forecasting from historical voting statistics arises out of the marvelous stability of American voting habits. But the weakness of such a technique is also manifest. Sometimes gross changes in populations through immigration or changes in the appeals of the parties to different voting groups will throw the historical two-party vote ratios in the sample area out of joint. When a forecast made with this technique is wrong it is usually quite difficult to tell whether transitory or lasting causes are at the root of it. This limits the usefulness of the forecast greatly since in the end it rests on assumptions which have only partial validity in any one election and nobody can say precisely how or where or to what extent they may be valid.

A third technique is a variant of the two foregoing types of analysis and is used by electronic computers at the radio and tele

vision networks on election night. The basic principle of these machines for our purposes can be described simply. They are given information about the past voting history of various locales. As these locales report their returns on election night, the machine compares this year's result with the information about previous years and arrives at a prediction of how this year's election will turn out when all the votes are counted. The system is exactly the same as we have already described for Alsop and Lubell: only the machine can be loaded with historical information about many localities, precincts, wards, and so on, and then the machine compares this historical information not with voting *intentions* as expressed by a few interviewees, but by voting *results* as expressed by the whole voting population of the area. The method the machine uses to predict the outcome early in the evening is roughly the same as Louis Bean's technique: only once again, instead of the Maine election, the machine has results from a great many early reporting areas and can therefore correct discrepancies arising out of one or two purely local situations.

Interestingly enough, at least one of the network machines on election night in 1960 was not programmed in the way described above. The IBM system set up for CBS began election night in 1960 with the erroneous prediction that Richard Nixon would win the Presidency—a prediction that was later corrected as more and more returns came in.⁴³ It is useful to pause for a moment to look at this mistake, because it demonstrates clearly that these machines, like any other tools, are only as good as the people who use them.

The IBM computer was fed information based not on the geographic locale of the vote, but rather on the order in which the vote was reported to election headquarters. Thus all the machine knew in 1960 was how many Democratic votes and how many Republican votes had been reported at 7 p.m. in previous elections, at 7:15, and so on. But it did not know *where* these votes had come from. The introduction of a faster method of vote-counting in Kansas between 1956 and 1960 was the reason for the IBM computer's early mistake. A flood of Kansas Republican votes arrived earlier than ever before. The computer, not knowing where they came from, compared them with the early returns in 1956, which were from the "swing" state of Connecticut, and drew a false conclusion.

Since the order in which states report their vote varies quite a bit more than the voting habits of people living in specific early reporting places all the computers seem likely in the future to be working on geographic assumptions. It will in all probability be almost impossible to find out what assumptions the computers are using during election night coverage however because of the network reporters' dislike of imparting "complicated" information. It is so much friendlier to give the machine a nickname and ask it to "do tricks" and to bat one's eyelashes helplessly at the TV camera while the "mysterious" machine does its prosaic work.

The final method for predicting elections is the most powerful, the most controversial, and by all odds the most famous: polls. These are based on a few simple assumptions that have been found to be quite correct over the years. One is that people will generally tell you the truth if you ask them how they are going to vote. Another is that it is not necessary to ask everyone what he is going to do in order to get as accurate a forecast as if you had asked everyone.

The polls are commercial operations and these days they are big business. In addition to the publicly available polls such as the Gallup newspaper reports, politicians commission private polls. They are expensive. They entail writing up a list of questions and asking them all, and all in the same way, to several thousand people spread all over the country, collecting the answers, and figuring out what it all means. Each of these phases of the operation—question writing, selecting the sample of the total population to be interviewed, interviewing, organizing the answers, and interpreting the results—is a job requiring skill and training. It is this that commercial polling organizations provide.

Some of these organizations regrettably treat the technical aspects of their operation as trade secrets (which they are not) and persist in leaving the impression that their forecasts are the result of a particularly efficacious kind of witchcraft. Since the fiasco of 1948, when pollsters were so sure of the result that they became professionally careless, there has been less ballyhoo. But the general reader will do well to keep a sharp eye on the following points as the polls begin reporting early in the campaign.⁴⁴

1) How big is the population which is reported to be "unde-

cast the crucial ballots. Pollsters have a rule in reporting their results which goes this way: If the undecided people were to cast their ballots in the same proportion as those who have made up their minds. "But wait. If these people *were* like the decided, they too would have made up their minds. Sometimes they *do* vote like early deciders. But sometimes they don't. Unfortunately not enough is known about when they do and when they don't the best advice we can give is to pay close attention to what the pollster says he is doing about them and if they are more than 10 to 15 per cent of the population sampled then place little confidence in the poll report. Until these people make up their minds it is too early to tell about the outcome.

2) What is the stability of general sentiment in the population? Very often the polls will report wide swings of sentiment from week to week. In 1960 The Gallup organization began averaging one week's totals with the previous weeks part way through the campaign—without telling its readers.⁴³ This tended to depress the extent of an apparent shift of sympathy from Nixon to Kennedy and it also tended to make the figures appear a great deal more stable and settled than they actually were. In general wide swings of sentiment from week to week mean that opinions have not crystallized sufficiently for a reliable prediction to be made.

3) Remember that the polls are based on a gross overall nationwide sample but that Presidential elections are decided by the distribution of votes in the Electoral College. Thus a really reliable prediction would have to include a state by state breakdown. This is prohibitively expensive and so it is not done. If it were done it would be possible to detect situations like the following:

Candidate A has 49% of the popular vote in polls taken in all the populous states and 75% of the popular vote in sparsely settled states. He loses badly to Candidate B in the Electoral College although it looks like a close election.

Pollsters generally caution that they are trying only to forecast the percentage distributions in the popular vote. Here again if the result is closely divided around 50% then the poll may be quite close to being perfectly accurate but still forecast the wrong winner.

4) Some people never show up to vote on Election Day. These

tend to be undecideds and Democrats (in that order) more often than Republicans but in any event some sort of grain of salt has to be taken with results in order to account for the phenomenon of differential turnout. Most experienced polling organizations do build some sort of correction into their results based on assumptions about how many people in their sample will actually vote. It is important to know precisely what this assumption is and what the resulting corrections are.

5) Many people are plagued with the feeling that the samples used by pollsters—of two to five thousand people—are inadequate to represent the feelings of the millions of Americans whose voting they are supposed to represent. This by and large is a false issue. Experience has shown that very few of the errors one makes with a sample of 3 000 are correctable with a sample of 15 or 20 thousand although the expense of polling such a population rises steeply.⁴⁶

Generally it is not a sampling error that is at fault nowadays when pollsters' predictions go awry but illicit "cooking" of the data or incompetent interpretations of findings. There is one famous instance of a sampling error when polling was in its most rudimentary stages. In 1936 the *Literary Digest* predicted a landslide victory for the Republican Alfred Landon.⁴⁷ When Franklin D. Roosevelt won in overwhelming fashion the *Digest* became a laughingstock and soon thereafter went out of business. What had happened was simple enough. The magazine had sent out millions of postcards to telephone subscribers asking them how they intended to vote. The returns showed a huge Republican triumph. Surely the *Digest* must have thought, we cannot possibly be wrong when our total response is so large and so one-sided. But of course something was terribly wrong. And that stemmed from the fact that in the Depression years only the relatively wealthy had telephones. So the *Digest* got its returns from that group in the population most likely to vote Republican and completely ignored the much larger number of poorer people who were going to vote Democratic. Moreover there is a much greater tendency for people of wealth and education to return mail questionnaires so that the bias in favor of people likely to vote Republican was further enhanced.⁴⁸

In 1948 a whole series of errors were made but none of them seem to have been connected with the size of the sample. In that year

the Gallup Roper and Crossley polls all predicted that Governor Dewey would unseat President Truman. Among the problems with the polls that year the following were uncovered by a committee of social scientists after the event.⁴⁹

a) The pollsters were so sure of the outcome that they stopped taking polls early in the campaign, assuming that the large population of undecideds would vote if they voted in the same way as those who had made up their minds early in the campaign.

b) The undecideds voted in just the reverse proportions.

c) Many instances were revealed where polling organization analysts disbelieving pro-Truman results arbitrarily "corrected" them in favor of Dewey. The methods of analysis employed were not traced in any systematic way, however, because they could not systematically be reconstructed from records of the polling organizations.

d) Sampling error occurred not because of the size of the samples but because respondents were selected by methods that gave interviewers too much leeway to introduce biases into the sample. The so-called "quota control" method (which instructs interviewers for example out of 20 interviews to pick ten men, ten women, fifteen Protestants, four Catholics, one Jew, seventeen whites and three Negroes and so on) has been replaced with "stratified random samples" in which geographic areas are picked randomly and neighborhoods and houses within neighborhoods are selected randomly with controls so that areas representing a variety of economic levels are sure to be selected. This gives the people in charge of the poll greater control over who is going to be in their sample and prevents interviewers from asking only people who live near them or who are conveniently accessible in some other way and are likely to be similar to them in social standing and political outlook.

Predicting Presidential elections is largely a matter of satisfying curiosity. It is a great game to guess who will win and we look to the polls for indications of the signs of the times. But the importance of this kind of prediction is not great. After all we do get to know who has won very soon after Election Day with much greater detail and accuracy than the polls can supply. The bare prediction of the outcome even if it is reasonably correct tells us little about how the result came to occur. More may be learned if it is possible to break

down the figures to see what kind of groups—ethnic racial economic regional—voted to what degree for which candidates. Yet our enlightenment at this point is still not great. Suppose we know that in one election Catholics voted Democratic 60% of the time and in another election this percentage was reduced to 53. Surely this is interesting but unless we have some good idea about why Catholics have switched their allegiance our knowledge has hardly advanced. The polls often tell us what but seldom why. There is however no reason why polling techniques in the future cannot be used to answer "why" questions.

The usual polling technique consists of talking to samples of the population at various points in time. The samples may be perfectly adequate but different people constitute each successive sample as the interviewers seek out people who meet their specifications. It is difficult to discover with any reliability why particular individuals or classes of people are changing their minds because interviewers ordinarily do not go back to the same people who gave their original preferences. A panel survey is used to overcome this difficulty.¹⁰ In a panel survey a sample of the voting population is obtained and the very same people are interviewed at various intervals before Election Day and perhaps afterwards. This technique makes it possible to isolate the people who make up their minds early and those who decide late. These groups can be reinterviewed and examined for other distinguishing characteristics. More important perhaps those voters who change their minds during the campaign can be identified and studied. If a panel of respondents can be reinterviewed over a number of years and a series of elections it may become possible to discover directly why some people change their voting habits from election to election.

NOTES

- 1 See Seymour M. Lipset, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Allen H. Barton, and Juan Linz, "The Psychology of Voting: An Analysis of Political Behavior" in *Handbook of Social Psychology*, ed. Gardner Lindzey (Cambridge, Mass. 1954), pp. 1124-1175; Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, *The People's Choice*, 2nd ed.

(New York 1945) pp 87-93 and Bernard Berelson Paul F Lazarsfeld and William N McPhee *Voting* (Chicago 1954) pp 16-17

2. See Warren E Miller "The Political Behavior of the Electorate" *American Government Annual 1960-61* ed. E. Latham (New York 1960) pp 40-61 and Fred I Greenstein *The American Party System and the American People* (Englewood Cliffs 1963) Chapter 3 both of which give findings of surveys conducted primarily under academic auspices. Gallup data also bear out the same general conclusion. "If every potential voter in the country had to register with either party the figures projected by survey findings would be Democrats 50 800 000 Republicans 40 020 000 Undecided 11 200 000" (American Institute of Public Opinion News Release "Republicans Outnumbered by 16 Million Poll Finds" October 10 1960) The number of "undecideds" may have been reduced by assigning a party affiliation to people who expressed a faint preference for one or the other party.

3. There is another possibility. That voters who turn out only by being dinned at by the media are likely to be less stable in their political orientations and will therefore vote less for the party and more for the candidate whose name or personality seems more familiar to them. This in a year when an Eisenhower is on the ticket might well mean Republican votes.

4. See Angus Campbell Philip E Converse Warren E Miller and Donald E Stokes *The American Voter* (New York 1960) pp 124 552-553 Table 6-1 on p 124 summarizes the highly consistent results of seven separate national sample surveys taken by the Survey Research Center from October 1952 to October 1958. In October 1958 the S R C figures were

Strong Republicans	13%
Weak Republicans	16%
Independent Republicans	4%
Independents	8%
Independent Democrats	7%
Weak Democrats	24%
Strong Democrats	23%
Apolitical don't know	5%

5 See Philip E. Converse, Angus Campbell, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes "Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating Election" *American Political Science Review* 55 (June 1961) 269-280 esp p 274

6 See Campbell *et al* *The American Voter* pp 537-538 and Herbert H. Hyman and Paul B. Sheatsley "The Political Appeal of President Eisenhower" *Public Opinion Quarterly* 19 (Winter 1955-56) 28-39

7 For indications that this strategy is feasible despite the existence of general stereotypes see Campbell *et al* *The American Voter* pp 44-59 179-187. See also American Institute of Public Opinion News Releases February 6 1963 October 9 1964 and October 25 1964

8 For a striking demonstration of this see Ithiel de Sola Pool, Robert P. Abelson and Samuel Popkin *Candidates: Issues and Strategies* (Cambridge Mass 1964) pp 117-118

9 Recall Senator Dirksen's famous castigation of Thomas E. Dewey at the Republican Convention of 1952: "We followed you before and you took us down the path to defeat."

10 For indications that this is so see in particular Herbert McClosky, Paul J. Hoffman and Rosemary O'Hara "Issue Conflicts and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers" *American Political Science Review* 54 (June 1960) 406-427


11 Good accounts of debates over strategy among Republicans can be found in such sources as Charles O. Jones *The Republican Party in American Politics* (New York 1965), Robert Donovan *The Future of the Republican Party* (New York 1964), Malcolm C. Moos *The Republicans: A History of Their Party* (New York 1956), Robert Novak *The Agony of the G.O.P.* 1964 (New York 1965) and Conrad Joyner *The Republican Dilemma* (Tucson 1964)

12 Another example is the common practice of declaring special dividends on G.I. insurance to put more money in circulation in order to increase income and decrease unemployment

13 Campbell *et al* *The American Voter* pp 525-527

14 A useful source on the Nixon campaign is *The Speeches of Vice President Richard M. Nixon: Presidential Campaign of 1960* Report 994 Part II 87th Congress 1st Session U.S. Senate (Washington 1961)

Party Best Suited to Keep the United States Out of War




source: Adapted from the Gallup Political Index

15 The report of the speech in the *New York Times* October 11 1956 gives no indication of how it was received The authors heard it delivered

16 Thomas Flinn "How Nixon Took Ohio" *Western Political Quarterly* 15 (June 1962) 276-279

17 See footnote 2 and for examples of this Democratic strategy in operation in 1960 see *The Speeches of Senator John F. Kennedy Presidential Campaign of 1960 Report 991 Part I 87th Congress 1st Session US Senate* (Washington 1961)

18 See Nixon's speeches in Report 994 Part II For example on p 266 in a speech at Lafayette La Sept 24 1960 Mr Nixon said



Report No 17 (October 1968)

"I say further that what we adopted in our platform in Chicago is closer to the views of Democrats in not only the South but in California where there are many more Democrats than Republicans incidentally on oil depletion Mr Kennedy's position was not in agreement with the Democratic platform"

19 See for example the American Institute of Public Opinion News Release of September 3 1964 in which 53% of a national sample said that the Democrats were the party best able to keep the country prosperous Only 21% picked the Republicans See also Campbell *et al* *The American Voter* pp 44-59

20 *The Joint Appearances of Senator John F Kennedy and*

Vice President Richard M. Nixon Presidential Campaign of 1960 Report 994 Part III 87th Congress 1st Session U.S. Senate (Washington 1961) See for example Mr. Nixon's opening remarks in the first joint television debate pp. 75-78

21 See for example Campbell *et al.* *The American Voter* pp. 44-59 and Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren E. Miller *The Voter Decides* (Evanston 1954) pp. 44-45 especially Table 4.3 p. 45

AIPO surveys show the fifteen year trend on this issue indicated in the graph on pages 164-165. This graph indicates first that over the whole fifteen year period the position of the Republican party as the party of peace has steadily been eroded. It also indicates that just before elections voters' expressions of their accustomed stereotypes are at their strongest which we would expect owing to the polarization in voters' attitudes that takes place during the heat of battle. A dramatic reversal took place at the time of the 1964 election, no doubt owing to Senator Goldwater's extreme foreign policy positions and to President Johnson's relative moderation. However the progressive escalation under President Johnson of the Vietnam war since 1964 seems to have had an impact on public opinion and the Republican party once more seems to have regained its status by a small margin as the party of peace.

22 The most well publicized clashes over foreign policy occurred in the second and third television debates: see the *New York Times* October 8 1960 pp. 1-12; October 9 1960 Pt. IV p. 10; and October 14 1960 p. 22. The impression of journalists and political observers that Nixon gained in these confrontations (see for example the *New York Times* for October 17 1960) was corroborated by surveys of the viewers (see the references in footnote 21 following) and by Paul Abelson and Popkin *Candidates Issues and Strategies* p. 118.

23 Converse *et al.* "Stability and Change in 1960: A Reinstating Election" 269-280.

24 Elihu Katz and Jacob J. Feldman "The Debates in the Light of Research: A Survey of Surveys" in *The Great Debates* ed. Sidney Kraus (Bloomington 1962) pp. 201-202. Bear in mind however that issues as such do not strongly influence voting behavior. Katz and Feldman conclude "First of all it seems safe to say that the debates

—especially the first one—resulted primarily in a strengthening of commitment to one's own party and candidate. This was much more the case for Democrats than Republicans but the former had much greater room for improvement" (p. 208).

25 See Theodore H. White *The Making of the President 1960* (New York 1961) pp. 269–275 and his *The Making of the President 1964* (New York 1965) *passim*.

26 Department of Marketing, Miami University Oxford Research Associates *The Influence of Television on the Election of 1952* (Oxford 1954) pp. 151–160.

27 See White *The Making of the President 1960* pp. 282–283 and Herbert A. Seltz and Richard D. Yoakum *Production Diary of the Debates* in *The Great Debates* ed. Sidney Kraus pp. 73–126.

28 *Ibid.* see also Richard Nixon *Six Crises* (New York 1962).

29 Earl Maza *Richard Nixon* (New York 1959) pp. 21–22.

30 See Katz and Feldman "The Debates in the Light of Research: A Survey of Surveys" pp. 173–223.

31 See William L. Rivers "The Correspondents After 25 Years" *Columbia Journalism Review* 1 (Spring 1962). Nixon *Six Crises* and especially White *The Making of the President 1960* for a discussion of two candidates contrasting attitudes toward their camp of reporters. For the 1964 election see White *The Making of the President 1964*.

32 For further examples see Hugh A. Bone *American Politics and the Party System* pp. 457–469. Readers may not be aware that Al Smith had thought of moving the Vatican to Washington or that Herbert Hoover had a Negro concubine yet these ridiculous allegations were made (p. 458).

33 Robert E. Sherwood *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York 1948) p. 821.

34 See Flinn *How Nixon Took Ohio*.

35 *New York Times* August 1, 1948 p. 49.

36 See Jules Abels *Out of the Jaws of Victory* (New York 1959).

37 Robert Alford "The Role of Social Class in American Voting Behavior" *Western Political Quarterly* 16 (March 1963) 180–194. Campbell et al. *The American Voter* Chapter 13.

38 White *The Making of the President 1960* pp. 203–204.

39 *Ibid* p 315

40 *Nixon Six Crises*

41 See for example Samuel Lubell *The Future of American Politics* (Garden City 1950) and his "Personalities and Issues" in *The Great Debates* ed Sidney Kraus pp 151-162 and Joseph Alsop "The Negro Vote and New York" *New York Herald Tribune* (and elsewhere) August 8 1960

42 Louis H Bern *Ballot Behavior* (Washington 1940)

43 IBM published a pamphlet *The Fastest Reported Election* in 1961 describing their operations

44 These suggestions are drawn in part from a reading of the Report of a Committee of the Social Science Research Council Fredrick Mosteller et al *The Pre Election Polls of 1948* Social Science Research Council Bulletin 60 (New York 1949)

45 Joseph Alsop "The Wayward Press Dissection of a Poll" *The New Yorker* (September 24 1960) pp 170-184

46 There are several sources about the technology and tactics of polling George Gallup has published *A Guide to Public Opinion Polls* (Princeton 1948) More recently see *Opinion Polls Intercrus* by Donald McDonald with Elmo Roper and George Gallup (Santa Barbara 1962)

47 Sherwood Roosevelt and Hopkins p 86

48 As a matter of fact this method produced a correct prediction in 1932 when the *Literary Digest* said that Roosevelt would win Sampling error is tricky an atypical sample may still give the correct prediction—by luck but sooner or later the law of averages is bound to catch up with it

49 Mosteller et al *The Pre Election Polls of 1948*

50 See Paul F Lazarsfeld "The Use of Panels in Social Research" *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 92 (November 1948) pp 405-410

Chapter 4

The 1964 Election

THUS FAR we have talked about the strategies of candidates and election outcomes as though they were related in a particular way and in a sense they are. Experience and accumulated knowledge suggest that there are strategies that are best for Democrats and for Republicans for incumbents and for challengers for front runners and for dark horses and so on. An underlying assumption we have been using—for the sake of simplicity—is that, when a player knows the payoffs attached to various available alternatives he will on the whole choose the alternatives that are likely to bring him the maximum payoffs. This is more or less what all “rational man” theories predict in economics, game theory or politics.

But in 1964 the Republican party chose a number of alternatives manifestly disadvantageous to its chances of winning the election. It nominated a relatively unpopular candidate who alienated not only independents and borderline Democrats but even many traditional Republicans by the kind of campaign he conducted. The results of the 1964 election suggest that our understanding of the merits of various strategies available to Republicans is not faulty. Goldwater did lose badly as the prevailing theory would predict but it is still necessary for us to try to understand why the Republicans chose as they did.

why they in effect rejected alternatives promising greater pay offs in favor of less promising alternatives

Two explanations are possible. On one hand it may be that Republicans misperceived the payoffs that they believed they *were* pursuing — a winning strategy. On the other hand perhaps Republicans were not trying to win the election but had other payoffs in mind which dictated a choice of alternatives quite different from a strategy in which winning public office is the paramount goal.

If some Republicans did not care about winning or thought that Goldwater might win, other Republicans did care about winning and knew that Goldwater would lose. Why then did the Republican party nominate Barry Goldwater?

It is clear that our explanation of the Goldwater phenomenon must come in two parts. We must first understand the nature of Goldwater's supporters. Why did they care so little about winning or so badly misperceive their candidate's electoral chances? Second, even if we can understand why some Republicans preferred to back Goldwater, we still need to know why these Republicans triumphed within the party as a whole.

We shall deal with these two points in turn. Then we shall see how Goldwater's nomination decisively affected the campaign. Finally, we shall assess the impact of 1964 upon the future of the competitive two party system in the United States.

MISPERCEIVING THE OUTCOME THE HIDDEN VOTE HYPOTHESIS

Did Republicans believe that Barry Goldwater could actually win the election? An argument was made by Goldwater supporters that he could win based upon the possibility that he could put together a coalition in the Electoral College of Southern and Western states and in particular upon the notion of a *hidden vote*.

The class — Republican criticism of "me too" strategies argues

that such strategies merely alienate potential Republican voters while failing to attract sufficient Democrats. Alienated Republicans so goes this argument seeing no difference between the policies espoused by the major parties withdraw from politics into apathy. This is the hidden vote that a thoroughgoing conservative Republican campaign is supposed to attract. But did this hidden vote exist—or was this argument an instance of misperception on the part of those who believed it and supported Goldwater thinking he could win?

The resulting disastrous consequences for the Republican party at the congressional and state levels¹ invites the exercise of hindsight on the question of the hidden Republican vote. But for once hindsight merely confirms foresight. It was apparent before the election as well as afterward that there are only very weak factual grounds supporting the notion that there is a hidden Republican vote waiting to be tapped by an unequivocally conservative candidate.

Let us examine the evidence. First we must ask where the Republican vote could be hidden that this strategy seeks to tap. Presumably not among Democrats at least outside the South since this approach relies so heavily upon sharpening the cleavage between the two parties. Nor can there be much of a hidden vote among disaffected conservative Republicans who fail to turn out since the best knowledge we have of Republicans is that they do turn out and vote Republican.²

The only other possible location for the hidden vote is among those who profess to no regular party affiliation—roughly 25% of the potential electorate. What do we know about these people that might lead us to conclude that they can be moved to vote Republican by a highly ideological appeal based on conservative and right wing doctrines?

There is in fact no reason at all to suspect that these people can be reached in this way. All the information we have on party neutrals indicates that they are much less interested, less informed, less likely to seek information about politics and much

less likely to vote than are regular partisans. Non affiliates are relatively unconcerned about issues and are only dimly aware of political events.² Efforts to reach this population to attract their attention are likely to fail. Attempts to outline issue positions to them to engage their support in behalf of any self-consistent philosophical and political position seem on a par with the famous campaign to sell refrigerators to Eskimos.

There is a well known suspicion voiced from time to time by imaginative writers that conservative elements of the population are in fact alienated from politics and sit in the wings frustrated, immobilized and without party loyalties until some one pursuing a Goldwater like strategy gives them the "choice" they are looking for. This is probably a canard. What fragments of evidence we have point to the probability that the dedicated conservatives and right wing ideologues who are sufficiently interested in politics to hold strong opinions about public policy do in fact belong to political parties and participate actively in them. Outside the South it seems certain these people are almost all Republicans. Thus the hidden vote that Goldwater hoped to attract was probably hidden inside the vote Richard Nixon received in 1960.³

Another assumption underlying the hidden vote theory is that in 1964 it would have been possible to attract this mythical vote in substantial numbers without losing the allegiance of large numbers of more moderate people who supported the almost successful candidacy of Richard Nixon in 1960.

In fact this proved impossible to accomplish. An enormous number—probably around 20%—of Nixon's 1960 supporters voted for Lyndon Johnson in 1964.⁴ But this outcome might have been extrapolated from poll and primary election data in the pre-convention period which showed that even among Republican voters Goldwater enjoyed far from overwhelming support.⁵

In addition Goldwater aroused great antipathy among the general population. According to the Gallup poll in mid September 38.3% of respondents expressed definite hostility to Goldwater

(including 14.7% expressing the most extreme hostility on an 11 point scale) while only 8.1% expressed any antipathy at all toward President Johnson.⁷ Likewise on a number of issues Louis Harris surveys found that sizable majorities in the general population defined themselves as opposed to positions that they believed Senator Goldwater held.⁸

ALTERNATIVE PAYOFFS

PURISTS vs PROFESSIONALS

Yet even if Goldwater's supporters could convince themselves that his cause was not utterly hopeless the fact that they chose him in the face of reasonably strong evidence of his slight chance of victory suggests that winning the election was not uppermost in their minds. Politicians have been accused of many things until now it has not been usual to accuse them of wishing to lose elections. But perhaps in specifying only the paramount goal of winning we have been taking a narrow view of the matter. Interviews held with Goldwater delegates to the Republican Convention may help to clarify this problem.⁹

One Goldwater delegate said "The delegates are for Goldwater because they agree with his philosophy of government. That's what you people will never understand—we're committed to his whole approach." He was undoubtedly correct. There was a remarkable fit between Goldwater and a substantial majority of his followers. What they liked about Goldwater however was not merely or even primarily his policy positions but rather his "approach" his style of operation. When we asked Goldwater delegates to tell us what they most liked about their candidate only a few mentioned his position on the issues and those who did were content with brief references to constitutional principles like states' rights.

By far the most frequent delegate characterizations of Goldwater referred to his consistency, honesty, integrity, and willingness to stick by principles.¹⁰ It was not so much his principles

(though these were undoubtedly important) but the belief that he would stick to them that counted most with his supporters "He can be trusted" "He is straightforward" "He does not compromise" "He doesn't pander to the public he's against expediency" "He is frank" "He has courage" "He stands up for what he believes" "He won't play footsie with the people" "He votes his convictions when he knows he's right" "He doesn't go along with the crowd" He meets issues head-on" "Goldwater speaks about things others avoid Most politicians like to avoid issues" "He keeps promises" "He doesn't change his mind" "He is not confused" As one of Goldwater's supporters perceptively observed "He's different from most politicians" And so were most of Goldwater's followers different from most politicians

Many Goldwater delegates held attitudes quite different from those characteristic of American politicians We can refer to these delegates as "purists"—political activists whose attitudes about politics have strongly moralistic overtones Here is an example This Goldwater purist was a delegate from a rural area in Pennsylvania attending his first convention

Interviewer: What qualities should a Presidential candidate have?

Delegate: Moral integrity

I: Should he be able to win the election?

D: No principles are more important I would rather be one against 20 000 and believe I was right That's what I admire about Goldwater He's like that

I: Are most politicians like that?

D: No unfortunately

I: What do you like about Goldwater?

D: I am in sympathy with many of his philosophies of government but I like him personally for his moral integrity I always believed that a candidate should carry out his promises Scranton didn't do that But now for the first time in my life we have a candidate who acts as he believes He doesn't change his position when it is expedient

I Do you think that if the party loses badly in November it ought to change its principles?

D No I'm willing to fight for these principles for ten years if we don't win

I For fifty years?

D Even fifty years

I Do you think it's better to compromise a little to win than to lose and not compromise?

D I had this problem in my district. After we fighters had won [the nomination for] the Congressional seat the local [Republican] machine offered to make a deal. They wouldn't oppose our candidate if we didn't oppose theirs. I refused, because I didn't see how I could make a deal with the men I'd been opposing two years ago for the things they did. So I lost, and I could have won easily. I've thought about it many times because if I had agreed I could have done some good at least. But I don't believe that I should compromise one inch from what I believe deep down inside.

Here we begin to see the distinguishing characteristics of the purists: their emphasis on internal criteria for decision; on what they believe "deep down inside"; their rejection of compromise; their lack of orientation toward winning; their stress on the style and purity of decision—integrity, consistency, adherence to internal norms.

The professionals looked at politics quite differently. Here is a California delegate strongly for Goldwater with more than fifteen years in party work, attending his third Republican Convention.

Interviewer You seem different from many of the Goldwater supporters. How would you characterize your position in comparison with them?

Delegate Yes I'm more practical. I realize you have to live together. For example I'm going up now to a meeting of the California Republican committee and we've got to handle a liberal candidate and an ultra-conservative. I'm going to urge

them to accept the liberal because we've got to work together. We [the Republicans] are a minority party in California and we can't afford to squabble amongst ourselves. The art of politics is the art of compromise. If I can get a whole loaf I'll take it. If not I'll take half rather than lose it all.

I: What would Goldwater do about the Cuban situation?

D: Well, it's there now and we'll just have to live with it.

I: The Berlin Wall?

D: He won't tear it down. I know him very well.

I: Social Security?

D: We've had it for a long time. It's part of our system. That's something some of these Goldwater people don't realize. They're a new breed and sort of naive on things like this. They think you can suddenly shift the whole range of government to the right. What they don't realize is that you can only bend a little back away from the left.

I: What if Goldwater loses by a landslide?

D: Well, I don't think that will happen.

I: Suppose it does?

D: Well, then maybe the people aren't ready for a change.

Yes, we'll have to try to change, maybe a little more toward the liberal side.

The belief in compromise and bargaining, the sense that public policy is made in small steps rather than big leaps, the concern with conciliating the opposition and broadening public appeal, and the willingness to bend a little to capture public support are all characteristic of the traditional American politician.

Having sketched some of the essential attributes of purists and professionals, we can proceed to a closer examination of these two types, with special emphasis on the purists.

Winning Elections

"I've talked to some of the California delegates - a citizen who observed the convention informed us - and I don't understand them at all. They talk like they don't care if we win." In

a sense he was wrong because the delegates desperately wanted Goldwater to win. But our informant was essentially correct in the sense that these delegates cared more about maintaining their purity—"I would rather lose and be right"—than about winning. The essential element of this style is a devotion to principles especially the principle that men in politics should have maintain and cherish their principles.

When asked why they entered politics Goldwater delegates often answered "For the same reason as any man—principles." When asked if the party should change some of its policies if Goldwater lost badly the delegates responded by reiterating their devotion to principles "God no. These are American principles these are what we stand for." "No we want a clear party which will represent principles to the people." "I'd rather stick by the real principles this country was built on than win. Popularity isn't important prestige isn't important it's the principles that matter."

Although the professionals on the other hand put a high premium on popularity with the electorate there were things that even they would not do and ways they would not prefer to win. A Scranton delegate in politics for many years in Philadelphia pointed out that in his white upper class ward he and his party had benefited from a white backlash issue in a local election. "But we don't want that that divides the country. We don't want whites and blacks to fight it's not good for the country." A New Jersey delegate with many years of political experience did not really like any of the candidates for the nomination and feared that the party would fare badly at the polls if Goldwater were nominated. Yet he felt that things could happen "a white backlash building up if the Negroes have a lot of big demonstrations in the cities or if Vietnam blew up in our faces. But I'd rather lose than have those things happen. I'd rather lose than have race fights or war."

One great difference between the purists and the professionals lay in what they considered valid grounds for preferring not to

win. The professionals emphasized specific unfortunate consequences such as race riots and war. The purists emphasized departures from internal principles—such as consistency, integrity, and standing firm—held by their party leaders. The professionals were oriented toward what might happen to other people, the purists toward their own consciences.

Emphasizing Differences

An important component of the Goldwater style was the guiding principle that the parties ought to be different. The maintenance of wide and sharp differences between the parties was seen as a fundamental purpose of engaging in politics. As an enthusiastic woman from New Jersey put it: "I think everything should be an issue. civil rights should be an issue. Cuba should be an issue. This is the first time a campaign will be on issues. I think it's wonderful. It's just terrible the way personality has been in politics. like Kennedy winning on his hair and teeth and Nixon losing because there was a shadow on his chin. It's ridiculous."

Hence when Goldwater supporters were asked whether they should balance the ticket with a liberal as Vice President, they replied: "We don't want a blurred image. we've been a me too party for too long. We want to take a clear position." If, in order to provide clear differences between the parties, the Republicans lost, that was all right. For "even if the party loses at least we have presented a clear alternative to the people. At least we'll have a strong party." What is meant by "strong"? "Cohesive, united on principles." The chorus of Goldwater purists rose to a crescendo when they insisted in almost identical words: "We don't want to become a me too party. we don't want to be the same as the Democrats." There is a definite possibility therefore that if they had been offered accommodations or compromises on issues, they would have rejected them because they wanted to be different.

The ideal party of the purists is not merely a conservative

party it is also a distinct and separate community of co believers who differ with the opposition party all down the line To this extent their style merges with that of the liberal Democratic reformers in some big cities who wish to see the parties represent clear and opposing alternatives and to gain votes only through appeals based on policy differences rather than on such "irrational" criteria as personality party identification or ethnic status¹¹ But the Goldwater purists went even further in their willingness to cast aside whole groups of voters who did not agree with them "We won't get Negro votes anyway so there's no point in trying" "They can vote for the other party for all I care" "We won't change our principles just to get a few votes from Negroes" In the same spirit Barry Goldwater suggested that people who favored the kind of government the United States has had since 1932 should not vote for him

For the professionals the desire to win is intimately connected with the belief that a political party should try to get as much support from as many diverse groups as possible In describing the qualities a Presidential candidate should have a professional would say "He should be diplomatic He should be able to gather support from a lot of groups underneath him That's what Eisenhower had that's what Kennedy had and that's what Johnson has You know there's one thing about politics there's no such thing as second place you don't get anything for coming in second"

Hence the professionals were concerned with the possible loss of a substantial part of the small Negro vote they had received in the past "You just can't go around throwing away votes The object of a party is to draw voters together to the party not to push them away" A delegate from Philadelphia was more specific He had "nothing personal against Goldwater" but feared that if Goldwater were to run "we'll get the hell kicked out of us We've been out of [state] power for ten or twelve years Now we're getting some of the Polish vote and the Italians don't treat us too bad The Jews and the Negroes go about 75%

against us but at least we get part of the Negro vote and that helps us hold the line in the state generally”

To their dichotomous view of political parties and their belief that issue preferences are the only moral way to choose between the parties the purists added a strong desire to simplify political choice a party for the growth of government and a party against a party which believes in standing up to the enemy and one which believes in appeasement a party which believes in private initiative and one which wishes to stifle it a party of free enterprise and a party of socialism

The desire to dichotomize and simplify found expression in ways of locating political supporters and opponents Perhaps the most charming example came from a California delegate who expressed the wish to see all liberals in the East and all conservatives in the West Presumably then if one knew where a man came from one could immediately discern his political tendency Many delegates voiced the desire to divide friend from foe by simple criteria and then do joyous battle

THE PRIVATIZATION OF POLITICS

We may sum up the purist style by saying that it represents a virtually complete privatization of politics The private conscience of the leader—rather than his public responsibilities—becomes the focal point of politics Internal criteria—possession of devotion to and standing up for private principles—become the standards of political judgment Constituents disappear and we are left with a political leader determining policy on the basis of compatibility with his private principles

From this perspective we can better understand why Goldwater voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964 despite his agreement with the view that the race issue should not become a matter of political partisanship Goldwater's conscience dictated that he vote against an Act which contained two sections that he believed violated the Constitution Although he knew that the

Act would pass anyway, he was simply unwilling to sacrifice his private conscience in order to achieve what he agreed was the public good. Nor would he or his supporters agree to make rather innocuous concessions in the civil rights plank of the Republican platform in order to placate Negroes because that would have suggested compromise and compromise suggests that one has not stuck to one's principles.

Once the platform became identified as a Goldwater platform presumably derived from careful scrutiny of conscience, it became a matter of principle not to permit any alteration whatsoever even if this refusal to compromise meant rejecting important segments of the party. The very idea that the Republican party should try to balance its ticket with a less conservative Vice Presidential candidate was uniformly regarded as immoral and despicable. Such thoughts reeked of inconsistency "me tooism," expediency and other political vices stemming from the lack of conscience in politics.

Conspicuously missing from purist thought is any consideration of the voters. The political party is defined entirely without reference to the people who would have to vote for it. To be sure the purists believed that there was a hidden Republican vote and they fully expected a huge upsurge of support as these Americans discovered that a party embracing their most cherished principles had at last appeared on the scene. But the "real Republican party" as they were fond of calling it was far removed from vulgar pandering for votes. It stood on its principles. It did not change to attract votes. Voters would be attracted to it when people changed.

One can see the privatization of politics at work when Goldwater delegates expressed their feelings about President Johnson and former President Eisenhower. Extremely hostile feelings were voiced about both men because they were seen as traditional politicians given to compromise. Goldwater's castigation of Johnson as a "faker" for example was regarded by the delegates interviewed as accurate and appropriate. "Originally and

against us but at least we get part of the Negro vote and that helps us hold the line in the state generally"

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historically" a delegate told us "Johnson was a conservative but he's willing to do things to change to stay in power. This shows weakness of character."

The purists did not think it appropriate for a man to act differently as President than as Senator. If a public official need consult only his private conscience of course there should be little change in his actions in different offices. If Johnson acted differently in the two offices this could only be because "he has no principles. LBJ is a consummate politician. He is inconsistent and immoral. Goldwater was different. He doesn't talk from both sides of his mouth."

If the essence of politics is to be found in the relationship between leaders and their principles rather than between leaders and constituents one would ask quite different questions and give much different answers to queries about the positions taken by candidates. When we asked delegates about Goldwater's position on racial matters the purists would always respond by saying that Goldwater himself was not bigoted. They knew the exact percentage of employees in the Goldwater department store in Phoenix who were non-Caucasians and pointed with pride to this statistic as evidence of their candidate's favorable disposition toward Negroes. There was no mention of what Goldwater might do as President; there was no understanding that the public role of a Presidential aspirant might be of interest. The Negro delegates we interviewed to be sure could not have cared less about Goldwater's personal predilections. They wanted to know what he would do for Negroes in his capacity as President of the United States. That Goldwater shared his supporters' perspective became evident during the campaign when he asked if Negroes would not rather have a President who dealt with race relations as a matter of conscience than as a political football. Since these days political action is a major method of redressing Negro grievances it is not surprising that Goldwater failed to get his conscience accepted as a substitute for favorable Presidential action.

The privatization of politics leads to a fundamentalist approach to politics. Problems are dealt with by stating one's first principles and assuming that they must be relevant to whatever issue is at hand. One gets no sense whatsoever that Goldwater purists approached problems and inquired how special circumstances might be taken into account in order to achieve desirable results. The pragmatic spirit is completely lacking. Indeed the purists manifested amazingly little interest in specific issues. In our interviews at the convention we simply could not get them to talk about anything concrete unless references to welfare statism and too much government are considered specific replies. The purists did express strong belief in the importance of being interested in issues but this was not reflected in their own interests in specific issues.

WHY THE REPUBLICAN PARTY NOMINATED BARRY GOLDWATER

Republicans in 1964 did not first settle upon a grand strategy and then look around for a candidate to carry it out. The strategy was adopted from the beginning by those within the party who first decided to advance the Goldwater candidacy. By choosing Goldwater at the national convention the Republican party thereby chose Goldwater's strategy of sharp and general opposition to the incumbent Democratic administration on such matters as government intervention in the economy, the extension of government sponsored welfare and medical benefits, and the use of the powers of the Federal government to further the cause of civil rights. Goldwater expressed it in Phoenix in January 1964:

After asserting that a majority of Republicans believe "in the essential emphasis on individual liberty" he continued:

"I have been spelling out my position now for ten years in the Senate for years before that here in my own state I will spell it out even further in the months to come. I was once asked what kind of Republican I was. I replied that I was

not a me too Republican That still holds I will not change my beliefs to win votes I will offer a choice not an echo "1

If this strategy for victory was transparently untenable and Senator Goldwater's showing in the public opinion polls and in Presidential preference primaries indifferent how did the Republican party come to nominate him?

There are five principal reasons for Goldwater's success in his campaign for the nomination the weakness of his opposition within the Republican party the lack of hierarchical control within state Republican organizations President Johnson's immense popularity and seeming invincibility Goldwater's own strength among Republican party professionals and the unusual influx of political amateurs—almost all favoring Goldwater—into Republican politics

First there was the weakness of Goldwater's opposition within the Republican party For the first time in thirty years there was no moderate Republican candidate who was both popular with the voters and willing to contest the nomination actively There was a fatal flaw for example in the candidacy of Nelson A Rockefeller As each new incident unfolded in Governor Rockefeller's private life—his divorce his remarriage and the birth of Nelson A Rockefeller Jr just days before the California primary—his Presidential candidacy became less and less promising ¹²

Henry Cabot Lodge who won the early bird New Hampshire primary ■ ■ ■ write in candidate with 35% of the vote and who showed write in strength in the Massachusetts Texas Illinois and Nebraska primaries refused to resign his ambassadorship to Vietnam in order to come home to campaign This may have cost him the Oregon primary, which he lost narrowly to Rockefeller Lodge's strategy could be defended on the grounds that he is an indifferent campaigner and hence was less likely to damage his candidacy by his absence On the other hand it cast grave doubts upon the seriousness of his interest in the nomination To party professionals these doubts seemed to have reinforced pre

existing antipathies toward certain of Lodge's personal mannerisms and in addition many professionals still nursed resentments over Lodge's active role in securing Eisenhower's nomination in 1952.

The attractive though inexperienced William Scranton adopted a Stevensonian posture of reluctance. But unlike Stevenson in 1952, who was the designated successor of President Truman, Scranton could never manage to win more than qualified encouragement from General Eisenhower. No doubt the Scranton campaign was delayed not only by the hesitancy of the candidate but also by the hope that Rockefeller and Goldwater would effectively cancel one another out in the primaries. This hope was dashed by the unexpected Rockefeller defeat in California. By the time the Scranton campaign got started too many people had been otherwise committed. Only a *force majeure* such as the Eisenhower blessing could have shaken the situation loose but instead Eisenhower's main impact was to delay Scranton's entry into the race until after the crucial Governor's Conference in early June, giving him less than a month to campaign before the convention began.

Finally Richard Nixon's candidacy seems to have been hampered to a remarkable degree by his own activities since his narrow loss of the Presidency in 1960. In 1962, he ran for Governor of California and lost. Thus by itself was bound to create some skepticism in the minds of party leaders about Nixon's continued popularity with the voters. He then compounded his problem by his immediate reaction to this defeat. His bitter recriminatory remarks about press coverage of the gubernatorial race were given wide publicity. On the spot radio and television records of this unfortunate event put a potent weapon into the hands of his future political opponents. Shortly after this debacle he gave up his titular leadership of the California Republican party and moved his residence to New York City where he entered private law practice. But unlike Thomas E. Dewey in whose steps he seemed to be following

Nixon retained a sufficient interest in public officeholding to embark upon a low key campaign for the Presidency which consisted—in the absence of any more tangible resources—of statements reminding Republicans of his ideological acceptability to all wings of the party and of his general abilities as an experienced campaigner and public servant. These statements were understandably received with something less than enthusiasm by party leaders who had made commitments to other candidates but even when this was not the case as for example at the Cleveland Governors Conference Nixon seemed to have created a predominantly negative impression by efforts in his own behalf that could not be energetically seconded by some identifiable bloc of troops at the national convention.¹⁴

Participation in Presidential primaries is usually the preferred strategy of aspirants who cannot be chosen by compromise at the national conventions. Men like Kennedy and Humphrey in 1960 or Goldwater and Rockefeller in 1964 actively contest many primaries because they have to establish overwhelming support before the conventions meet in order to have a chance. Candidates like Nixon, Lodge and Scranton however may reasonably hope to be the choice of the convention after the front runners have demonstrated that they cannot win. So they stay out of the primaries and wait to pick up the pieces. This waiting strategy proved disastrous in 1964 because Nelson Rockefeller was unexpectedly unable to play the role allotted to him: he failed to defeat Goldwater in the California primary and the contest was over before it was supposed to have started.

In addition to the various flaws in the candidacies of Goldwater's potential opponents the Republican party in 1964 on a state by state basis was somewhat more loosely organized than usual. Normally state party organizations are unified by incumbent Governors. Without the centralizing forces of state patronage and coherent party leadership embodied by a man in the Governors chair state parties tend to fragment into local satrapies or territorial jurisdictions which can be played off one

against another by astute aspirants for the Presidential nomination. The lack of strong leadership at the state level also means that a set of Presidential preferences and strategies for pursuing them is less likely to be worked out in advance and agreed upon by all elements of the state party. Decentralized state parties thus become happy hunting grounds for early starters in the Presidential sweepstakes. They can move into a vacuum, make alliances and receive commitments and build delegate strength from the ground up.

There were Republican state leaders in 1964 who winced at the thought of a disastrous defeat in November but there were fewer such leaders than there might have been precisely because the Republicans are a minority party. There were only sixteen Republican Governors at the Republican Convention (See the table on p. 188). The advantages to Goldwater's early candidacy under these circumstances are obvious. Governors might have had sufficiently hierarchical control over their delegations to keep them from precipitously joining the Goldwater bandwagon. The absence of central leadership on a state by state basis meant that delegates were freer to follow their personal preferences and also free to weigh ideological considerations more heavily than they could have if they had been responsible to a leader who would suffer badly if Republicans were defeated for state offices.

This factor may continue to weigh heavily in the future. There has been a little noticed but important secular decline in the number of Governorships that are up for election in years during which Presidents are also running for office, as the table on page 188 indicates. From a starting point of thirty three governorships that were open to election in 1944, the number will decline to twenty five in 1968. Many states are changing the two year gubernatorial term to a four year term and are providing for the gubernatorial election in the middle of the President's term of office. This is intended to isolate gubernatorial elections from national electoral currents. But it may also mean that the number of state delegations to national party conventions con-

trolled by Governors will decrease as the motivation of Governors to protect their own fortunes by finding popular Presidential candidates also decreases. This trend thus far has had its most pronounced effect upon the Republican party where the number of Republican Governors up for election in Presidential years has declined from twenty in 1911 to seven in 1961 (See the table on p. 189.)

Decline in the Number of Republican Governors in Office During Presidential Election Years (Excluding Hawaii and Alaska)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of Republican Governors</i>
1911	20
1918	21
1952	25
1958	21
1960	14
1961	10

Decline in the Number of Gubernatorial Elections in Presidential Election Years (Excluding Hawaii and Alaska)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of Elections</i>
1911	33
1918	31
1952	31
1958	31
1960	27
1961	26
1968	25

Decline in the Number of Republican Governors Up for Election
in Presidential Election Years (Excluding Alaska and Hawaii)

Year	Number of Republican Governors Up for Election
1944	20
1948	19
1952	15
1956	16
1960	11
1964	7

SOURCE World Almanac 1944 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964

Another factor which helps to explain the nomination of Senator Goldwater was the strength of the Democratic party. In 1964 reasonable Republicans might well have asked themselves whether the nomination of their party was worth fighting for or whether it was in the words of one Eastern liberal delegate "a ticket on the Titanic. Less than a year before a Democratic President had been martyred. John F. Kennedy's hairline margin of victory in 1960 suddenly had been replaced as a point of reference by a massive bipartisan wave of sympathy, remorse and retrospective popularity following his assassination.¹⁵ Kennedy's chosen successor, Lyndon Johnson, had had only eight months on the job and by astute management he had prolonged his honeymoon with Congress, the press and the people.¹⁶ These factors had to be added to the normal advantages which accrue to Democrats by virtue of their majority of supporters and to incumbent Presidents because of their access to publicity, their command of the resources of the entire government for political purposes and the various emotional linkages of the populace with them—feelings of dependency, demands for "security" and so on—all of which were no doubt magnified by the Kennedy

assassination. The universal expectation that no Republican candidate had much of a chance of beating Lyndon Johnson also reduced the persuasiveness of the usual argument that the Republican party should put up a popular candidate who might win. Goldwater's opponents had to content themselves with the weaker argument that another candidate might lose by less.

The belief that the Republican party was bound to lose the election opened up the possibility of using the conflict over the nomination as a means of gaining control of the various state parties. Party leaders still cared about winning, but their notion of the relevant contest changed. Wherever Goldwater had strong support among Republican activists, opposing party factions could be beaten down in the name of support for him. Had there been a popular candidate to oppose Goldwater, the opposition might have decided to fight the battle around this champion. In the circumstances, however, they were faced in many states with the choice of Goldwater or nothing. Some Republican leaders, as was apparently the case with Charles Percy in Illinois, decided to try to maintain their influence within the party by rolling with the Goldwater tide and thus living to fight another day. This is precisely what Governor DiSalle of Ohio did in 1960 when a hostile faction of the Democratic party threatened to use John F. Kennedy's popularity as a club with which to beat him. By supporting Kennedy, he was able to hold at bay his opponents within the party.

In addition, Goldwater's own strength among Republican party professionals should be recalled. Goldwater had been building a base of support at the Republican grass roots for some time. He was chairman of the Republican Senatorial Campaign Committee for the elections of 1956, 1960, and 1962. After the 1960 election, while Richard Nixon was pinned down in California and Governor Rockefeller was engrossed in domestic problems, he became the most active party leader on the national banquet circuit, helping to raise money for local candidates and

parties and not incidentally widening still further his acquaintance with state and local party leaders. Furthermore there is no doubt that he struck a responsive chord with many of these leaders not only because he is personally charming and likeable but also because he expressed many of their own views on public policy.

Finally there is the factor of increased amateur participation in politics. By slow increments the image of politicians in this country as cynical manipulators devoid of interest in public policy is giving way to a more complicated description in which practicality and patronage are mixed with idealism and issue orientation.¹⁷ In an era of economic prosperity and great opportunities in the private sector recruitment into political involvement and leadership is bound to contain a more important component of issue orientation than would be true when the government is a major source of direct income through the distribution of jobs and favors.¹⁸ In fact a high degree of interest in party politics usually is associated with a high level of political information and strong policy preferences. Among Republican political activists even allowing for diversity of opinion these preferences can in general be characterized as definitely conservative and apparently, on a very large number of issues as more conservative than the views not only of Democratic activists but also of ordinary citizens who classify themselves as habitual Republican voters.¹⁹

Our explanation of Goldwater's nomination does not fully account for what others saw at the Republican National Convention—a kind of amateur take over of the Republican party. The journalist Murray Kempton commented at the time: "The Goldwater forces seem in fact to have captured a number of state conventions with the device of mass amateur influx which Dewey and Henry Cabot Lodge used to seize so many Southern states from Taft in 1952. A mountain state Republican Senator who had assumed that he would be his delegation's favorite son was

shocked to find that his state convention had elected a Goldwater delegate state. "There were people at the convention," he said, "that I've never seen before."¹

One assumption underlying this idea of amateur take-over seems to be that professional politicians would never, if left to their own devices, have supported a candidate who panned to be as weak as Goldwater. Even if they entertained small hope of winning the Presidency, these politicians had a stake in the preservation of party competition further down on the ballot where the right candidate for the Presidency could at least attenuate the effects of the Johnson coalition. Such considerations, it is suggested, are bound to be less salient to amateurs who are more likely to value ideological purity above all other considerations.

But the 1964 Republican Convention is not good evidence for this notion. Regular Republican activists may well have preferred Goldwater anyway, on ideological grounds. In addition, there was no doubt an influx of amateurs into the state conventions which helped turn the tide in his favor. County Chairmen certainly represent an important part of the activists of the Republican party. An Associated Press poll of Republican County Chairmen taken in April 1964 showed that 722 chose Goldwater as their personal preference compared to 301 for Nixon.² But the nature of the activists at the conventions may have changed somewhat. In the state of Washington, for example, Goldwater forces won control by the simple expedient of showing up and being elected precinct delegates when nobody else wanted the jobs. F. Clifton White headed a secret committee which undoubtedly tried similar maneuvers in other states, but we do not know to what extent they were successful.³ One clue may be found by determining the proportion of delegates who were at the Goldwater convention but not at previous conventions.

We are accustomed to reading about new faces at national conventions. Each election year, so it seems, some leading politician well known to members of the press is asked to discover

that his delegation has been taken over by strangers. Indeed at the Republican conventions of 1952 and 1956—one a hard fought contest among factions of the out party the other a love feast dedicated to the renomination of an incumbent—a majority of the regular delegates had not served at the previous convention. Nevertheless the Republican Convention of 1964 was extraordinary. 74.3% of the delegates had not been at *either* of the two preceding conventions. Thus the proportion of new faces was high and so also we may surmise was the number of amateur persons moved by passionate conviction and relatively insensitive to demands for compromise or the necessities of team play with copartisans whose general orientation to politics or whose policy preferences differed from their own.

The question arises as to whether the Goldwater delegates were a special breed of activist who came out in 1964 to support their hero or whether as we believe they are representative of a large proportion of Republican activists. It is clear that Republican activists have been more conservative than Republican voters at least since 1952. In that year the Gallup organization polled both County Chairmen and ordinary Republican voters. While the activist Chairmen preferred Taft over Eisenhower by 61% to 31% the voters preferred Eisenhower by 46% to 31% for Taft.²⁵ That nothing has changed since then is made clear by a comparison of the preferences of County Chairmen in 1964 with the voters in the New Hampshire Republican primary. In this case Goldwater received 48% of the preferences of the party professionals; he received only 22% of the Republican votes.²⁶ When the 1960 Republican delegates were queried about their preference in 1964 Goldwater was far and away the strongest candidate.²⁷ A comparison of the Goldwater and Rockefeller slates of delegates in California²⁸ gives us no reason to believe that the Goldwater people were novices to the Republican party. On the contrary, 41% of the Goldwater slate had attended previous national conventions compared with 21% of the Rockefeller people. The Goldwater men averaged slightly greater years of active

service to the Republican party (16 to 15) and far more of them held an official party position in the state (61% to 39%) than did the supporters of Nelson Rockefeller. Taken together with McClosky's poll of 1956 Republican delegates and voters, these data suggest that Goldwater's nomination was but another manifestation of a historical trend in which Republican voters have become much more moderate in their preferences than Republican activists.

Let us summarize our analysis of why Goldwater won the Republican nomination by taking a close look at the state delegations that supported and opposed him. A major part of the explanation we believe lies in the underlying commitment of a substantial proportion of Republican activists to strong conservative views. On top of this we have argued there was some infusion of new conservative activists into the party in several states. Finally there were splits within the ranks of the moderate and liberal Republicans and they relied on a weak reed in Nelson Rockefeller to defeat Goldwater in the primaries. The table that follows tells most of the story.²⁹ The existence of

<i>Percent of Vote for Conservatives</i>	<i>Taft States¹</i>	<i>Suing States²</i>	<i>Progressive States³</i>
1952	83.6%	18.6%	13.0%
1964	95.1%	92.8%	16.0%

23 states for Taft and Goldwater

12 states against Taft but for Goldwater

13 states against Taft and Goldwater

persistent conservative tendencies is dramatically demonstrated by the fact that Goldwater carried all but one of the twenty-three states that Taft had won in 1952. In addition Goldwater won back the three states (Texas, Louisiana, and Georgia) that Taft had lost to Eisenhower in their famous credentials fight. What this shows is that when Republican conservatives have a candidate, he can count on a good deal of support. In order to

win however Goldwater had to turn Eisenhower majorities into Goldwater majorities in nine swing states California Colorado Delaware Iowa Kansas Missouri Oklahoma, Washington, and Wyoming The poll data make it clear that Goldwater would not have won the primary in California had he run against Lodge instead of Rockefeller²⁰ Goldwater's capture of the border states of Missouri Oklahoma and (to some extent) Delaware may represent two phenomena the impact of the race issue and the influx of conservatives into weak Republican party organizations We know that Goldwater backers organized to prevail in Washington and they may have done the same in Colorado Iowa Wyoming and Kansas While it is difficult to give a precise estimate of the exact importance of each of the various factors we have mentioned it does appear that the conservatism of Republican activists provided a strong base from which to consolidate gains in the South and make incremental advances in the Mid and Far West When joined to Rockefeller's weakness in California the combination was irresistible

CAMPAIGN STRATEGIES

Fought between a political purist and a traditional politician the 1964 election campaign was most peculiar by recent American standards Questions of personality and morality—did Goldwater lack responsibility and Johnson integrity?—seemed to dominate the campaign For the first time in many years the Republicans made more appeals based on party identification than did the Democrats The change in direction that this represented for professional Republicans was not accomplished without cost Many Negro delegates to the Republican National Convention expressed dismay at the turn of events so did party leaders and candidates from the urban Northeast who were beaten back in attempts to strengthen the civil rights plank of the platform and to insert a plank criticizing "extremism"

The Goldwater Strategy

Senator Goldwater throughout the platform battle and thereafter adhered to an uncompromising line with impressive fidelity. He and his allies withstood all attempts to amend the platform from the floor. As his running mate Goldwater "balanced" his ticket by choosing a man almost as conservative as he is Representative William E. Miller of New York. And when the time came to bind up his party's wounds and unite it for action against the Democrats—which is one traditional function of the acceptance speech—Senator Goldwater spoke these words (seemingly to his fellow Republicans)

Anyone who joins us in all sincerity we welcome. Those those who do not care for our cause we don't expect to join our ranks in any case. And let our Republicanism so focused and so dedicated not be made fuzzy.

Immediately thereafter came his famous allusion to the platform battle

I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice.

And let me remind you also that moderation in the defense of justice is no virtue.²¹

Throughout the campaign, the Goldwater-Miller ticket continued to differentiate itself sharply, even from those Democratic policies likely to be favored by audiences. The candidates were addressing. On Labor Day Representative Miller criticized liberalized immigration policies in South Bend, Indiana, an industrial community heavily populated with immigrants and their children. Before the American Political Science Association on September 11, Senator Goldwater criticized the Supreme Court of the United States as, among the three branches of the government, "least faithful to the constitutional tradition of limited government and to the principle of legitimacy in the exercise of power." On September 16 in Knoxville, Tennessee, Senator Goldwater said

"I know that you know and most of you share my faith in private initiative and private enterprise. Now what I said with respect to TVA is within the general framework of that philosophy and I stand by it." Two days later, in the economically depressed Appalachian region he attacked the Administration poverty program as "phony," "cynical," and "irresponsible" and called for free enterprise to combat poverty. At the National Plowing Contest in North Dakota, Goldwater said that "a gradual decline would be good for you" in farm price supports. Contrast this last statement with a more conventional Republican campaign. General Eisenhower's pledge at this same gathering during the 1952 campaign to work for farm price supports at 100% of parity.³²

Another atypical feature of the Goldwater campaign was his unequivocal bid for support from the South and his forthright sacrifice of Negro votes. Whereas Vice President Nixon did his best in 1960 to appeal to *both* Southerners and Negroes,³³ Goldwater's campaign was marked by attacks on the Supreme Court reminders that he had voted against the Civil Rights Act of 1964 because he believed sections of the bill were unconstitutional and promises that a Goldwater Presidency would restore "law and order" in the streets and would not tolerate civil disobedience and demonstrations of a kind associated by many of his listeners with the civil rights movement.³⁴ In all of these particulars, Senator Goldwater's campaign represented a sharp departure from Republican tactics of the recent past.

There can be little doubt that in addition to his unimpeachably conservative voting record in Congress, Goldwater made a general appeal based on ideological considerations, laying emphasis upon issues of morality and rightness "in your heart" and on complaints about an unidentifiable malaise in American society. These sorts of appeals can be contrasted with the identification of specific issues, the making of promises about the content of policies, and the suggestion of concrete steps to be taken. This latter approach can be used when there is a specific

coalition of interest groups to be put together. But Senator Goldwater took a novel public posture with respect to interest groups: "If I had to cater to every special interest in the country to get elected, I wouldn't want the job."²³

The campaign speeches of Barry Goldwater are a testimonial to the extraordinary importance he assigned to political style. One would have to go far to find another candidate so insistent that people not vote for him if they did not share his views. Rarely has so much attention been given to these sorts of reasons for supporting a candidate. Let us take one major speech (which epitomizes this approach) delivered at a rally at Madison Square Garden and observe the overwhelming emphasis on matters of individual style.

Goldwater began by saying that although he knew what statements would get him the most votes, he was not going to make them:

I can't help wondering if you've asked why my campaign is what it is.

I wonder, my fellow Americans, if you think I don't know what views would be most popular. Do you think I don't know what labor wants to hear; what management, what housewives and diplomats and white-collar workers want to hear?

Do you honestly think, after all these years in politics, that I don't know the easy ways to get votes? The promises to make? The subjects to talk about—and the ones to avoid? Well, I do!

He then proceeded to tell his audience why he didn't "take the easy way":

First of all, if I just went around telling people what they wanted to hear, I'd sound like Lyndon Baines Johnson. And I still think the American people are entitled to a choice.

But more important, if I had to cater to every special interest in the country to get elected, I wouldn't want the job.

Like many of his followers Goldwater was a political purist who objected to telling people what they wanted to hear, catering to "special interests" or being like the other party in order to gain popularity

As a political purist, Goldwater was careful about the kind of people who should and should not support him. The Nazi and Fascist types, the Communists and left wing radicals are clearly beyond the pale. Goldwater also excluded "the lazy, dole happy people who want to feed on the fruits of somebody else's labor" and people who believe in promises and those "who are willing to believe that Communism can be accommodated." Most revealing for our purposes was his characterization of the people he believed would vote for him:

People who take the trouble to reread thoughtfully the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States will vote for me

People who have learned to be suspicious of neverending promises of "something for nothing"—they will vote for me

People who have the courage and the intelligence to listen to the truth and think about it. People whose votes can't be bought. They'll vote for me

People who are sick to death of politicians coming out in favor of happiness and declaring war on misery. People who are fed up with so called leaders of government promising to legislate worry out of existence. People who will listen for a little while to such transparent, vote grabbing demagoguery and say "Bulloney." They'll vote for me

But most of all, it will be the people who know that something must be done.²⁸

Goldwater thought that the people who would vote for him were not merely those who agreed with him on specific issues. Rather, they would be the people who hark back to funda-

mental principles such as may be found in the nation's venerable documents people who are suspicious of promises who have courage who are "sick to death of politicians" and who know that something must be done

The Democratic Strategy

If Senator Goldwaters nomination was unexpected and his campaign strategy unorthodox the Democratic strategy was a model of orthodoxy and scarcely needs either description or explanation

Most of the resources available to President Johnson have already been mentioned incumbency the halo effect that resulted from the trauma of his predecessors assassination and that undoubtedly prolonged his honeymoon with the press and with Congress and his leadership of what after all is the majority party

Johnson's main problem standing in his way when he sought the nomination in 1960 was the fact that he is from the South Indeed labor and civil rights groups had opposed even his nomination as Vice President in that year²⁷ But the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 with his vigorous support served as no honeyed words alone could possibly have served to underscore to liberal Democrats that Johnson understood the necessities of the times as they understood them and demonstrated that he was ready like President Truman and Adlai Stevenson before him to sacrifice the demands of the South where they conflicted with the demands of the rest of the Democratic coalition

The Democratic Convention of 1964 seated representatives of the predominantly Negro Freedom Democratic party of Mississippi in a White House approved compromise Television viewers whose memories ran back to the 1960 convention remembered Joseph Rauh a prominent leader of the liberal Americans for Democratic Action and delegate from the District of Columbia When the word went out that Senator John Kennedy wanted Lyndon Johnson for his running mate Rauh seized the nearest

to be called an extremist when he leads his party far from positions it has previously espoused especially if the new position is far from where the voters are. Goldwater raised the morality issue and by using the Bobby Baker episode tried to undermine Johnson. If one believes that politics should be concerned with the private conscience of the political leader and his stock of basic principles as the Goldwater people did then the morality of the candidates necessarily assumes prime importance. The politician is immediately condemned as immoral by virtue of his usual practices. He is immoral because he alters his policies to suit different constituencies. Even when the politician hangs onto his fundamental position but gives a little to assure a wider consensus he is immoral because of his inconsistency and vacillation. Because Lyndon Johnson epitomized the practicing politician famed for his love of bargaining maneuver conciliation and consensus his morality was questionable for the political purists.

There is still another way in which concentration on political style made morality a central focus of the campaign. Goldwater purists believed that difficulties facing America particularly in foreign affairs were due to forces largely within the control of leaders. They thought that if the leaders of the United States had the right approach if they stood up for what they believed and enunciated their principles with sufficient force most of the nation's problems would be solved. This was presumably what Goldwater meant when he said that he had a "rational solution" to the Cold War without specifying what it was or when he insisted that our foreign policy difficulties are not complex but simple if the world situation was not exactly rosy therefore the blame lay with immoral leaders who behaved as politicians instead of as purists. They sold out their country because they either did not have the right American principles or did not stand up for them or both. From the Goldwater point of view one needed only to look at the state of the world to see that American political leaders were immoral. Reasoning from effect to cause the purists would be bound to place the simple moral test—

does the candidate have the right political style?—at the heart of a campaign taking place when decay had set in from the remotest Asian principality to the nearest city street

DISCUSSION OF ISSUES

Although the candidates in 1964 were not subjected to the kind of abuse that was typical of the early days of the American republic one has the impression that there was more personal vilification than in the past decade or two. Of greater importance for our purposes however, is the undoubted fact that in a campaign in which the parties were further apart on issues than they have been in our time at least since 1936 and possibly in this century, there was relatively little discussion of issues. Certainly the existence of wide and deep policy differences did not as has sometimes been thought lead directly to a campaign focusing on specific issues. Why not?

Perhaps when candidates are virtually identical in their views there is little else for them to talk about except differences in their respective personalities. When they are too far apart discussion also turns on personalities because issue differences are generalized to differences in basic values. When they are moderately far apart, separated by marginal but real differences on the issues the possibility for discussion may be at its highest point. For the parties are then far enough apart to make debates meaningful and yet close enough together so that a real dialogue is possible. Both the candidates and attentive publics can understand what a marginal change from one proposal to another might mean.

The experience of the 1964 Presidential campaign suggests that the old proposition—the greater the differences on issue positions the greater the discussion of specific issues—might be replaced with a new hypothesis. Discussion of issues varies directly with moderate marginal disagreements on issues and in

versely with the extremes of total agreement or total disagreement. Such has been the situation in France where election campaigns typically involve disagreements among the parties closest to each other and little or no direct confrontations among the parties furthest apart in ideology.⁴⁰

THE FUTURE

The existence of a political elite in a position to control a major national party which holds views widely at variance both with the general voting population and its own followers presents a major political problem in the United States. Goldwater's nomination and defeat was merely a sign of an old problem but one which has been hidden by the normal operation of the party system. What are some of the consequences for American political parties?

One possibility is that the Republican party will return to its previous course and seek out popular candidates whose moderate views will give it a chance to win Presidential elections. If on the other hand the Goldwater movement is not a temporary aberration but represents a profound current within the Republican party we cannot expect that the moderates and liberals in the party will automatically gain control simply because Goldwater lost badly. Nearly a majority of party activists may now support the political tendency that Goldwater represents.⁴¹ While it is always possible that they will alter their behavior if the chances of defeating these conservatives are to be consistently high they will have to be challenged by a rival moderate elite willing to engage in the daily tasks of political organization. The vast majority of Republican votes in 1964 of course were traditional Republicans who would undoubtedly support almost any candidate of their party.

Goldwater supporters were saying after it was all over that the twenty six million people who voted for their man constituted an endorsement of right wing Republicanism. But Goldwater's

total represented a decline of over seven million in the vote for the Republican candidate since 1960 and was a stunning sixteen million fewer than voted for the winner (By way of contrast Lyndon Johnson received the largest percentage of the major party vote in any twentieth century Presidential election) Students of messianic movements and of other organizations heavily dependent upon faith rather than rational calculation as a method of achieving internal cohesion would not be surprised at the reaction shown by the Goldwaterites ⁴¹

But political parties in the United States cannot long survive solely as vehicles for drastically unpopular doctrines no matter how passionately these doctrines are upheld by the minority of activists who believe in them Indeed after the election a clamor among Republicans for a new image was not long in coming A month after the election the Republican Governors met for two days in Denver and issued a statement endorsing civil rights and condemning radicalism "whether of the right or left" Writing in the January, 1965 issue of *Fortune* Republican Representative Gerald R. Ford of Michigan suggested that in the House his party abandon its attempts to coordinate plans with leaders of the Southern Democrats ⁴² In spite of the misgivings of some of his colleagues about the import of this article Ford running on a new image platform successfully displaced Charles Halleck of Indiana as Republican leader of the House at the start of the 89th Congress And Barry Goldwater's hand picked chairman of the Republican National Committee Dean Burch was at the same time forced out of office His successor Ray Bliss of Ohio is preeminently a rational calculating organization politician who is used to testing his personal preferences against political realities

To an outside observer the lesson of this election for Republicans seems to be remarkably clear a question remained as to who within the Republican party would be charged with interpreting that lesson Normally this task falls to officeholders of the defeated party No one could believe on the record of their

past performance and preferences that the elevation to leadership of Mr Ford and Mr Bliss heralded a drastic leftward turn in the policies espoused by the leaders of the Republican party. However both men recognized the need to strike a bargain with reality. Whether merely giving ground before popular sentiment will be enough to transform the Republican party from a minority to a majority party may be doubted but such a leadership is capable of attracting a larger share of the voting population than candidates and leaders who are unwilling even to accommodate that much.

It may be that some pro Goldwater Republicans recognized that their chances of winning the election were slim but believed that even a debacle in 1964 would enhance their long run chances of controlling the Republican party and in possibly pushing political dialogue in this country to the right. Judging from the activity of the 89th Congress and from the tendency of political parties to cohere around elected officeholders rather than defeated candidates this seems to have been a gross miscalculation.

The possibility cannot be ruled out that the Republican party will continue to nominate conservatives like Goldwater and will continue to lose badly. A noted study of state party systems has shown that when one party dominates the political scene and nomination becomes tantamount to election there is a strong tendency for voters to move into the primaries of this party in order to gain some influence over its decisions.⁴⁴ The minority party loses its moderates and becomes the preserve of the die hards. Hence it becomes increasingly difficult for a candidate who might appeal to the whole electorate to win nomination in the minority party. As the majority party grows in relative size and importance it becomes more diverse at the same time the weakness of the opposition removes a powerful incentive to majority party cohesion.

Should this vision of the future materialize we can expect an end to a competitive two party system. In its place we will have a modified one party system with a dominant Democratic

party As its leaders find that their potential for controlling policy decisions has enormously increased they may also discover that their capacity for united action has precipitously decreased due to vastly intensified internal factionalism The Republican party much diminished in size will find that its greater potential for unity is accompanied by a drastically reduced capacity to get its preferences translated into government policy It will have gained cohesion in exchange for impotence The 1964 election may yet turn out to be a disaster for conservative Republicans and a Pyrrhic victory for liberal Democrats

At the same time it must be remembered that the Republican party scored an impressive victory in the 1966 elections In part this victory appears magnified by the extent of their defeat in 1964 But in any event the Republicans did snap back in 1966 winning several key governorships and regaining much of the strength they had lost in the House of Representatives

The results have important consequences for the 1968 Presidential election The larger the number of Republican governors the greater the chance that a moderate candidate will be nominated This follows not only because of the moderation of most of the governors but because governors in general have a stake in protecting the electoral chances of their party They also have the resources to control delegates who might otherwise vote their own ideological preferences But whether or not 1966 will be looked upon as a significant break in the trend toward continual diminution of Republican strength or merely a minor deviation will depend on whether Republicans are able to find attractive candidates in 1968 and future years

Despite the results of the 1966 elections and various measures within the Republican party to mend the damage caused by Senator Goldwater's candidacy the events and efforts may be insufficient to prevent an effective shift in this country to a one and one half party system a shift that has been in the making for some time⁴³ While this may be a deplorable development to defenders of a vigorous two party system the health of the sys

tem depends ultimately upon the capacity of the two parties to agree on most issues and at the margins to offer alternatives attractive to slightly different components of the population. This makes for disagreement on live issues, not on issues already settled and part of an overriding national consensus. There seems to be little incentive for voters to reward with public office an out party that fails to seek new opportunities to appeal to the preferences of voters.

In any event a serious problem for Republicans is whether the opportunity will soon arise for them to capture the loyalties of enough voters to return them to power for any lengthy period of time. We are speaking now not of a momentary aberration but of the creation of long term party loyalties. The great historic opportunities for the creation of party loyalty seem to have been associated to a certain extent with domestic disasters, but even more important with the entry into suffrage of great numbers of similarly situated people. The prospects for civil war seem dim; we are now growing accustomed to the role of the government in putting a floor on many aspects of the economy which heretofore were capable of combining and producing drastic depressions. And so the Republican chances to create lasting adherents among those who now vote Democratic on account of domestic crisis must be rated as slim. What is worse from a Republican standpoint the Goldwater candidacy seems to have solidified a trend visible since the New Deal away from the Republican party of the last great bloc of voters to enter American political life, the Negro voters. Once Negroes everywhere vote the long march toward universal suffrage in America will have ended. Even allowing for the past instability of the Negro vote, the future loyalties of the Negro seem likely to be predominantly Democratic. Seen in this light and projected into the medium range future the Goldwater candidacy was a disastrous bargain for the Republican party. It is much easier for a political party to win new friends than to convert old antagonists. The decision of

Senator Goldwater and his advisors to lock the Negro out of his historic home may have had a greater impact on the Republican party's future fortunes than any other strategic choice of 1964

NOTES

1 *Congressional Quarterly* November 20 1964 p 2709 estimated that Republicans lost more than 500 seats in state legislatures in the 1964 election. Republicans gained one Governor (for a total of 17) lost two United States Senators (reducing their senatorial representation to 32) and sustained a net loss in the House of Representatives of 38 seats (reducing their strength to 140 members the lowest since the Roosevelt landslide of 1936)

2 See for example Charles O Jones *The Republican Party in American Politics* (New York 1965) pp 66-71. The Michigan Survey Research Center estimates that an overwhelming 96% to 98% of such Republicans typically vote. Philip E Converse Aage R Clausen and Warren E Miller "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election" *American Political Science Review* 59 (June 1965) 322-323

3 This point has been confirmed as often as any in the entire literature of voting behavior. See Bernard Berelson Paul F Lazarsfeld and William McPhee *Voting* (Chicago 1954) pp 333-347 e.g. propositions 39 50 51 66 68 69 70 71 78 79. Angus Campbell, Philip E Converse Warren E Miller and Donald E Stokes *The American Voter* (New York 1960) pp 142-145

4 The study of right wing ideologues and their supporters is more speculative than empirical. Nevertheless there are a few straws in the wind and all blow in the same direction. In 1962 Raymond E Wolfinger and his associates administered a questionnaire to 308 "students" at an anti Communism school conducted by Dr. Fred Schwarz's Christian Anti Communism Crusade in Oakland California. Among the findings of this study were that 278 of the 302 persons in this sample who voted in 1960 (or 92% of those who voted) had voted for Nixon and that 58% of those who answered the question chose Goldwater over Nixon for 1964. At about the same time a nationwide Gallup poll showed Goldwater the choice of only 13% of

Republicans Raymond E Wolfinger Barbara Kaye Wolfinger Kenneth Prewitt and Sheila Rosenhack "America's Radical Right Politics and Ideology" in *Ideology and Discontent* ed David Apter (New York 1964) pp 267-269 Analysis of various election returns and of a 1954 Gallup poll suggest that support for the late Senator Joseph McCarthy was importantly determined by party affiliation with Republicans far exceeding Democrats or independents in the ranks of his supporters See Nelson W Polsky "Towards an Explanation of McCarthyism" *Political Studies* 8 (October 1960) 250-271

5 AIPO News Releases of September 11 1964 and October 16 1964 suggested that Republican defections would run as high as 30% but the Release of December 11 indicated that a 20% defection figure was more accurate This compares with defections by Republican voters of 5% 4% and 8% in the three previous elections Democratic defections in this election were also high—13% of those calling themselves Democrats voted for Goldwater—but these were confined mostly to the Southern states

6 In early July the Gallup poll (AIPO News Release November 11 1964) showed the following figures among Republican voters

Preferring

Goldwater 22%

Lodge 21%

Scranton 20%

Rockefeller 6%

Just before the Republican Convention the figures among Republicans were

Scranton 60%

Goldwater 34%

Undecided 6%

Goldwater received 23% of the vote in the New Hampshire primary 18% in Oregon 8% in Pennsylvania (fourth in a field of five write-ins) 10.5% in Massachusetts 71% in Indiana where Harold Stassen received the remainder only 49% in Nebraska where Goldwater's name alone was on the ballot 51.4% in California 76% in Texas running in a trial heat with only Rockefeller 31.9% in South Dakota and a bit better than 60% in Illinois where he was opposed on the ballot by only Margaret Chase Smith and where there is no law requiring election officials to tabulate write-in votes

Gallup trial heats (AIPO News Release July 1 1964) before the

Republican Convention showed Goldwater running a poorer race against President Johnson than either Scranton or Nixon, e.g.

Goldwater 18%	Scranton 26%	Nixon 27%
Johnson 77%	Johnson 69%	Johnson 70%
Undecided 5%	Undecided 5%	Undecided 3%

7 AIPO News Release September 13 1964

8 Louis Harris Survey News Releases July 13 1964 and September 14 1964 Some of the Harris survey findings on foreign affairs were

Issue		Voters Describe Goldwater Position		Describe Own Position	
		July	Sept.	July	Sept.
Go to war over Cuba	For	78%	71%	29%	29%
	Against	22%	29%	71%	71%
Use atomic bombs in Asia	For	72%	58%	18%	18%
	Against	28%	42%	82%	82%
United Nations	For	42%	50%	82%	83%
	Against	58%	50%	18%	17%

9 The interviews were conducted in the lobby of the Fairmont Hotel in San Francisco—where the California Illinois and New Jersey delegations were housed—by Aaron Wildavsky Judy Gordon, Maralyn Millman James Payne and Joseph Paff While these unstructured interviews in no way represent a systematic sample of the delegates they were undertaken because they have one great advantage over the usual mail questionnaire They can elicit spontaneous information about respondents attitudes that a more structured method might well miss

10 This is borne out by findings of the Michigan Survey Research Center Integrity was the personal quality most admired in him by his supporters See Angus Campbell, "Interpreting the Presidential Victory" in *The National Election of 1964* ed. Milton C. Cummings Jr (Washington 1966) p 261

11 See James Q. Wilson *The Amateur Democrat* (Chicago 1962)

12 Robert D. Novak *The Agony of the G.O.P. 1964* (New York 1965) pp 268-269

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12 Robert D Novak, *The Agony of the GOP 1964* (New York, 1965) pp 268-269

13 Here and in the following paragraphs we rely on contemporary newspaper coverage in the *New York Times* *Wall Street Journal* *Washington Post* and *Star* on accounts in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Reports* on Robert Novak's excellent *The Agony of the GOP 1964* and also upon a manuscript account being prepared for publication by Professor John Kessel of Allegheny College tentatively titled *The Goldwater Coalition*

14 See Rowland Evans and Robert Novak "The Unmaking of a President" *Esquire* (November 1964) 91 and J F Ter Horst "Nixon Hopes as GOP Unifier Clouded by June Maneuvers" *Washington Star* December 2 1964

15 See Bradley S Greenberg and Edwin B Parker eds *The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public Social Communication in Crisis* (Stanford 1965)

16 Before the nominating conventions pro-Johnson sentiment in national sample surveys was expressed by well over 70% of the voting public See a summary in the *Washington Post* November 2 1964

17 For a good example of this sort of description at the state level see James D Barber *The Lawmakers* (New Haven 1965)

18 See Wilson *The Amateur Democrat* and Fred I Greerstein "The Changing Pattern of Urban Party Politics" *Annals* 353 (May 1964) 1-13

19 See Herbert McClosky Paul J Hoffman and Rosemary O'Hara "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers" *American Political Science Review* 54 (June 1960) 406-427 This article compares the responses on a long self administered mail questionnaire of three populations 1788 delegates to the Democratic Convention of 1956 1232 delegates to the 1956 Republican Convention and 1484 persons in two successive waves of American Institute of Public Opinion national cross section surveys in January 1958

20 *The New Republic* (July 11 1964) 6

21 *New York Times* April 26 1964 18

22 Theodore H White *The Making of the President 1964* (New York 1965) p 134

23 *Ibid* p 92ff and pp 132-133

24 Paul T David, Ralph M Goldman, and Richard C Bain *The Politics of National Party Conventions* (Washington, 1960) pp 349-350

These turnover figures raise an interesting question as to the proper inferences one can make from the McClosky data discussed previously on party leaders who attended the 1956 convention. A substantial number of delegates to the 1964 convention did not attend the convention of 1956. In fact 153 of 1,308 delegates to the 1964 convention were delegates or alternates at the 1956 convention according to a comparison of the two convention rosters. Therefore we would have to take the McClosky findings as indicative rather than demonstrative of attitudes of a much larger—and somewhat different—group of party activists. Because the 1956 Republican nominations were a foregone conclusion, enlivened in the event only by the brief candidacy of one "Joe Smith" for Vice President, the number of party insurgents at this convention must have been unusually low. This gives a greater plausibility to the use of responses from the delegates to this convention as in some sense accurately representative of regular Republican activist sentiment.

25 AIPO News Release June 20 1952 (poll of County Chairmen) and July 2 1952 (poll of Republican voters). Out of 2,774 County Chairmen polled by mail, 1,480 responded.

26 *Ibid.* March 29 1964. Out of some 3,000 County Chairmen polled 1,840 responded.

27 Novak *The Agony of the G O P 1964* (New York, 1965) p 174.

28 Edmond Costantini (University of California, Davis) and Kenneth Craik (University of California, Berkeley) preliminary breakdowns of questionnaires received from Goldwater and Rockefeller delegates.

29 Frank Munger and James Blackhurst, "Factionalism in the National Conventions 1940-1964: An Analysis of Ideological Consistency in State Delegation Voting" *The Journal of Politics* 27 (May 1965) 379n. For purposes of analysis the Taft vote was combined with a handful of votes for Douglas MacArthur.

30 Conversé Clausen and Miller "Electoral Myth and Reality: The 1964 Election" 324-325.

31 Shortly after the convention in a meeting at Hershey Pennsylvania Goldwater made a half hearted attempt (and his only attempt) to unify the party behind him

32 *New York Times* September 7 1952

33 See the discussion of this in Theodore H White *The Making of the President* 1960 (New York 1961) pp 203-204 315 See also pp 128-129

34 See Goldwater statements on September 3 10 and 15 summarized in *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report* October 2 1964 2323-2324

35 Speech at Madison Square Garden New York City October 20 1964 Contrast this with General Eisenhower's final TV appearance in 1952 November 4 1952

36 *New York Times* October 27 1964 30

37 See Philip Potter "How LBJ Got the Nomination" *The Reporter* (June 18 1964)

38 Lyndon B Johnson *My Hope for America* (New York 1964) See for example, the review by Murray Kempton, "The People's Choice" *New York Review of Books* (November 5 1964) 3-4

39 Seymour Martin Lipset "Democracy and Working Class Authoritarianism" *American Sociological Review* 24 (August 1959) 482-501

40 See Philip M Williams *Crisis and Compromise Politics in the Fourth Republic* (Hamden Conn 1964) and Maurice Duverger *Political Parties Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State* trans Barbara and Robert North (New York 1959)

41 It might be well to recall the Associated Press poll of Republican County Chairmen taken in April 1964 which showed that 722 chose Goldwater as their personal preference compared to 301 for Nixon. See also McClosky Hoffman and O'Hara "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers"

42 See Leon Festinger Henry Riecken and Stanley Schachter *When Prophecy Fails* (Minneapolis 1956)

43 Gerald R. Ford "What Can Save the G O P?" *Fortune* (January 1965) 140

44 V O Key Jr *American State Politics An Introduction* (New York, 1956) pp 169-196

45 There is some indication for example that the number of noncompetitive Democratic Congressional seats has increased over the years. See Charles O. Jones "Inter Party Competition for Congressional Seats" *Western Political Quarterly* 17 (September 1964) 461-476

Chapter 5

Reform?

THE POLITICAL PROCESSES we have been describing have from time to time come under severe criticism from people who believe that our political system can be made more responsive to popular demands more equitable and more effective. One clarification asserts: "The American government today suffers from three weaknesses

- 1) its difficulty in generating sustained political power
- 2) its difficulty in developing a flow of imaginative informed consistent and power related responses to pressing national and world issues
- 3) its difficulty in making policy truly accountable to a national popular majority" ¹

If these implied goals were enunciated in the abstract few people would disagree with them assuming that they could be achieved at all or at a less than exorbitant cost. It is to the credit of critics of the party system that they have made suggestions recommending specific changes in specific institutions. A recent commentator has a list which includes recommendations 1) to centralize electoral campaign finance in the hands of national party leaders 2) to expand two party competition in Congressional elections by strengthening the role of the national (i.e. Presidential) party in campaign finance and other campaign

services 3) to enlarge the staffs of the party national committees and to create permanent advisory councils to the national committees 4) to build offices for the two major political parties on Federal land situated in Washington between the White House and Capitol Hill 5) to repeal the 22nd amendment to the Constitution which limits the President to two terms 6) to amend the Constitution so that Congressmen and Senators are always elected at the same time as Presidents 7) to centralize the Congressional parties by means of frequent party caucuses and effective policy committees and 8) to "find a mathematical formula for computing Congressional seniority which will give added weight to those legislators who come from competitive two party districts and states" 2

There is a kind of fascination to a list such as this one. Sweeping constitutional amendments and trivial building programs are suggested with equal seriousness. Machinery such as Congressional party caucuses is proposed which already exists but does not do the job contemplated by reformers. Other machinery such as the "mathematical formula" would undoubtedly do the job assigned to it but how would such machinery be put into effect? On this question reformers customarily are silent relying only on the extremity of the national "need" as they interpret it to evaporate any possible opposition to their schemes.

Taken all together the position of party reformers constitutes a coherent picture or view of the functions of a party system. The concreteness of their proposals makes it possible for others to examine them and to ask such questions as whether or not they will in fact accomplish the ends in view whether they can be achieved under the political conditions which prevail or whether changing these conditions would not lead to consequences more costly than the alleged mischiefs of the status quo. *This general view can also be compared and contrasted with an alternative view whose implications for party reform would diverge from the party reformers' ideal model.*

THE POLITICAL THEORY OF PARTY REFORM

There is a general political theory which is implied in the proposals of party reformers a theory that contains a conception of the proper function of the political party which evaluates the legitimacy and the roles of the Congress and the President and which embodies a particular definition of the public interest This theory is stated with greater or lesser elaboration by different advocates of reform some reformers leave out certain features of it and some are disinclined to face squarely the implications of the measures they espouse We shall try here to reproduce correctly a style of argument which though it ignores the slight differences separating party reformers one from another gives a coherent statement of the party reform theory and juxtaposes and contrasts it with the political theory which critics of the party reform position appear to advance³

Party reformers suggest that democratic government requires political parties which 1) make policy commitments to the electorate 2) are willing and able to carry them out when in office 3) develop alternatives to government policies when out of office and 4) differ sufficiently between themselves to provide the electorate with a proper range of choice between alternatives of action"⁴ Party reformers thus come to define a political party as "an association of broadly like minded voters seeking to carry out common objectives through their elected representatives"⁵ In a word party is based on policy

Virtually all significant party relationships are for reformers mediated by policy considerations The electorate is assumed to be policy motivated and mandate conscious Policy discussion among party members is expected to create widespread agreement upon which party discipline will then be based Pressure groups are to be resisted and accommodated only as the overall policy commitments of the party permit The weaknesses of parties and the disabilities of governments are seen as stemming from failure to develop and support satisfactory policy programs

pressure groups.¹⁰ While they suggest that there are in principle ways of judging whether a policy is in the public interest apart from the procedural test applied by supporters of consensus government these methods are never identified. This lack of concrete criteria spelling out the public interest would not present great difficulties if it were not for the fact that policy government advocates demand that an authoritative determination of party policy be made and that party members be held to it. Information about the policy preferences of members is supposed to flow upward and orders establishing and enforcing final policy decisions are supposed to flow downward in a greatly strengthened pyramid of party authority. Without criteria of public interest clearly in mind however the party leaders are in a position to define the public interest in any terms they find convenient.

It would be wrong to suppose that policy government advocates do not believe in the advisability of some compromise or that consensus government supporters do not recognize the necessity that the parties sponsor some policies and programs. Nonetheless each gives heavy stress to its own particular concern and admits qualifications only with reluctance. The respective positions are clearly a response to their adherents' deeply held views on the most basic needs of our times.

"In an era beset with problems of unprecedented magnitude at home and abroad" party reformers declare "it is dangerous to drift without a party system that helps the nation to set a general course of policy for the government as a whole."¹¹ The failure to establish policy government may well "lead to grave consequences in an explosive era."¹² Reformers seek to awaken the people to untold dangers that lie ahead to "growing public cynicism" that may lead to the "disintegration of the two major parties" and to the eventual destruction of constitutional government.¹³ It is no wonder that with the apparent need so great the supporters of policy government feel that a way must be

his readers "would impose a burden which politicians in a republican system could not be expected to bear" ¹⁸ In the same vein other advocates of consensus parties have argued "the day that some major elements completely desert one party in favor of the other the stage will have been set for the kind of conflict that leads to civil war" ¹⁹ But we are never told in detail why policy government would lead to severe social conflict under other than the most extreme conditions

THE BIAS BEHIND PARTY REFORM

It should be obvious that party reforms are generally not politically neutral. They are designed almost entirely to strengthen the President and to weaken Congress especially as Congress is presently constituted. More specifically reforms of the party system are generally designed to help Democrats and weaken Republicans. The reasoning is this: Republican Presidents represent a party generally unsympathetic to innovation and increased activity by the Federal government. Hence they will be inclined to ask less of Congress and thus they run less risk of being stymied by a recalcitrant Congress. Democratic Presidents on the other hand in behalf of the more liberal more activist and more innovative party ask much more of Congress and customarily have to settle for much less of what they ask.

It seems to us quite understandable that agitation for party reform which during the late 1940s so excited the liberal academicians who are its chief proponents died away to a whisper during the Eisenhower decade. Now once again frustrated liberals are taking up their cudgels in the cause of righteousness "responsibility, and Presidential prerogative. The underlying aim it seems to us is to speed up social changes that they desire by trying to rig the rules of the game more in favor of that political institution the Presidency which shares their policy preferences.

At the moment of course many rules of the game favor policies defending the political economic and social status quo

however we suggest that it is not some abstract (and unexplained) conception of equity which prompts this renewed plea for reform but rather the policy preferences of reformers. We are ourselves sympathetic to many—indeed perhaps most—of the social measures covertly advocated by party reformers. Rent supplements and the negative income tax are two examples. But as political scientists rather than political advocates, we think it proper to spell out the political implications of proposals such as those put forward by party reformers, and not pretend, as party reformers sometimes do that their suggestions are designed to make everyone happy.

IS BROAD-GAUGED PARTY REFORM POSSIBLE?

If we were to have parties that resembled the ideal of the party reformers what would they be like? They would be coherent in their policies reliable in carrying them out and accountable to the people sharply differentiated and in conflict with each other disciplined and hierarchical internally. Let us see then what it would take to create a party system of this kind.

For the parties to carry out the promises they make the people responsible for making promises would have to be the same as (or in control of) the people responsible for carrying them out. This means logically one of two alternatives. 1) either the people who controlled party performance all year round would have to write the party platforms at the national conventions or 2) the people who wrote the platforms would have to be put in charge of party performance. In the first case the party platforms would have to be written by leaders such as the Congressmen who presently refrain from enacting laws favored by both national conventions. State and local political leaders would write their respective platforms. Thus very little formal, overall coordination or policy coherence seems likely to emerge. Logically coherent unified policy is the main point of policy government because this is regarded by party reformers as the main method of mobilizing

public support for government and so we must reject the first alternative as a possible way to fulfill the demands of party reformers

In fact it is the second alternative which is most often recommended by advocates of policy government. National conventions must be newly arranged to make policy that will be enforced on national state and local levels by means of party discipline and the people who write the convention platforms must be put in charge. This arrangement also has a fatal defect. It ignores the power of the people who do not write the platforms. How are independently elected Congressmen to be by-passed? Will present day sectional and state party leaders acquiesce in this rearrangement of power and subject themselves to discipline from a newly constituted outside source? Generally we assume they will not. Getting politicians to exchange some political power for none is a task the magnitude of which has surely been underestimated. When reforms have to be carried out by those who would stand to lose the most from them their practicality is dubious. A Democratic Congressman has written of the institutional factors which in the House of Representatives make his party leaders shy of party cohesiveness. "The Democrats don't meet to talk things over to be persuaded to be sold. We don't meet in caucus because the Leadership fears that it would irreparably breach the tenuous links with the South. [House leaders] lead but they lead only because they win. If they cannot be certain of winning they don't want to go. Latent power negative power is so much better than power committed that lacks victory as a capstone. Hence the legislative timidity of the Congress. Hence the great time lags for consideration of legislation while the Leadership waits for the pressures to build. Hence the distaste for short cuts. distaste for battle just for the sake of battle. distaste for The Discharge Petition and for Calendar Wednesday and for the Democratic Caucus."

One reformer says "As for the clash of personal political ambitions in the United States they are being completely sub

merged by the international and domestic concerns of the American public. War and peace, inflation and depression are both personal and universal issues. Tariffs, taxes, foreign aid, military spending, federal reserve policies and hosts of other national policies affect local economic activities across the land. Politicians who wish to become statesmen must be able to talk intelligently about issues that concern people in *all* constituencies.²¹

But is it necessarily the case, as party reformers suggest, that the increasing importance of national issues will inevitably lead to placing greater power in the hands of party leaders with national (that is to say, Presidential) constituencies? There is no necessary connection between political power in the national arena and the national scope of issues. National political power may rest upon local control of nomination, alliances with locally based interest groups, and many other bases. Even if national issues become more important, this may only enhance the powers of the local interests best able to influence national policy.

The people who have the most to lose from party reforms are of course the leaders of Congress. As of now, the major electoral risks facing national legislators are local. This does not mean that they will necessarily be parochial in their attitudes and policy commitments. But it does mean that they are not necessarily bound to support the President or national party leadership on issues of high local saliency. In order to successfully impose discipline, the national party must be able either to control sanctions presently important to legislators, such as nomination to office, or to impose still more severe ones upon him. At the moment, our system provides for control of Congressional state and local nominations and elections by geographically localized electorates and party leaders. Presidents are not totally helpless in affecting the outcomes of these local decisions, but their influence is in most cases quite marginal.

In the light of this, one obvious electoral prerequisite of disciplined parties is that the local voters must be so strongly tied to national party issues that they will reward rather than penalize

their local representatives for supporting national policy pronouncements even at the expense of local advantage. The issues on which the national party makes its appeal must either unify a large number of constituencies in favor of the party or appeal at the least to some substantial segment of opinion everywhere. But even if this could be accomplished it would be strategically unwise for parties to attempt to discipline their members who lived in areas which were strongly against national party policy. This would mean reading the area out of the party. Thus reformers must show how they intend to contribute to the national character of political parties by enforcing national policies upon members of Congress whose local constituencies are drastically opposed to national party policy or whose constituents do not pay attention to issues but care more for the personality or the services of the Congressman.² Insofar as leeway exists let us say for Republicans in the Northwest to support public power and for Southern Democrats to oppose civil rights; the parties shall in fact have retained their old "undisciplined" "irresponsible" shape. Insofar as this leeway does not exist, splinter groups of various kinds are encouraged to split off from the established parties surely a consequence regarded as undesirable by most party reformers.

IS BROAD-GAUGED PARTY REFORM DESIRABLE?

An Appraisal of the Nomination Process

Although reform of the party system may be impractical this does not necessarily mean that it is undesirable. If we believed that such reform were a vital necessity we might still advocate it and hope that the unfolding of events would lead others to share our viewpoint. But we suspect that achievement of many of the specific objectives of party reformers would be detrimental to their aims and to those of most thoughtful citizens. Let us consider for example two specific reforms of governmental ma-

chinery commonly advocated in order to make the parties more responsive to popular will and more democratic, but which might well have the exactly opposite effects. Party reformers often advocate a variety of changes in the nomination process and modification or abolition of the Electoral College.

In order to evaluate the nominating process it would be helpful to suggest a set of goals which most Americans would accept as desirable and important.²³ The following six standards appear to meet this test. Any method for nominating Presidents should 1) aid in preserving the two-party system 2) help secure vigorous competition between the parties 3) maintain some degree of cohesion and agreement within the parties 4) produce candidates who have a likelihood of winning voter support, 5) lead to the choice of good men, 6) result in the acceptance of candidates as legitimate.

We may first look at some suggested alternatives to the system that presently relies so heavily upon decision making by party leaders at national conventions.

A national direct primary has often been suggested. This however would have serious disadvantages. It is quite probable that as many as ten candidates might obtain enough signatures on nominating petitions to get on the ballot. Nor would it be surprising if they divided the vote equally. The victor would then have to be chosen in a special run-off primary. By following this procedure the United States might have to restrict its Presidential candidates to wealthy athletes. No man without enormous financial resources could ever raise the millions required for the nominating petition, the first primary, the run-off primary, and the national election and no one who was not superbly conditioned could survive the pace of all these campaigns.

National primaries might also lead to the weakening of the party system. It is not unusual for a party to remain in office for a long period of time. If state experience with primaries is any guide a prolonged period of victory for one party would result in a movement of interested voters into the primary of the win-

ning party where their votes would count more.²⁴ As voters deserted the losing party it would be largely the die-hards who were left. They would nominate candidates who pleased them but who could not win the election because they were unappealing to a majority in the nation. Eventually the losing party would atrophy, thus seriously weakening the two-party system and the prospects of competition among the parties. The winning party would soon show signs of internal weakness as a consequence of the lack of opposition necessary to keep it unified.

A national primary might lead to the appearance of extremist candidates and demagogues who, unrestrained by allegiance to any permanent party organization, would have little to lose by stirring up mass hatreds or making absurd promises. A George Wallace might well find a fertile field in a national primary, an opportunity sufficient to raise the temperature of American politics to explosive levels even if he did not win. On the whole, the convention system rules out these extremists by placing responsibility in the hands of party leaders who have a permanent stake in maintaining the good name and integrity of their organization. Some insight into this problem may be had by looking at the situation in several Southern states where most voters vote only in the Democratic primary and where victory in that primary is tantamount to election. The result is a chaotic factional politics in which there are few or no permanent party leaders, the distinctions between the "ins" and "outs" become blurred, it is difficult to hold anyone responsible, and demagogues sometimes arise who make use of this situation by strident appeals.²⁵ The fact that under some primary systems an extreme personality can take the place of party in giving a kind of minimal structure to state politics should give pause to the advocates of a national primary.

We believe, in short, that widespread use of direct primaries would weaken the party system because only the wealthiest candidates could possibly enter a large number of them; they would encourage prospective candidates to bypass regular party organ-

system of nomination has been rejected since Andrew Jackson's time because it did not give sufficient representation to the large population groups whose votes were decisive in the election.²⁷ Furthermore the large fluctuations of party membership in Congress lead to serious difficulties. If a party happened to do very poorly for a few years in several sections of the country the representation in Congress from those areas would be small and they would in effect be deprived of a voice in nominating a President. Thus if Northern Democrats suffered a serious reversal one year the Southern members of that party would be in complete control. This nominating procedure would advertise itself as being national in scope but it would be far more likely than the present system to produce candidates with a limited sectional appeal. The attempts of leaders in areas where the party is weak to strengthen themselves by nominating a candidate who might help increase their vote would be stymied.

Perhaps it may be argued what is required is not some radically new method of nominating candidates but reform of some of the more obnoxious practices of the present system. High on the list of objectionable practices would be the secret gathering of party leaders in the smoke-filled room. Some liken this to a political opium den where a few irresponsible men hidden from public view stealthily determine the destiny of the nation.²⁸ Yet it is difficult to see who other than the party's leaders should be entrusted with the delicate task of finding a candidate to meet the majority preference. Since head-on clashes of strength on the convention floor usually do not resolve the question the only alternative would be continued deadlock, anarchy among scores of leaderless delegates splitting the party into rival factions or some process of accommodation.

Let us suppose that the smoke filled room were abolished and with it all behind the scenes negotiations. All parleys would then be held in public, before the delegates and millions of television viewers. As a result the participants would spend their time scoring points against each other in order to impress the folks

back home Bargaining would not be taking place since the participants would not really be communicating with one another No compromises would be possible leaders would be accused by their followers of selling out to the other side Once a stalemate existed it would be practically impossible to break and the party would probably disintegrate into warring factions

An extensive system of state primaries in which delegates were legally compelled to vote for the candidate who won in the state would lead to the disappearance of the smoke filled room without any formal action Since delegates could not change their positions there would be little point in bringing their leaders together for private conferences Sharply increasing the number of pledged delegates would introduce great rigidity into the convention because of the increased likelihood of stalemates which could not be overcome because no one would be in a position to switch his support

Much criticism has been leveled at the raucousness of demonstrations that take place on the convention floor while candidates are being nominated²⁹ Criticism of demonstrations on the grounds that they are unseemly and vulgar seem to us to be trivial There is no evidence which would substantiate a claim that the final decision is in some way worse than if demonstrations were banned

In still another way the demonstrations help meet the need of many delegates for an active function which they can perform³⁰ As in almost any large political gathering (the number of delegates and alternates were approximately 2,600 for the Republicans and 5,260 for the Democrats in the 1964 conventions) only a small number actively participate in planning strategy or in trying to influence other people The rest often find that they have no well-defined political role other than casting one vote out of many and they may feel at a loss to explain their lack of activity to themselves as well as to the people back home The demonstrations provide an opportunity for the delegate to enhance his feelings of importance by active participation in a

colorful event which he can recount when he returns. Since one of the advantages of the convention is to gather the party faithful and imbue them with a sense of belonging to a national party, a mechanism which increases the delegates' sense of satisfaction is by no means unimportant.

Undoubtedly the demonstrations have been overdone and might be cut short. This task can safely be left to the requirements of television. As the conventions of the last few years have shown, television dictates briefer demonstrations to retain the attention of the vast audience which the party would like very much to influence in its favor.

The convention, as we have said, aids party unity in a variety of ways. It provides a forum in which initially disunited fragments of the national party can come together and find common ground as well as a common nominee. The platform aids greatly in performing this function. In order to gain a majority of electoral votes, a party must appeal to most major population groups. Since these interests do not want the same thing in all cases, it is necessary to compromise and sometimes to evade issues which would lead to drastic losses of support. And since the parties must contain somewhat conflicting interests, internal accommodation is essential to avoid splits. A perfectly clear unequivocal consistent platform on all major issues presupposes an electorate and a party system which divides neatly and more or less evenly along ideological lines, and that is not the case in this country.

The concern of reformers with party platforms stems primarily from two assumptions: first, that there is a significant demand in the electorate for more clear-cut differences on policy; second, that elections are likely to be a significant source of guidance on individual issues to policy makers. Yet both these assumptions are either false or highly dubious. On a wide range of issues, leaders in both parties are much further apart than are ordinary members who in fact are separated by rather small differences.³¹ To the degree that party platforms do spell out clear and important differences on policy, and these were considerable in 1960 and

extraordinarily large in 1964 this probably results far more from a desire of party leaders to please themselves or from misinformation about what the voters desire than from any supposed demand from the electorate. In any event it is exceedingly difficult (if not impossible) to discover just what an election means in terms of the policy preferences of a majority. About all that one can expect from a platform is an indication of the general direction in which a candidate and the dominant factions in his party intend to go and the present party platforms do reasonably well in this respect.

Some critics object to the normal convention's stress on picking a winner rather than the "best man" regardless of his popularity. This doctrine is not compatible with the democratic notion that voters should decide who is best for them and communicate this decision in an election. Only in dictatorial countries do a set of leaders arrogate unto themselves the right to determine who is best regardless of popular preferences. An unpopular man can hardly win a free election. An unpopular President can hardly secure the support he needs to accomplish his goals. Thus popularity can be regarded as a necessary element for obtaining consent in democratic politics. Only if one assumes that it is the characteristic behavior of parties in a two party system to disregard their chances of winning does it make sense to speak of popularity in a derogatory way.

Although popularity is normally a necessary condition for nomination it should not be the only condition. The guideline for purposes of nomination should be to nominate the best of the popular candidates. But "best" is a slippery word. A great deal of what we mean by "best" in politics is "best for us" or "best represents our policy preferences" and thus can hardly be held up as an objective criterion. What is meant by "best" in this context are certain personal qualities such as experience, intelligence, and decisiveness. Nevertheless it is not at all clear that an extreme conservative would prefer a highly intelligent liberal to a moderately intelligent candidate who shared his conservative

policy preferences. Personal qualities are clearly subject to discount based on the compatibility of interests between the voter and the candidate.

Insofar as the "best man" criterion has a residue of meaning, we believe that it is possible to argue that the criterion has largely been followed in recent times. Looking at the candidates of both parties since 1940—Roosevelt, Truman, Stevenson, Kennedy, Johnson for the Democrats and Willie Dewey, Eisenhower, Nixon for the Republicans—there is not one man among them who could not be said to have had some outstanding qualities or experience for the White House. Without bothering to make a formal declaration of the fact, American political leaders and their followers have apparently agreed on at least one hidden requirement of availability. They have restricted their choice to those popular candidates who give promise of measuring up to the formidable task of the President as preserver of the nation and guardian of prosperity. The nominee whose sole virtue is his innocuousness or pleasant smile seems to have disappeared.

As usual, Goldwater presents a special problem because in many important ways he is a man of extreme views, something we have argued the present nominating process normally discourages. It is unlikely that any system of nomination—total primary, total convention, mixed or even action by Republicans in Congress—would have resulted in a different choice. For the nomination of Goldwater is, in part, the result of an underlying trend working since the New Deal period through which Republican activists have become separated in their preferences from Republican voters and from the electorate as a whole. It required only the temporary disarray of the moderate opposition for this trend to manifest itself in the visible presence on the ticket of Senator Goldwater. No system of nomination, indeed no political system, can be expected to forever run counter to the desires of the activists who have the most say about running it. It is not the convention system but the desires of the activist core of the Republican party that produced an exception to the rule in 1964.

It might be argued however, that the criterion of ability has been violated because nominations have come to be determined by popularity that is by expressions of mass preferences as reported in polls and state primaries.³² Merely defining the candidate who won the nomination as most popular is not sufficient to prove the thesis it must be shown that the voters agreed who was the most popular candidate that this was communicated to the delegates and that they nominated him. It would be hard to say that William Howard Taft, Warren Harding, Alfred Landon, Wendell Willkie and Thomas Dewey, to name a few, were indisputably the most popular Republican candidates (Goldwater was clearly an unpopular candidate). Dwight Eisenhower might fit in this category (though he had to fight for the nomination) but he represents just one case and is counterbalanced by the very popular Theodore Roosevelt's failure to obtain the nomination in 1912. There is no evidence to suggest that, among Democratic candidates, Woodrow Wilson was more popular than Champ Clark in 1912 that James M. Cox and John Davis fitted the most popular criterion or that Franklin Roosevelt could have been placed in that category with certainty before his first nomination. If any Democrat was most popular in 1952 it was Estes Kefauver and not Adlai Stevenson.

A surface view of the 1960 Democratic Convention might suggest that John F. Kennedy's nomination was due to an irresistible current of public opinion. When other factors are taken into account however this "mass popularity" thesis loses much of its force. To begin with, Kennedy's excellent organization was not matched by any other candidate. We must also take into account the difficulty which Democratic leaders would have faced in refusing the nomination to a Catholic who had won important primaries and whose defeat in the convention might easily have been viewed as a sign of religious prejudice which would damage the party's chances for years to come. Still a third factor operative in securing Kennedy's nomination is suggested indirectly by the 1960 Republican race for the Presidential nomination. We have

never discovered whether or not Nelson Rockefeller was more popular with the voting public than Richard Nixon because the latter had such strong support among party professionals that the former decided it was not worth running. A crucial difference between the two conventions was that there was no Democrat to oppose Kennedy who could claim a widespread preference among party leaders as was the case with Nixon in the Republican party.

Presidential primaries have also been subjected to much criticism. What we may ask is the overall effect of the primary in Presidential nominating politics? In theory the primary election is supposed to have the effect of bringing the nominating process to the people but in practice it does not work quite that way at all. What really happens in primary elections is governed by a number of contingencies not at all anticipated by those who advocate primaries as the solution to a variety of political problems.

First not all serious candidates run in primary elections. They may not want to run the risk although they are avowed candidates. They may not wish to tip their hand if they are not. They may not have the time to make what they regard as an adequate campaign or they may not be able to raise the money to do so.

Second many people do not vote in primary elections. These stay at home voters tend to be less well educated, less informed and less interested and less closely tied to regular party organizations. The voting in primary elections is in other words a rather imperfect representation of public sentiment.

President Truman after hearing the results of the 1952 New Hampshire primary which Estes Kefauver had just won without serious opposition referred to primaries (with unexpected mildness) as "eyewash." In this sense he was correct. Primaries are far from what their proponents would like them to be. But they do serve the useful purpose of providing politicians at national conventions with some information about the relative popularity of candidates in a series of admittedly artificial "trial heat" settings. Most often so it seems primaries kill off promising contenders before the convention. This at any rate seems to have

been the fate of Hubert Humphrey, who was a casualty in West Virginia in 1960 Harold Stassen who lost in Oregon in 1948 Wendell Willkie in Wisconsin in 1944 and Nelson Rockefeller in California in 1964 Kennedy's long shot parlay paid off in 1960 it is true but the rather discouraging example of Kefauver was the best recent historical evidence he had on the fate of primary winners

The primaries though held in different sections of the country and in different kinds of states are by no means a perfect representation of the electorate Another criticism of primaries is that they are held at widely separated intervals so that some candidates do not declare themselves in time to enter and others are exhausted by a grueling series of campaigns But if primaries were all held at the same time they would take on the aspect of a national primary with all its disadvantages and without the one great advantage of being open to all interested voters in the nation Candidates like Hubert Humphrey and Estes Kefauver could not have afforded the enormous expenditures required to put their views before the public in so many places at once

The conclusion we would draw is that the primaries together with other methods of delegate selection which give predominance to party activists provide one reasonably viable balance between popularity and other considerations which party leaders deem important Without denying an element of popular participation the decision is ultimately thrown into the hands of the men who ought to make it if we want a strong party system—the party leaders

For some critics the defects of conventions lie not only in their poor performance in nominating candidates but also in their failure to become a sort of "superlegislature" enforcing the policy views in the platform upon party members in the executive branch and Congress We have previously indicated that such enforcement is most unlikely to be achieved

Let us suppose nevertheless for the purposes of argument that the conventions could somehow become much more influ

ential on matters of national policy. How could either party retain a semblance of unity if the stakes of convention deliberations were vastly increased by converting the platform into an unbreakable promise of national policy? If one believes that an increase in heated discussion necessarily increases agreement, then the problem solves itself. Experience warns us, however, that the airing of sharp differences, particularly when the stakes are high, is likely to decrease agreement. For example, at the 1964 Republican Convention, Negro delegates, bitter about the defeat of Governor Scranton's proposed amendment on civil rights to the GOP education plank, held a protest march around the Cow Palace and, when Goldwater was nominated, announced that they would sit out the campaign.³³ Today, the choice of nominees at the convention is accepted as legitimate by all but a few delegates. The fact that platforms are not binding permits the degree of unity necessary for the delegates to stay long enough to agree on a nominee. By vastly increasing the number of delegates who would bitterly oppose platform decisions and who would probably leave the convention, the proposed change would jeopardize the legitimacy of its nominating function. Paradoxically, in such circumstances, the temptation to make the platform utterly innocuous so as to give offense to no one would be difficult to resist.

There are also good reasons for opposing the desires of those who love the conventions so well that they would like to see them convene once every year or two years. For without a Presidential candidate to nominate, they would have little to do. If the purpose of these meetings is to give free advice, there would seem to be little point to them. Congressmen are likely to pay as little attention to convention talk as they would to the pronouncements of any advisory committee that does not appreciate the context within which they operate. After all, Congressmen are subject to different risks and sanctions than are most delegates: get little help from the national party in securing nomination and election, and have no reason to be beholden to it for

suggesting policies which may get them into trouble. As they have uniformly decided in the past, Congressional leaders will probably refuse to participate in organizations whose policies they cannot control but whose proposals they are committed to support. The notion of getting delegates together under circumstances where their disagreements are certain to come out into the open merely for the purpose of making recommendations, does not seem promising. It is doubtful whether most delegates who could not be expected to take an active part in formulating proposals would feel it worthwhile to participate in a convention which lacked its major rationale and interest—the choice of a Presidential candidate.

Although we hope to have avoided the error of assuming that whatever is right the superiority of national conventions to the available alternatives is clearly demonstrable. Only the convention permits us to realize in large measure all the six goals—the two party system, party competition, some degree of internal cohesion, candidates attractive to voters, good men and acceptance of nominees as legitimate—which we postulated earlier would commonly be accepted as desirable. It is a rare occasion indeed that we fail to get good candidates rather than extremists who would threaten our liberties or convert our parties into exclusive clubs for party ideologists. Leaders are usually motivated to choose popular candidates who will help maintain vigorous competition between the parties but who are unlikely to split them into warring factions. As a matter of fact the two major party splits in this century occurred while an incumbent was securing his own renomination. The Progressive split in the Republican party which Theodore Roosevelt led against President Taft in 1912 and the revolt Dixiecrats led against President Truman in 1948 indicate that incumbent Presidents as hierarchical leaders are perhaps more prone to underestimate the costs of their actions to party unity than are the party leaders who are forced to bargain with one another in the smoke filled rooms.³⁴

The element of popular participation in the present nomination process is strong enough to impress itself upon party leaders but not sufficiently powerful to take the choice out of their hands. The convention is sufficiently open to excite great national interest but it is not led into perpetual stalemate by pseudo-bargaining in public. Voters have a choice between conservative and liberal tendencies—a choice which is not absolute because a two-party system can be maintained only if both parties moderate their views in order to appeal to large population groups in the country. In our view the very unusual experience of 1964 only serves to reinforce strongly this conclusion.

An Appraisal of the Electoral College

In the case of the Electoral College two proposals are offered. One would abolish the Electoral College outright and weigh votes everywhere equally. The net effect of such a proposal would be to undermine slightly the current strategic advantage enjoyed by populous two-party urbanized states. The second proposal would retain the apportionment of the Electoral College (which gives numerical advantage to the small rural states) but abolish the unit rule electoral vote (which operates strongly in favor of populous states). This proposal is most extreme in its import which would be to confer an additional political bonus upon states already overrepresented in positions of Congressional power.³⁵

The Constitution provides that each state regardless of its population shall be represented by an equal number of Senators. This means that the eight largest states with 54 per cent of the voters have just sixteen Senators. In the course of legislative proceedings these Senators can be canceled out by the sixteen votes of the Senators from the eight least populous states with less than 3 per cent of the voters. In the House of Representative Nevada has nearly fifteen times as much representation as it would have if representation were apportioned strictly accord-

ing to the number of voters and New York has only one sixth as much representation as it would have if voters were equally represented. Thus in elections for the House an average vote in Nevada has eighty five times as much weight as an average vote cast in New York, other things being equal.⁸⁶

We recognize the merit in allowing a rural minority to have at least some protection from their more numerous city brethren. But the fact that most of our people live in or near cities provides a sufficient reason to resist changes in the "balance of power" which would give greater weight to the needs and preferences of a dwindling rural population.

Any proposal to equalize the weight of voters would have to attack both the Presidential and Congressional problems simultaneously. To do otherwise would be to reduce the Presidential advantages of urban voters while maintaining the Congressional advantages of rural voters. If one problem is tackled before the other an imbalance might well be created that would be most difficult to correct. But that difficulty may shortly be dissolved. In a series of decisions beginning with *Baker vs Carr*, and extending through *Wesberry vs Sanders* and *Reynolds vs Sims*⁸⁷ the Supreme Court has set in motion a train of events that eventually should lead to gradual rearrangement of districts represented by members of the House of Representatives. These new districts are designed to come into closer accord with the principle of "one man one vote" and thus give greater weight in the House to presently underrepresented metropolitan areas especially the rapidly growing suburbs. Hence the major contemporary rationale for the retention of the Electoral College is slowly being removed. If rural, sparsely populated areas are no longer so grievously overrepresented in the House there is much less need to give metropolitan areas special advantages in the election of Presidents.

Allowing a majority (or plurality) of voters to choose a President has a great deal to commend it. This is the simplest

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Allowing a majority (or plurality) of voters to choose a President has a great deal to commend it. This is the simplest

method of all it would be most easily understood by the greatest number of people and it comes closest to reflecting intuitive notions of direct popular sovereignty through majority rule. But to end the matter there would be too simple minded. There is more than one political lesson to be learned by a closer examination of the Electoral College and available alternatives to it.

Some plans to change the Electoral College would have greater effect than others on the rural urban balance in national politics. The outright abolition of the Electoral College and the substitution of the direct election of the President would certainly reduce the importance of the larger states. It would not however completely obliterate urban influence. A vote is a vote wherever it is found and more votes will continue to be found in the cities. But the one party states would take on a new importance. In some states where one party's organization is nonexistent large majorities for the other party are easier to turn out at election time and special rewards would be forthcoming for party leaders who could provide a large margin of victory for their candidate. The emphasis would not be on which candidate is going to win already a foregone conclusion but by how many votes he is going to win.

In two party states however voters are cross pressured in many ways and a candidate can seldom count on defeating his opponent by a very large margin. The emphasis again is on the difference in popular vote between the two candidates and states which are able to provide large differences are more likely to be rewarded. For example in 1960 Senator Kennedy won in Illinois by 6 000 votes but in Louisiana his margin was 170 000 votes. If Kennedy had distributed his gratitude in proportion to his popular margin the "Solid South" would have risen once again to play an extremely significant role in Democratic Presidential politics. Let us examine 1960 as the latest example of the usual operation of Presidential elections and 1964 as an unusual instance of how this difference effect works.

The table on p. 245 shows the extent in 1960 to which

Southern States Yield a Greater Difference in Popular Votes for the Winner Than Do Larger States

(Large states and Southern states ranked together in order of the margin of votes given to the winner of each state 1960)

<i>State</i>	<i>Two Party Voting Population</i>	<i>Margin for Winner</i>
Massachusetts	2 462 680	511 680
New York	7 258 901	404 535
Ohio	4 151 051	269 445
Louisiana	610 740	170 414
Georgia	647 853	155 615
Pennsylvania	4 907 002	130 158
Alabama	523 829	73 699
Tennessee	1 025 051	73 073
North Carolina	1 352 914	66 092
Michigan	3 299 448	65 134
Texas	2 157 086	45 264
Virginia	759 757	40 503
Mississippi	173 531 (votes for unpledged Electors excluded)	33 269
Arkansas	367 413	31 881
Florida	1 494 073	28 321
New Jersey	2 747 614	22 454
California	6 425 262	13 160
South Carolina	383 835	8 139
Illinois	4 741 093	6 397

Southern states despite their smaller size yielded a harvest of popular votes for the winner comparable to that of the large states. Only New York, Ohio and Massachusetts led all the Southern states in popular vote margins delivered to the winner of the state while at the other extreme ten of the eleven Southern states exceeded the large states of Illinois, California and New Jersey in popular vote margins. This table confirms our expectation that the large two-party states would not be wholly

eclipsed by doing away with the Electoral College but it is also apparent that the one party states such as those of the South could expect to become a great deal more important in the calculations of party leaders and Presidential candidates especially Democrats

However in 1964 an election which overturned numerous political axioms the margin for Johnson was greatest in the larger urbanized states and least in the small Southern states The reason for this exception is obvious The Southern states were the only ones with a sizable minority to whom Goldwater's stand on civil rights appealed Johnson won dramatically in all other areas In effect the South became an area of two-party states and the North of one party states for the duration of that single election If a man is going to win as easily as Johnson did he is going to bury normal divisions in the popular vote as handily as he buries his opponent

But 1964 was unusual in normal elections in the past the South has delivered lop-sided Democratic majorities Yet curiously the rise of the South is precisely what many Electoral College reformers want to prevent They are horrified at the spectre of unpledged Southern Electors throwing a Presidential contest into the House of Representatives They apparently take no comfort from the inability of the South to make good its threat both in 1948 and again in 1960 And they are particularly slow to recognize that these repeated Southern failures occur primarily because of the unit rule of the Electoral College not in spite of it Reformers are attempting to do away with the very system which helps to prevent the election of the President by one party states To change the present manner of electing the President would play directly into the hands of the Southern states and other one party states as well

Another proposal once embodied in the unsuccessful Lodge Gossett Resolution is seen by some reformers as an acceptable "compromise" between outright abolition of the Electoral College and its retention³³ In this scheme the electoral vote in each state

Southern States Yield a Smaller Difference in Popular Votes for the Winner Than Do Larger States

(Large states and Southern states ranked together in order of
the margin of votes given to the winner of each state 1964)

<i>State</i>	<i>Two Party Voting Population</i>	<i>Margin for Winner</i>
New York	7 166 015	2 669 597
Pennsylvania	4 818 668	1 457 336
California	7 050 985	1 292 769
Massachusetts	2 344 798	1 236 695
Michigan	3 203 102	1 076 463
Ohio	3 969 196	1 027 466
New Jersey	2 846 770	903 828
Illinois	4 702 000	890 887
Texas	2 026 811	704 619
Mississippi	409 038	303 856
Alabama ¹	689 817	268 353
North Carolina	1 424 983	175 292
Tennessee	1 144 046	126 082
Louisiana	896 293	122 157
Georgia	1 139 157	94 043
South Carolina	524 748	93 348
Arkansas	560 426	70 933
Virginia	1 042 287	70 704
Florida	1 854 481	42,599

Unpledged Democratic Electors

is split between the candidates according to their proportion of the popular vote. This is not a compromise but the most extreme "reform" of all. Under this system large urban two-party states would no longer be able to deliver large blocs of electoral votes to the winning candidate in the state. In fact, the electoral vote in two-party states would be quite evenly divided between the two candidates, neither one receiving more than a margin of two or three electoral votes. Hence the bargaining position of these

states at national conventions would be drastically reduced and Presidential nominees would begin to follow a different strategy in their campaigns giving special attention to those states in which they felt a large difference in electoral votes could be obtained.

Once again the proposed reform throws the emphasis on the amount of difference within the state between the winner and the loser. In this case however it is the electoral votes of the states which are divided rather than the popular votes. This effectively cancels out the advantage of the large states. The fact that the Electoral College underrepresents the large states in the first place even further reduces their influence. The following table shows how under normal political conditions the large states are in effect neutralized by proposals to divide the electoral vote proportionally between the candidates. There is no point in dealing with the special case represented by 1964 because the Democratic victory was so overwhelming that it is difficult to imagine a remotely democratic method of recording votes that would have altered the outcome.

Larger States Lose Influence When Their Electoral Vote Is Split

Electoral vote advantage given to the winning candidate

State	<i>Under present system</i>	<i>If electoral votes were split proportionately in 1960</i>
New York	45	475
California	32	664
Pennsylvania	32	864
Illinois	27	627
Ohio	25	16
Texas	24	48
Michigan	20	4
Massachusetts	16	32
New Jersey	16	128

The reduction in influence suffered by the large states under this proposal might mean in effect that the overrepresentation of sparsely populated and one party states in the Congress would entirely dominate the national lawmaking process unchecked by a President obliged to cultivate urban and two party constituencies

Most of the current criticisms of the Electoral College come about because it is claimed that majority rule is endangered. People ask "Isn't there something inherently wrong with a system which makes it possible for a President to be elected by something less than a majority of the American electorate?" Twelve times in our history a President of the United States has been elected by a majority of the Electoral College but by less than a majority of the popular vote. Three times the winner received fewer popular votes than the loser. Those who believe in majority rule deplore these facts and want to change our Constitution accordingly. On the whole we favor the rule of the majority. We believe, however, that most people tend to forget the extent to which our Constitution is in fact designed to thwart majority rule.

In our form of government majority rule does not operate in a vacuum but within a system of "checks and balances." The President, for example, holds a veto power over Congress which if exercised requires a two thirds vote of each House to override. Treaties must be ratified by two thirds of the Senate and amendments to the Constitution must be proposed by two-thirds of Congress or of the state legislatures and ratified by three fourths of the states. Presidential appointments in most cases must receive Senatorial approval. The Supreme Court passes upon the constitutionality of legislative and executive actions. Involved in these political arrangements is the hope that the power of one branch of government will be counter balanced by certain "checks" from another, the result being an approximate "balance" of forces. In the past the Electoral College had its place within this system. Originally designed to check popular majori-

ties from choosing Presidents unwisely the Electoral College provided a "check" on the overrepresentation of rural states in the legislative branch by giving extra weight to the urban constituencies of the President

Majority rule should be placed in proper perspective by considering other aspects of democratic government such as the principle of political equality We want majority rule but we also want all sectors of the population to have an equal voice in government Overrepresentation of rural interests in Congress inhibited political equality To check this inequality we had to either alter the circumstances which promoted such inequality or provide some other means of preventing rural interests from dominating the political system Now that the method of determining the composition of Congress is undergoing change we can consider abolishing the Electoral College and turn to majority (or plurality) voting in electing Presidents Other things being equal, a simpler and more direct method is preferable to a device that has outlived its usefulness

Party Differences and Political Stability

The case for the desirability of party reform often rests on the assumption that American political parties are identical that this is confusing and frustrating to American voters and that it is undesirable to have a political system where parties do not disagree sharply

We would suggest rather that there are enough differences between the political parties to give voters a choice but that many wide policy differences between the parties would be undesirable from the standpoint of the stability of the political system The parties could well be somewhat further apart on a few issues however without necessarily decreasing the stability of the system Our conceptual tools are too rough to say much about small departures from the existing situation let us consider only extreme changes of the kind advocated by the proponents of policy government

Imagine for a moment that the two parties were in total and extreme disagreement on every major point of public policy. One group would appease the USSR the other would court nuclear war. One group would stop Social Security the other would expand it drastically. One group would raise tariffs the other would abolish them entirely. Obviously one consequence of having clear cut parties with strong policy positions would be that the costs of losing an election would skyrocket. If parties were forced to formulate coherent full-dress programs and were forced to carry them out "responsibly," then people who did not favor these programs would have no recourse. Clearly their confidence in a government whose policies were not to their liking would suffer and indeed they might feel strongly enough about preventing these policies from being enacted to do something drastic like leaving the country, or not complying with governmental regulations or in an extreme case seeking to change the political system by force. This bear in mind assumes a more or less even distribution of extreme opinions in the population which is unrealistic what really happens is that nobody votes for the unpopular side.

In fact we have a political system that is kind to losers. Why? Because both Presidential parties usually agree on a wide variety of issues because people other than the President have to pass on policies before they are enacted by law and these people are not bound by the Presidential platform.

This is we suggest not necessarily a bad thing. Suppose that each major political party were composed solely of people who supported it because and only because it represented their views on a wide range of policies. The surface attractiveness of this idea diminishes rapidly once we consider the consequences. The most immediate results would be extraordinary instability in the party system. For as soon as people changed their minds or the party changed its position vast numbers of its adherents would leave. Great swings in party strength might take place leaving the minority party on occasion virtually without repre-

sentation. Who then would take on the burdens of party opposition? Who would take the lead in introducing rival policies to compete for public favor?

The existence of a one party system would be the least of our troubles. What would be the point in building up a party organization if it were doomed to come tumbling down with every significant change of opinion? None at all. So the function of nominating and electing candidates would become a matter for shifting groups of individuals varying from issue to issue and place to place. Naturally those groups with the best organizations, the most money, and the greatest interest in the policies of the day would predominate. No longer would it be possible to use party identification as a shortcut as a means of reducing information costs about candidates. Unless voters spent most of their time finding out precisely what officeholders were doing, they would have little idea how to vote. Nevertheless their votes might be more important to them because the dizzying alternation of policy would have created such political chaos as to disrupt normal patterns of life. We need go no further to make the point that the existence of a hard core of party adherents who do not easily switch party allegiance from year to year provides an element of stability for the party system and thus for the whole political system as well. Paradoxically the attempt to make issues all important as a means of increasing the rationality of public decisions greatly decreases the chances for making any sort of meaningful decisions at all.

Party platforms written by the Presidential parties should be understood not as ends in themselves but as means to obtaining and holding public office. It would be strange indeed if one party found policies like Social Security and unemployment compensation to be enormously popular and yet refused to incorporate them into its platform.¹¹ This would have to be a party of ideologues who cared everything about their pet ideas and nothing about winning elections. Nor would it profit them much

since they would never get elected and never be in a position to do something about their ideas. Eventually ideologues have to make the choice between pleasing themselves and pleasing others.

Actually, party platforms do change over a period of time in a cyclical movement. The differences between the parties may be great for one or two elections until innovations made by one party are picked up by the other. The net change from one decade to the next however is substantial. Let us begin when platforms are more or less alike. Their similarity begins to give way as it appears that certain demands in society are not being met. The minority party of the period senses an opportunity to gain votes by articulating and promising to meet these demands. The majority party reluctant to let go of a winning combination resists. In one or two elections the minority party makes its bid and makes the appropriate changes in its platforms. Then in the ensuing elections if the party which has changed its platform loses it drops the innovation. If it wins however and wins big the other party then seeks to take over what seem to be its most popular planks and the platforms become more and more alike again.

We can see this cycle clearly in the New Deal period. The 1932 Democratic platform though hinting at change was much like the Republican especially in its emphasis on balancing the budget. A great difference in platforms could be noted in 1936 as the Democrats made a bid to consolidate the New Deal and the Republicans stood pat. The spectacular Democratic triumph signaled the end of widely divergent platforms. By 1940 the Republicans had concluded that they could not continue to oppose the welfare state wholesale if they ever wished to win again. By 1952 the parties had come much closer to one another as the Republicans adopted most of the New Deal. Though the platforms of the major parties were similar to each other in both 1932 and 1952 the differences between 1932 and 1952 for either party were enormous.⁴⁰

Sometimes reformers deplore what they regard as an excessive amount of mud slinging in campaigns but also ask that differences among the major parties be sharply increased in order to give the voters a clear choice. The two ideas are incompatible to some extent. It would be surprising indeed if the parties disagreed more sharply about more and more subjects in an increasingly gentlemanly way. A far more likely outcome would be an increase in vituperation as the stakes of campaigns increased: passions rose, tempers flared, and the consequences of victory for the other side appeared much more threatening than had heretofore been the case. The 1964 campaign is a good case in point.

Those who claim American elections are a fraud and wish to see great things decided in these contests all the time often point to Great Britain as a shining example of the right way to do things. There in that wiser country where the fires of class warfare are held (fortunately) to burn more fiercely, the voters have real choices. They vote a government in or out, and the victorious party goes about making great changes in order to carry out its mandate.

This tale may be a pretty one according to one's taste for conflict, but it is quite exaggerated. The truth is it occurs every once in a great while, much as American party platforms present sharp and profound differences about that often. Such was the case in 1945 when the Labour Party staged its great bid to bring the full welfare state to Britain and to nationalize what it could. The overwhelming Labour victory did its work. The Conservatives soon decided to adopt all the most popular parts of the Labour Party program—medicare, increased pensions—and left Labour holding the unpopular bag of nationalization. By 1955 the two major parties in Britain were presenting much the same program. By 1958 the only difference we could find was that Labour offered sixpence more on the pension. Most of the time in fact in Britain as in the United States the great parties lean toward the undivided middle.⁴¹

The Labour Party's reaction to the problem of nationalization is instructive. The party was reluctant to leave behind its heritage in this respect nor was it certain that this issue alone caused its electoral defeats after 1950. Nevertheless it moved however painfully away from a strident position on the subject. There were pleas from those who put ideological consistency first and felt that the lesson to be learned from each defeat was to propose more of the same. Parties do not usually choose to die in this way however and Labour politicians who hoped one day to gain office won out over their more ideologically inclined colleagues. Indeed since regaining office in 1964 the Labour Party leadership has carefully avoided a showdown in Parliament over nationalization of industry.

IS PARTY REFORM RELEVANT?

Even if reform were successful and the political system did not suffer detrimental effects such as we have outlined many of the problems at which reform is aimed still would not be closer to solution. Thus it can be argued that the achievement of party government is beside the point.

Can we say for example that the present system shows marked or widespread party incoherence in Congress? This is perhaps an overstated problem for in fact, on roll call voting party allegiance is the strongest cohesive force in Congress. It has been demonstrated that party is stronger than other bases of allegiance stronger than sectionalism rural versus urban native versus foreign born.¹¹ Party cohesion depends to be sure on the nature of the issue. On the organization of Congress itself and on patronage matters each party is aligned 100 per cent against the other. Defense policies and appropriations usually show wide spread agreement among members of both parties a situation which is widely regarded as desirable. Some issues like race relations may split each of the parties down the middle. On the economic and welfare issues where the general label of liberal

upon the President for guidance in a fantastically complicated world where our personal experience rarely proves a reliable guide. Perhaps this is why the President's popularity rises sharply whenever he acts in an international crisis even in cases like the invasion of Cuba and the Suez crisis which were from our point of view disasters.⁴³ Rather than seeing danger in our President's being thwarted by hostile Congresses the more likely danger is that few except the President will have much to say about the most vital foreign policy decisions which may have to be made in a terribly short time.

Perhaps the most significant area with impact on foreign policy in which some contradiction among party policies appears is in the area of tariffs.⁴⁴ The United States seeks the stability of nations like Japan, on the one hand and sets up tariff barriers which may help undermine this stability on the other. Interests which find themselves disadvantaged seek a sympathetic hearing in Congress where members are less attuned to foreign policy considerations than is the President.

It would not in any event be surprising if governments were concerned about protecting the interests of domestic industries to some extent. Looking at nations like Britain, France and Germany whose governments can command automatic support in parliament we find that they are also interested in protecting their domestic industries and the workers who depend on them. The negotiations on the Common Market made this abundantly clear. If party government let us say on the British model were suddenly to appear in the United States there would still be the necessity of bargaining with interests within the majority party and no one doubts that the impact of tariff levels on industry would have to be considered. The United States has for the most part, been moving toward a tariff position more consonant with its foreign policy objectives. At least we have done no worse than other democratic nations with different party systems.

There is an unfortunate tendency to blame the American decentralized party system for all sorts of things which cannot

properly be laid at its door. In 1960 after the U-2 incident blew up the summit meeting in Paris, many recriminations were voiced about the lack of coordination in Washington. Wasn't it terrible, these critics cried, that in this crisis we were let down by our fragmented political system which permitted so many spokesmen to go off in different directions? A careful review of these events reveals however, that the charges were wholly erroneous. The problem was not at all one of lack of coordination. Just the opposite. All the responsible officials were following whatever instructions they had. The trouble was that these instructions turned out to be poor ones. The apparent inconsistencies, the clumsy efforts to cover up, resulted from the defective instructions. "Lack of coordination" presumably means that the officials involved all went their separate ways without regard to what the President wanted. It cannot properly be taken to mean that they did badly because the central directions they followed turned out not to be appropriate.

When we turn to Great Britain where policy government has long been established, we do not find that ability to command a certain majority in the House of Commons helps Prime Ministers solve foreign policy problems better than Presidents. Her Majesty's Government is in at least as much turmoil as ours because its problems are as difficult. The Prime Minister may be better able to disregard criticism but this is not necessarily an advantage.

The most notorious example of failure of democratic leadership in recent times comes not from the United States but from Great Britain. There in the 1930's Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain led their country to the brink of ruin when they failed to inform the people of the growing danger of Nazi Germany partly because they thought their people were profoundly pacifist and would defeat them at the polls. These men were patriots who wished their country well; they had devoted their lifetimes to its service. Had they realized the full implications of their actions (or failures to act) they undoubtedly would have done otherwise. Uncertain as to the course of events, prone to

underestimate the fury of their foes abroad they allowed themselves to be swayed by the notion that the people would not stand for the truth no matter how essential that truth was Surely the existence of a cohesive party system with sharp policy differences between the parties did nothing to avoid this disaster If any thing party cohesion permitted Baldwin and Chamberlain to proceed with impunity against the attacks leveled by Churchill and others who vainly sought to alert the nation So strong was party unity that it took the calamitous events of 1940 threatening the very existence of the nation, to bring about a change in government

Policy government is not however irrelevant for purposes of domestic politics and we will want to define more precisely its likely impact But before we proceed in this direction it is necessary to modify the policy government proposals so that they are more defensible For so long as its proponents insist that the parties be both popular and extremely far apart on many policies the contradictions in this approach do grave damage to the consistency and validity of their proposals Let us agree to modify the reformers proposals by stating that the major Presidential parties should be able to propose coherent policies to the electorate and to carry them out after they assume office regardless of whether their policies are or are not similar

Now we are in a position to write a sort of profit and loss statement on what would be involved in the realm of domestic politics if policy government were instituted The benefits would accrue almost entirely to liberals (and the interests they represent) with superior access to the President who would have a better chance of securing the enactment of the welfare and civil rights measures they prefer Conservatives would stand to lose their power and their policy preferences as their Congressional bastion was weakened if not rendered wholly useless Liberals in Congress would gain more of their preferred policies at the cost of losing Congressional power Where the present system enables them to maintain their power as Congressmen while achieving some of

strongholds in the cities candidates who will make a career out of service in Congress rather than regarding their service as a stepping stone toward a judgeship or some other such position. There is no need for conservatives to enjoy their present superiority of seniority, skill, and dedication. (3) greater attention by national party leaders in the distribution of Congressional committee positions so that liberal majorities on crucial committees may be more readily achieved. The recent success at the start of the 88th Congress in permanently expanding the House Rules Committee and putting men favorable to welfare legislation on House Ways and Means and Appropriations Committees are good examples of what might be done. (4) development of strategies which show the mass of people, especially urban people, the stake they have in welfare legislation and which bring home to them the importance of presenting their views to their Congressmen. No doubt it seems easier to talk blithely about a revolution in the party system than to actually do something to increase the support which the mass of people give to legislation which is presumed to benefit them. Action in any one or all of these directions would, in our opinion, do more to secure welfare legislation than talk about policy government or taking actions which are bound to be futile. Knowing what we know now, in 1967, we can well understand why the clamor for Congressional party reform has died down after the 89th Congress passed an enormous amount of the legislation that liberals had tried so hard to get in the 1940's and 1950's. The major reason these bills passed was that the Democrats were able to elect an extraordinary majority (particularly in the House) in 1964. Indirectly, of course, Barry Goldwater's candidacy was responsible for putting enough liberal Democrats in Congress to virtually complete the New Deal. It should also be said, however, that years of effort begun half a decade before that altered the composition of crucial Congressional committees was also important in securing this result.

To summarize: Most of the reforms suggested by students

of the party system are we believe designed to give greater power to liberal Presidents to enact their domestic programs and to diminish correspondingly the power of Congress. For the conduct of foreign affairs these changes would we believe be largely irrelevant. With respect to the stability and inclusiveness of the two major parties themselves the reforms might well be detrimental owing to the encouragement they might well give to splinter parties. And finally we observe that the case for party reform has certainly not been made. The enunciation of large national problems does not in and of itself demonstrate the linkage of these problems to the party system. The prescription of reforms does not in and of itself provide the strategy or the power or the inducements to carry them out. Until these key links in the argument are forged the advocacy of party reform will continue to be an academic exercise appealing to the frustrations of unsophisticated audiences but without practical effect.

NOTES

1 Stephen A. Bailey, *The Condition of Our National Political Parties* (New York 1959) p. 3

2 *Ibid.* pp. 12-18

■ There are many examples of the party reform school of thought. See for example Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional Government* (Boston 1889) Henry Jones Ford, *The Rise and Growth of American Politics* (New York, 1898) A. Lawrence Lowell, *Public Opinion and Popular Government* (New York, 1913) William MacDonald, *A New Constitution for a New America* (New York 1921) William V. Elliott, *The Need for Constitutional Reform* (New York, 1935) ■ E. Schattschneider, *Party Government* (New York, 1942) Henry Hazlitt, *A New Constitution Now* (New York, 1942) Thomas A. Finletter, *Can Representative Government Do the Job?* (New York 1945) James M. Burns, *Congress on Trial* (New York 1949) Committee on Political Parties, American Political Science Association, *Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System* (New York, 1950) Bailey, *The Condition of Our National Political Parties* and James M.

ing to achieve their desired ends only by entering into cooperation with other participants in the system by making coalitions

What sorts of behavior are encouraged in a system which requires coalitions? Coalitions mean bargaining. Participants must give something in order to get something. Those who start out with the most resources to give have an advantage. But skill also counts. The prizes tend to go to those individuals and groups who are skilled in using whatever resources they have to put together and maintain coalitions. They help themselves by finding ways in which the interests of others may also be served.

The most conspicuous problem that American political parties face is to achieve a record of advocacy and accomplishment in public policy while harmonizing the interests of Presidential and Congressional wings.

The parties that convene at the national conventions do not contain the same roster of personnel, the same coalitions of interests, or the same majorities as the parties that meet in Congress. These two different types of parties, though they bear the same party labels, represent different constituencies and perspectives. The national conventions are weighted according to the winning strategy dictated by the Electoral College. Congress is still somewhat weighted according to the overrepresentation in state legislatures (which determines the shape of Congressional districts) of rural interests,¹ according to the constitutional rule giving each state two Senators regardless of population, and according to the rules of seniority that govern the House and Senate and which tend to favor one party areas. This explains why, for example, the conservative wing of the Republican party, though dominant in that party in Congress for many years, had for many years until 1964 failed to nominate a candidate of its own choosing at the *Republican National Convention*. The difference on the Democratic side between the two party coalitions was made abundantly clear in 1956 when Senator Estes Kefauver defeated Senator John Kennedy for the Vice Presidential nomination in the convention and lost to the man from Massachusetts in the

Senate a few months later in a contest for a place on the prestigious Foreign Relations Committee. Obviously the same interests and considerations were not decisive in the national convention and the Senate.

Even when a President and a Congressional majority bear the same party identification it may be and often is necessary in a Presidential election campaign to adjust their varying interests on particular policies. This is done through bargaining and the creation of a coalition including interests represented in both Congressional and Presidential parties.

Although the lack of cohesion and discipline attributed to American parties can be overemphasized, it is true that on many major policies the President cannot rely on support from the full complement of his party in Congress but must seek the support of at least some members of the other party. Thus inter-party coalitions are necessary and common in American national politics.

Power within Congress is fragmented and dispersed. Bits and pieces of influence are scattered unequally to be sure among committee chairmen, appropriations subcommittees, the Speaker of the House, the House Rules Committee, the Senate majority and minority leaders, the President's lobbyists, and others. How is legislation passed and defeated then if it is not done by a central body of cohesive leaders who are able to enforce their will on Congress?

Legislative policy is approved or rejected by building a majority coalition through a process of bargaining and the proposal of objectives appealing to a wide variety of interests. A series of bills may contain attractions for all; concessions may be offered; log rolling may be attempted; and other bargaining techniques used. If the identical majority were required to pass every piece of legislation, however, and the diversity of interests in Congress prevented agreement on a comprehensive legislative program, the American political system could lead to stalemate and go the way of the French Fourth Republic. Actually, legislation in the vari-

ous policy areas often requires somewhat different coalitions. Legislative politics therefore is largely concerned with constructing coalitions appropriate to each set of policies.

The President does not have sufficient power to accomplish all his purposes and those the nation sets for him by issuing orders. He must obtain the support of others. Congress holds the vital power of the purse and the general legislative authority which the President needs. But much of the time he cannot either help or harm legislators because they are nominated and elected in their own constituencies at the local and state levels. Consequently to get some of the things he wants the President may have to trade some top-level appointments and make policy concessions to influential interests in Congress or to interest groups or local party leaders who can exert influence in Congress.

Power is also fragmented and dispersed in the executive branch. Parts are held by bureau chiefs, department heads, interest groups, members of Congress, party leaders, coordinating committees, the Executive Office, independent regulatory commissions and of course by the President himself. With no central authority to dictate decisions, administrative politics require the formation of coalitions among the many dispersed centers of power.

"This does not mean," a contemporary student of the Presidency says, "that Presidents are powerless." If that were true they would have nothing with which to bargain. They do have a veto, powers over foreign policy and the armed forces, some executive authority and other resources at their disposal. "It does mean though that Presidential power must be exercised *ad hoc* through the employment of whatever sources of support whatever transient advantages can be found and put together case by case."²

We may achieve some perspective on the American situation by noting how it differs from British and French experience. In Great Britain the major parties form their coalitions of interests

to say that our elections transmit unerringly the policy preferences of electorates to leaders or confer mandates upon leaders with regard to specific policies

It is easy to be cynical and expect too little from elections or to be euphoric and expect too much from them. A cynical view would hold that the United States was ruled by a power elite—a small group outside the democratic process. Under these circumstances the ballot would be a sham and a delusion. What difference can it make how voting is carried on or who wins if the nation is actually governed by other means? On the other hand a euphoric view holding that the United States was ruled as a mass democracy with equal control over decisions by all or most citizens would enormously magnify the importance of the ballot. Through the act of casting a ballot it could be argued a majority of citizens would determine major national policies. What happened at the polls would not only decide who would occupy public office it would also determine the content of specific policy decisions. In a way public office would then be a sham because the power of decision in important matters would be removed from the hands of public officials. A third type of political system—a pluralist one in which numerous minorities compete for shares in policy making within broad limits provided by free elections—has more complex implications. It suggests that balloting is important but that it does not often determine individual policy decisions. The ballot both guides and constrains public officials who are free to act within fairly broad limits subject to anticipated responses of the voters and to the desires of the other active participants.

In fact it is evident from our description of coalition politics that the American political system is of the pluralist type. Public officials do make major policy decisions but elections matter in that they determine which of two competing parties holds public office. In a competitive two party situation such as exists in American Presidential politics the lively possibility of change

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provides an effective incentive for political leaders to remain in touch with followers

But it would be inaccurate to suggest that voters in Presidential elections transmit their policy preferences to elected officials with a high degree of reliability. There are few clear mandates in our political system owing to the fact that elections are fought on so many issues and in so many incompletely overlapping constituencies. Often the voters elect officials to Congress and to the Presidency who disagree on public policies. Thus as we shall show mandates are not only impossible to identify but even if they could be identified they might well be impossible to enact because of inconsistency in the instructions issued to officials who must agree on legislation.³

Presidential elections are not referenda. The relationship between Presidential elections and policies is a great deal subtler than the relations between the outcomes of referenda and the policies they pertain to. In theory the American political system is designed to work like this: two teams of men, one in office, the other seeking office, both attempt to get enough votes to win elections. In order to win they go to various groups of voters and by offering to pursue policies favored by these groups hope to attract their votes. If there were only one office-seeking team their incentive to respond to the policy preferences of groups in the population would diminish; if there were many such teams the chances that any one of them could achieve a sufficient number of backers to govern would diminish. Hence the two party system is regarded as a kind of compromise between the goals of responsiveness and effectiveness.

The proponents of a different theory would say that elections give the winning party a mandate to carry out the policies proposed during the campaign. Only in this way they maintain is popular rule through the ballot meaningful. A basic assumption in their argument is that the voters (or at least a majority of them) approve of all or most of the policies presented by

the victorious candidate. No doubt this is plausible but not in the sense intended because as we have seen a vote for a Presidential candidate is usually merely an expression of a party habit and particular policy directions are not necessarily implied in the vote. Most voters in the United States are not ideologically oriented. That is they do not see or make connections among issues. They do not seek to create or to adopt coherent systems of thought in which issues are related to one another in some logical pattern. If this is the case then voters can hardly be said to transmit preferences for particular policies by electing candidates to public office.

Other basic objections to the idea that our elections are designed to confer mandates on specific public policies may also be raised. First the issues debated in the campaign may not be the ones in which most voters are interested. These issues may be ones which interest the candidates which they want to stress or which interest segments of the press but there is no necessary reason to believe that any particular issue is of great concern to voters just because it gets publicity. Time and time again voting studies have demonstrated that what appear to be the major issues of a campaign turn out not to be significant for most of the electorate. In 1952 for example three great Republican themes were Communism, Korea and corruption. It turned out that the Communism issue given perhaps the most publicity had virtually no impact. Democrats simply would not believe that their party was the party of treason and Republicans did not need that issue to make them vote the way they usually did. Korea and corruption were noticeable issues.⁴ Yet how could anyone know in the absence of a public opinion poll which of the three issues were important to the voters and which constituted a mandate? There were in any event no significant policy differences between the parties on these issues—Democrats were also against Communism and corruption and also wanted an end to the war in Korea.

A second reason why voting for a candidate does not neces

to tell us much about specific issues. Some people vote on the basis of a candidate's personality. Others follow a friend's recommendation. Still others may be thinking about policy issues but may be all wrong in their perception of where the candidates stand. It would be difficult to distinguish the votes of these people from those who know care and differentiate among the candidates on the basis of issues. We do know, however, that issue-oriented persons are usually in a minority while those who cast their ballots with other things in mind are generally in the majority.

Even if there is good reason to believe that a majority of voters do approve of specific policies supported by the victorious candidate, the mandate may be difficult or impossible to carry out. A man may get elected for a policy he pursued or preferred in the past which has no reference to present circumstances. One could have voted Republican because Dwight Eisenhower ended the war in Korea but this does not point to any future policy that is currently in the realm of Presidential discretion. "Corruption" in 1952 was a kind of issue where there was really no way of carrying out a supposed mandate other than determining to be honest, a course of action we may be pardoned for believing that Adlai Stevenson would have followed as well. John F. Kennedy promised in 1960 to get the nation moving. This was broad enough to cover a multitude of vague hopes and aspirations. More specifically, as President Kennedy may dearly have wished to make good on this promise by increasing the rate of growth in the national economy, but no one was quite sure how to do this. Lyndon Johnson was able to make good many of his 1964 campaign promises on domestic policy, but saying he would be more responsible than Goldwater did not constitute a viable future policy for Vietnam.

Leaving aside all the difficulties about the content of a mandate, there is no accepted definition of what size electoral victory gives a President special popular sanction to pursue any particular policy. Would a 60% victory be sufficient? This is rarely

achieved Does 55 seem reasonable? What about 51 or 52 however or the cases in which the winner receives less than half of the votes cast? And is it right to ignore the multitudes who do not vote and whose preferences are not directly being considered? One might ignore the nonvoters for the purpose of this analysis if they divided in their preferences between candidates in nearly the same proportions as those who do vote But they often don't In practice this problem is easily solved Whoever wins the election is allowed to pursue whatever policies he pleases within the substantial constraints imposed by the rest of the political system This, in the end is all that a "mandate" is in American politics

EXTREMISM

Among the most important things accomplished by a political system like ours is that it discourages the most extreme alternatives knowing that policies which would outrage significant groups in the country would result in a stream of protests leading to loss of the next election the party in power is restrained from the worst excesses For people in countries like America or Great Britain this may be difficult to appreciate precisely because they rarely have occasion to witness these extremes extreme policies are effectively ruled out by the party system and free elections This is not so everywhere and we can get an insight into what is possible when the ultimate restraint of free elections is missing Imagine that in 1956 the United States repudiated its national debt on the ground that it was inflationary Suppose that ten years previously our government had confiscated about nine tenths of all savings by issuing new currency worth only a tenth of the old No doubt there would have been riots in the streets petitions galore furious political participation by millions of formerly inactive citizens and a complete change of government as soon as the election laws allowed Can we conceive of a situation in which our government would ship millions of tons of

wheat abroad while millions of our own people were starving? All these extreme policies have been pursued by the Soviet Union. We are more fortunate than we know if we can say that it is difficult or impossible to imagine extreme policies like these being carried out. Indeed, it is hard to imagine that anyone in a responsible position would think of such policies let alone attempt to promulgate them. Here we come to a key point. No one thinks about these things seriously because everyone understands that they simply could not be done.

Extreme policies are discouraged in a more subtle way. Free elections discourage persons with extreme views from running for office because possible allies of such people know that they can not win and that if they do their victories will last only until the next election. Extremists deprive too many people of too many of their preferred policies to win office easily. Thus we find that would be Presidential aspirants do not get far if they are known publicly to hold bigoted views about racial or religious minorities or if they have done or said things which suggest that they are extremely hostile to large population groups such as laborers or small businessmen. Moreover those who do attain office and wish to enjoy its benefits find that compromise and conciliation bring greater rewards than hostility and intransigence. The political system conditions those who accept the rules of free elections to moderate behavior.

PARTY COMPETITION AND POLICY

Aside from casting extremists out beyond the pale, free elections and a two party system operate to bring governmental policy roughly in line with intense public preferences over a reasonable span of time. Through the trial and error of repeated electoral experiences, party leaders discover that certain policies must be excluded and others included if they are to have any hope of winning. The "out" party has a built in incentive to propose policies more popular than the "in" party in order to assume office.

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And the "in" party is highly motivated to respond by adopting the policy itself or by proposing others which it believes may be even more popular. Party competition for votes brings public policy into accord with private preferences. This calculus of support is far from precise: it is necessarily based more on hunch and guesswork at any point in time than on hard facts. Party leaders undoubtedly have a number of policies which they know they must include or exclude such as Social Security and veterans benefits. Beyond that, however, they face considerable uncertainty in determining which policies will prove to be the most popular with the largest number of voters who are in a position to help them. Policies themselves may break down, subjecting proponents to charges of ineffectiveness. There may be consequences of consequences which turn what once looked like a good thing into a disaster. John Kennedy might have been helped by a successful Cuban invasion but how was he to know that it would turn into a rout? And how could he tell that a Soviet attempt to install missiles would enable him to act decisively and recoup his fortunes? President Johnson has found it possible to do much more than previous Presidents to improve relations with Communist countries in Eastern Europe. Yet the Vietnam war has certainly created all sorts of additional difficulties in dealing with the Soviet Union. So much for the effectiveness of the policy. How about the perhaps more difficult problem in our system of discovering whether particular policies are so widely preferred as to aid one's political fortunes?

Opinion polls may help the politician, but there are always lingering doubts as to the polls' reliability. It is not certain in any event that they tell the political leader what he needs to know. People who really have no opinion may give one just to satisfy the interviewer. People who have an opinion but who care little may be counted equally with those who are intensely concerned. Many people giving opinions may have no intention of voting for some politicians who heed them, no matter what. The result may be that the politician will get no viable support.

from a majority who agrees with him but instead he will get complaints from an intense minority which disagrees. The people who agree with him may not vote while those who differ may take retribution at the ballot box. Those who are pleased may be the ones who would have voted for the public official anyway. And unless the poll is carefully done it may leave out important groups of voters, overrepresent some, underrepresent others, and otherwise give a misleading impression. Other methods of determining voter sentiment are bound to be even more unreliable. Who knows whether opinions expressed in newspaper editorials or a mail campaign are representative of the majority of the voting populace?

Let us turn the question around for a moment. Suppose a candidate loses office. What does this tell him about the policies he should have preferred? If there were one or two key issues widely debated and universally understood, the election may tell him a great deal. But this is seldom the case. More likely there were many issues and it was difficult to separate out those which did or did not garner support for his opponent. Perhaps the election was decided on the basis of personality or some events in the economic cycle or a military engagement—points which were not debated in the campaign and which may not have been within anyone's control. The losing candidate may always feel that if he continues to educate the public to favor the policies he prefers, he will eventually win out. Should he lose a series of elections, however, his party would undoubtedly try to change something—policies, candidates, organization, maybe all three—in an effort to improve its fortunes.

Let us suppose that a candidate wins an election. What does this event tell him and his party about the policies he should prefer when in office? He can take it on faith that the policies he proposed during the campaign are the popular ones. Some were undoubtedly rather vague, and specific applications of them may turn out quite differently than the campaign suggested. Others may founder on the rock of practicality; they sounded

fine but they simply could not be carried out. Conditions change and policies which seemed appropriate but a few months before turn out to be irrelevant. As the time for putting policies into practice draws near the new officeholder may discover that they generate a lot more opposition than when they were merely campaign oratory. And those policies he pursues to the end may have to be compromised considerably in order to get the support of other participants in the policy making process. Nevertheless if he has even a minimal policy orientation the newly elected candidate can try to carry out a few of his campaign proposals seeking to maintain a general direction consonant with the approach that may—he cannot be entirely certain—have contributed measurably to his election.

Let us summarize. The role of Presidential elections has been found to be very important in keeping our political system open and competitive and in keeping public officials responsive to the preferences of a variety of interests in the general population. However outcomes of these elections cannot by themselves transform the political system nor can they register precisely all the nuances of policies preferred by the general public. In spite of this our system of coalition politics operating within and among the two parties, the President, Congress, state parties and interest groups does provide a kind of substitute for specific mandates by the electorate.

In the American political system both inside and outside of formal government it is necessary to receive multiple agreements and clearances from actors (bureaucrats, interest groups, legislators, the President) variously situated, having somewhat different roles to play and values to defend in order to put new policies into effect. Alternatives which are fed into the political system and emerge as decisions are brought forth in a variety of ways and all sorts of strategies and resources can be mobilized and focused on political decisions by interested parties. It is a system which encourages stability and discourages extremism which sharply limits the choices available to the general public.

in the interests of finding agreement on only two alternatives either of which can govern effectively. Very few people are perfectly satisfied with this framework within which our Presidential elections are held but even fewer have devised ways of making the system better without simultaneously making it worse.

NOTES

1 *Wesberry vs Sanders Reynolds vs Sims* and the wave of reapportionment of state legislatures they set off may be expected to modify this condition somewhat over the next decade.

2 Richard Neustadt "The Presidency at Mid-Century" *Law and Contemporary Problems* 21 (Autumn 1956) 614.

3 This parallels in many respects an argument to be found in Robert A. Dahl *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago 1956).

4 Angus Campbell Philip Converse Warren E. Miller and Donald Stokes *The American Voter* (New York 1960) pp 525-527.

5 An excellent popular treatment of this set of alternatives is contained in Richard Frylund *100 Million Lives* (New York 1962).

■ See Dahl *A Preface to Democratic Theory* pp 124-131.

Appendices A & B

Bibliography

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Appendix A

1968 PRESIDENTIAL PRIMARIES *

March 12	New Hampshire
April 2	Wisconsin
April 23	Pennsylvania
April 30	Massachusetts
May 7	District of Columbia
May 7	Indiana
May 7	Ohio
May 14	Nebraska
May 14	West Virginia
May 28	Oregon
May 28	Florida
June 4	California
June 4	New Jersey
June 4	South Dakota
June 11	Illinois

In addition Alabama and New York hold primaries to vote for unpledged convention delegates. Texas election law does not provide for Presidential primaries but nothing in the law prohibits a political party from distributing an extra primary ballot sheet on which voters could indicate their Presidential preference. Neither state committee has yet determined whether it will conduct such a preference poll in 1968.

Appendix B

CONVENTION DELEGATES AND THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE 1964 AND 1968

State	Convention Delegates				Electoral Votes	
	Republican		Democratic ^a		1964	1968
	1964	1968	1964	1968		
Alabama	20	26	38		10	10
Alaska	12	12	12		3	3
Arizona	16	16	19		5	5
Arkansas	12	18	32		6	6
California	86	86	154		40	40
Colorado	11	18	23		6	6
Connecticut	16	16	43		8	8
Delaware	12	12	22		3	3
Florida	34	34	51		14	14
Georgia	24	30	53		12	12
Hawaii	8	11	25		4	4
Idaho	14	14	15		4	4
Illinois	58	58	114		26	26
Indiana	32	26	51		13	13
Iowa	24	24	35		9	9
Kansas	10	20	27		7	7
Kentucky	24	24	34		9	9
Louisiana	20	26	46		10	10
Maine	14	14	16		4	4
Maryland	20	26	48		10	10
Massachusetts	34	34	69		14	14
Michigan	48	48	92		21	21
Minnesota	26	26	50		10	10
Mississippi	13	20	24		7	7

Convention Delegates

State	Republican		Democratic ^a		Electoral Votes	
	1961	1963	1961	1963	1961	1963
Missouri	21	21	53		12	12
Montana	14	14	17		4	4
Nebraska	16	16	19		5	5
Nevada	0	12	22		3	3
New Hampshire	14	8	15		4	5
New Jersey	40	40	77		17	17
New Mexico	14	14	26		4	4
New York	92	92	179		43	43
North Carolina	26	26	53		13	13
North Dakota	14	8	15		4	4
Ohio	58	58	99		20	20
Oklahoma	22	22	30		8	8
Oregon	18	17	24		6	6
Pennsylvania	64	61	125		20	29
Rhode Island	14	14	27		4	4
South Carolina	16	22	38		8	8
South Dakota	14	14	15		4	4
Tennessee	28	28	40		11	11
Texas	50	56	99		25	25
Utah	14	8	16		1	4
Vermont	12	12	12		3	3
Virginia	30	24	42		12	12
Washington	24	24	35		0	9
West Virginia	14	14	37		7	7
Wisconsin	30	30	46		12	12
Wyoming	12	12	15		3	3
Canal Zone			5		0	0
District of Columbia	9	9	16		0	3
Guam			3		0	0
Puerto Rico	5	5	8		0	0
Virgin Islands ^b	3	3	5		0	0
TOTAL	1 308	1 333	2 316		538	538
Needed to nominate	655	667	1 159			
Needed to elect					270	270

^a Figures for the 1968 Democratic National Convention are not available at this time

^b Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are entitled to participate in the National Conventions but not in the Presidential election

ander Heard's *The Costs of Democracy* (Chapel Hill NC 1960) and Eugene H Roseboom's *A History of Presidential Elections* (New York 1957) Among the more popular works on the 1960 campaign are Theodore H White's *The Making of the President 1960* (New York 1961) and Harry Ernst's *The Primary that Made a President West Virginia 1960* (New York 1962) Both of these works are highly readable and contain a wealth of illustrations and anecdotes More scholarly studies of the 1960 campaign include Herbert E Alexander's *Financing the 1960 Election* (Princeton 1962) his *Responsibility in Party Finance* (Princeton 1963) and Sidney Kraus ed *The Great Debates* (Bloomington 1962) which provide both facts and competent analysis of two important and controversial aspects of that struggle The official record of the campaign the words of the candidates themselves is in Report 994 Parts I II and III 87th Congress, 1st Session, U S Senate (Washington 1961) entitled respectively *The Speeches of Senator John F Kennedy Presidential Campaign of 1960* *The Speeches of Vice President Richard M Nixon Presidential Campaign of 1960* and *The Joint Appearances of Senator John F Kennedy and Vice President Richard M Nixon Presidential Campaign of 1960* Two other useful analyses of the 1960 campaign are Paul T David, ed *The Presidential Election and Transition 1960-1961* (Washington 1961) and Eric Sevareid ed *Candidates 1960* (New York 1959) On the 1964 campaign see Robert D Noval *The Agony of the G O P 1964* (New York 1965) Richard H Rovere *The Goldwater Caper* (New York, 1965) Theodore H White *The Making of the President 1964* (New York, 1965) and Milton C Cummings Jr *The National Election of 1964* (Washington, 1966) Finally a dissection of one type of argument frequently used in political campaigning is contained in Aaron B Wildavsky's "The Intelligent Citizen's Guide to the Abuses of Statistics The Kennedy Document and the Catholic Vote" in Polsby Dentler and Smith *Politics and Social Life* pp 825-844

Paul T David, Ralph M Goldman and Richard C Bains *The Politics of National Party Conventions* (Washington 1960) gives a voluminous historical treatment of Presidential nominating conventions See also Nelson W Polsby and Aaron B Wildavsky's "Uncertainty and Decision Making at the National Conventions" in Polsby Dentler and Smith, *Politics and Social Life* pp 370-389 and Gerald Pomper *Nominating the President The Politics of Convention Choice* (Evanston, Ill 1963) For material on specific conventions see Paul Tillett ed *Inside Politics The National Conventions 1960* (Dobbs

Ferry NY 1962) and Paul T David, Malcolm C Moos and Ralph M. Goldman *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952* Vols I-V (Baltimore 1954) Information on the formal aspects of the nomination and election process can be found in *Nomination and Election of the President and Vice President of the United States Including the Manner of Selecting Delegates to National Political Conventions* House Document #332, 86th Congress 2nd Session (Washington 1960) and, with the same title Senate item #998 (January 1964)

Finally materials on the actual election results can be found in Richard M Scammon, ed. *America Votes* Vols I-V (New York, 1956-62) and, with analytical comments in Malcolm C Moos *Politics Presidents and Coalitions* (Baltimore 1952)

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